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Abstract: 
 
This  thesis  examines  the  influences  on  the  Stoics‟  development  of  their  material 
principle. The thesis argues that the reasons for the Stoics‟ conceiving of a material 
principle as they did actually have their origins in metaphysical speculation rather 
than physics.  
 
While  the  natural  philosophy  of  the  Ionians,  as  interpreted  by  Aristotle  and  his 
followers,  no  doubt  furnished  the  intellectual  background  for  a  persisting  material 
substrate  of  all  sensible  change,  it  is  in  fact  the  concerns  of  Plato  and  his  early 
followers with the non-sensible that exert the strongest influence on the Stoics.  
 
The  thesis  examines  the  concepts  of  space  and  matter  in  the  Timaeus  ultimately 
rejecting  this  work  of  physics  as  central  to  the  development  of  Stoic  thought  on 
matter. Rather it is the metaphysical doctrines of Plato and his successors, and the 
use they make of an incorporeal matter, that exerted the greatest influence on the 
Stoics and their material principle. The interpretation of Platonic metaphysics argued 
for in the thesis, based on the Unwritten Doctrines and the Old Academy‟s teachings, 
challenges the majority opinion of the English speaking community; and as a result 
offers a novel understanding of the relationship of Stoicism to Platonic metaphysics.   
 
The thesis concludes that it is likely that the early Stoics developed their doctrine of 
a material substrate in the particular way they did because of the tendency in the 
Old Academy to simplify the doctrines of Plato. This simplifying tendency comes to a 
head in the early Stoics with the ultimate reduction of the Old Academic system of 
hypostases, making use of active and passive principles at various levels of reality, 
finally ending in one level of reality and a simple two principle system.  
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Introduction: 
 
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold: firstly to examine and explain the influence of 
Old Academic ontology on the early Stoics - Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus – and 
its relationship to their particular understanding of the material principle – the apoios 
ousia.  Secondly,  and  in  order  to  achieve  the  first  aim,  to  re-examine  Plato‟s  late 
physics in light of the teachings of two of his students (Speusippus and Xenocrates) 
and in light of the Unwritten Doctrines as reported by Aristotle. In  answering the 
question of what is responsible for the world‟s materiality and corporeality I will look 
at the interpretations and uses made by the Stoics‟ predecessors of the concept of a 
material principle as an “out of which”. In looking at matter it is impossible to avoid 
discussions  of  the  Stoics‟  other  principle  –the  active,  or  god.  The  two  are  closely 
related  and  so  while  the  focus  of  the  thesis  is  matter  there  will  necessarily  be 
discussion  of  matter‟s  concomitant  in  the  analysis  of  Chrysippus‟  predecessors‟ 
philosophies and the nature of this relationship will prove key to our understanding. 
It  will  be  shown  that  it  is  likely  that  the  main  influence  on  the  Stoics  for  their 
development and characterisation of prime matter, so familiar to our minds, can be 
found  primarily  in  the  teachings  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates;  hence  matter,  as 
conceived by the Stoics, will be shown to be the culmination of a legacy starting with 
the  mathematical  metaphysics  of  the  Pythagoreans  and  reaching  them  via  the 
incorporeal principles of Plato.  
 
There are numerous candidates for the main influence on the Stoics‟ development of 
their two principles, the active and passive bodies that constitute the universe and all 
that  is in it, and  the  relationship  that  holds between  them:  1)  The  pre-Socratics, 
especially  Heraclitus
1. This is the influence the early Stoics themselves indicated 
most  strongly  but  has  been  convincingly  challenged  by  Long
2.  2)  The  written 
teachings of Plato, especially the Timaeus – an influence accepted positively by Long 
and Sedley: “His (Chrysippus‟) borrowings from the Timaeus are obvious.
3” 3) The 
Unwritten  Doctrines  and  their  interpretation  in  the  Old  Academy  –  specifically 
Speusippus  and  Xenocrates:  the  view  to  be  argued  for  in  this  thesis.  4)  Zeno‟s 
reported teacher at the Academy: Polemo. A position argued for strongly by Sedley 
                                                 
1 Aristotle is our main source of information about the pre-Socratics but there is no reason to suppose that 
this was the case in the Hellenistic period. The access the Stoics had to Heraclitus‟ work will be discussed 
in chapter four.  
2 Long  1996a.  
3 Cf. L&S vol. 1, p. 278.  8  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
in his “The Origins of Stoic God.” 5) Aristotle‟s writings on the subject, especially the 
Metaphysics and Physics. This view is forcefully argued by Hahm
4, and accepted to a 
lesser degree by Long
5, but argued just as vociferously against by Sandbach
6.  There 
is also  the  suggestion   of  influence  from  the  Near  East  and  Semitic tradition, a 
possibility discussed by Hahm
7 but in the end rejected through lack of evidence. I will 
not, therefore, entertain this possibility as it has already been sufficiently discussed 
and lacks any significant plausibility.  
 
The first option, that of influence through the pre-Socratic tradition, will be discussed 
at the end of the thesis as , while their materialistic theories undeniably have many 
resonances  with  Stoicism ,  the  idea  of  them  as  a  sign ificant  influence  on  the 
philosophical development of Stoicism seems unlikely. Not, though, for the reasons 
given by Curd
8  that neither Plato nor Aristotle paid much attention to Heraclitus , 
since,  on  the  contrary ,  he  seems  to  have  been  a  strong  influence  on  Plato‟s 
epistemology and a major driving factor behind his ontology and was certainly seen 
as  a  significant  thinker  by  Aristotle
9; but rather because the relationship of early 
Stoicism to Heraclitus is more of retrograde ascription by them of their theories onto 
Heraclitus in  order  to  support  their  theories  by  appeal  to  venerable  antiquity
10. 
However, since “influence” does not simply mean “adoption” the discussion of pre-
Socratic theories, and Heraclitus in particular, will help to place the main theme of 
the thesis in the context of the intellectual development of philosophy in the post-
Socratic environment
11.  
   
Option two, that it is primarily through the written work of Plato and especially the 
Timaeus that the Stoics‟ physics developed, was championed indirectly in antiquity 
by Antiochus of Ascalon and in modern times, as noted above, by Long and Sedley. 
Since  the  Timaeus  was  probably  the  most  influential  work  on  cosmology  from 
                                                 
4 Hahm 1977.  
5 Long 1998. 
6 Sandbach 1985. On pg. 16 he draws the parallel to Xenocrates suggesting that if we possessed as much 
of Xenocrates as we do of Aristotle that we could show a strong connection between him and the Stoics – I 
do not think that we need his entire corpus to show this and his influence on the Stoics will be argued for 
in chapter three.  
7 Op cit. p. 219. An interesting digression given Zeno‟s connection with the East, and Heraclitus‟ cf. fr. 14 
D = CXV Kahn = Clement Protrepticus 22.2. 
8 Curd 1993, p. 62.  
9 Indeed in both the  Theaetetus and Cratylus Heraclitus himself is spoken of favourably, and Aristotle 
discusses his epistemology at length as well as looking favourably upon his ethics.  
10 The conclusion reached by both Curd (1993), Long (1996a) and Barnes (2002).  
11 Chapter four will discuss the strong similarities that exist between what we know of Heraclitus and Stoic 
physics. It is, in my opinion, a similarity of coincidence that once recognised brought the Stoics to 
Heraclitus rather than them building on his work.  9  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
antiquity through to the time of Galileo
12 a large section of this thesis will be spent 
examining  its  do ctrines  which  are  related  to  Plato‟s  principles  (archai)  and  its 
suggestion of a material principle – the elements and the Receptacle. The primary 
discussion  of  the  Timaeus  will  follow  a  mostly  traditional  interpretation.  It  will  be 
seen that a traditional interpretation, even allowing for such major disputes as the 
nature of the Receptacle and principle of motion in the pre-cosmic chaos, leaves the 
Timaeus too far removed to have played the significant and direct role looked for 
here  in  the  development  of  the  Stoics‟  material  principle,  though  its  doctrines 
concerning  the  world-soul  will  be  seen  to  resemble  the  Stoics‟  active  principle 
strongly and so is likely to have been an influence in this respect. Instead it will be in 
conjunction with other written works of Plato that the physical aspect of the Timaeus 
must  be  understood.  The  physics  of  the  Timaeus  will  be  shown  to  be  only  fully 
explicable by appeal to Plato‟s metaphysics. I will, thus, be challenging the position 
of Algra
13 and Guthrie
14 who see each written work of Plato as a self-contained work 
internally sufficient. It is at this point that those who accept Platonic influence on the 
early Stoa usually halt their exegesis; Long and Sedley
15, Solmsen
16, Lapidge
17, and 
Longrigg
18, to name but a few, all accept Platonic, and some Peripatetic, influence on 
the Stoics but leave it up to the written works – the direct words of Plato - to explain 
the relationship of Academy to Stoa.  
 
This brings me on to option three: the Unwritten Doctrines and the first two heads of 
the  Old  Academy;  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates.  The  Unwritten  Doctrines  have  not 
enjoyed the favour of the academic community in the English speaking world as they 
have in the German. However it is one of the main contentions of this thesis that the 
works of Plato, and those of his successors, cannot be properly understood without 
recourse to these. Algra
19 has two objections to the Unwritten Doctrines: 1) that the 
controversy surrounding them is not resolved, so that extended reference to th em 
adds nothing to an understanding of Platonism; 2) That each dialogue of Plato stands 
alone as a self-contained piece of work so we do not need to appeal to “external” 
information to understand them, though he does not deny that knowledge of other 
                                                 
12 As Van Winden (1975, pg. 1) says: “Among the dialogues of Plato none has made a greater impact 
upon the centuries of human thought than the Timaeus”.  
13 Algra 1995, p. 75. 
14 Guthrie 1967-81, IV, p. 324.  
15 L&S 1987. 
16 Solmsen 1968-82. 
17 Lapidge 1973. 
18 Longrigg 1975.  
19 Ibid.  10  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
dialogues (while not vital) would aid understanding of another. The second concern I 
take to simply be false; instead each dialogue is not a stand alone comprehensive 
work but merely the most basic introduction, made available to whet the appetite of 
young philosophers, and that the important part of the teaching was taking place in 
discussion
20.  In  support  of  this  we  have  Plato‟s  seventh  letter,  which  states  that 
written works are not  the place to  find knowledge
21. If we also take into account 
Plato‟s  knowledge  and  evident  attraction  to  Pythagorean  philosophy  then  there  is 
another  reason  to  suspect  that  the  written  works  do  not  tell  the  whole  story  of 
Platonic  thought
22. Pythagoreanism is  notorious  as a  mystery cult which allegedly 
went so far as to kill a member for “religious heresy”, while I would not suggest that 
Plato would take such extreme action it seems to me more than likely that he too 
was  attracted  to  the  idea  of  intellectual  exclusivity  and  elitism  –  publishing  one‟s 
entire philosophy does not make much sense in light of that. As for the controversy 
surrounding the status of the Unwritten Doctrines this is really only a modern one
23. 
The successors to Plato: Aristotle, Speusippus and Xenocrates, all clearly took them 
seriously. I take both Speusippus and X enocrates to be both in essence following 
                                                 
20 A position dismissed by Gill (1993) but accepted by Dillon (1996, pg. 338). 
21 “But this much I can certainly declare concerning all these writers, or prospective writers, who claim to 
know the subjects which I seriously study, whether as hearers of mine or of other teachers, or from their 
own discoveries; it is impossible, in my judgement at least, that these men should understand anything 
about this subject. There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith…I 
am certain, that the best statement of these doctrines in writing or in speech would be my own statement” 
341b-c  (Trans.  Bury.  My  italics)  (cf.  341e).  Although  the  authenticity  of  the  letter  is  debateable  it  is 
among the most likely to be authentic and a any rate seems to represent Plato‟s thought reasonably well 
and so while it cannot be taken as definitive proof of his thought it can be taken as an indicator of it. 
Besides, the passage just quoted is supported by the Republic where it says that philosophy is only “for 
the few” (Rep 494a) so the exoteric works are unlikely to contain the whole truth.  As Gill (1993) points 
out, though he rejects  this  position, other texts  often cited in support of Plato‟s desire to keep some 
learning back are Phaedrus 275a6-b2 and Republic 533a. Gill (1993) rejects this position (held by Krämer, 
1967) on the basis that Plato did not actually think that the Unwritten Doctrines answered any questions 
more fully than his written work and that, in essence, their publication was unnecessary. Whatever the 
truth of this it cannot be doubted that in the eyes of his successors Plato‟s written words held a privileged 
place and that is almost more important than the status Plato meant them to have.   
22 It seems that Plato only really became acquainted with Pythagoreanism after his trip and so after the 
early dialogues had been written. Algra‟s and Guthrie‟s opinion thus stands up, in my opinion, with regard 
to those dialogues written before Plato‟s trip – the early dialogues. But I am primarily concerned with the 
dialogues which are generally thought to post-date his visit and which indeed show a marked change from 
the early dialogues.  Cf. the seventh letter, 338c, for his friendly relations with the prominent Pythagorean 
Archytas of Tarentum, and 339a for his friendship with Archedemus. He also refers to the Tarentines as 
his “comrades” at 339e, is he here aligning himself with the Pythagoreans who were dominant in this city? 
Sayre (2005), Allen (1977), Ryle (1966), Ferber (1992) and Gill (1993) all accept to some extent the 
notion  that  the  written  works  of  Plato  are  not  exhaustive  of  Plato‟s  thought  and  that  the  Unwritten 
Doctrines have an independent status worthy of attention for informing our understanding of Plato. In 
Findlay‟s (1974, pg. x) opinion: “A study of Plato which confines itself to the letter of the Dialogues, such 
as has been attempted by most scholarly interpreters in the past two centuries, has ended up by stripping 
Plato of his philosophical dignity and interests, has set him before us as a brilliant, but basically frivolous 
player-about with half-formed inconsistent notions and methods.” He builds on the work of Robin (1908) 
and suggests that the Unwritten Doctrines provide us with “what Plato really thought.”  
23 Allen (1977) argues strongly for the relationship of the 15
th century Platonist revival of Ficino with the 
reports of the Unwritten Doctrines vis-à-vis the Lecture on the Good.  11  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Plato‟s direct, oral, teaching
24, which is why they appear to be teaching things quite 
different from what we find in the Platonic corpus.  I will be looking at the role that 
the Indefinite Dyad plays in the systems  of Speusippus and Xenocrates since it is 
from their innovations and interpretations of this that the Stoic material principle has 
its origins. Speusippus and Xenocrates are no more materialistic than their teacher; 
however the role of the Indefinite Dyad in their systems is much more clearly that of 
an ekmageion and akin to “matter” and so to the Stoic position than anything found 
explicitly in Plato. Xenocrates in particular will be shown to have discussed things in 
a manner very sympathetic to Stoic tastes, adapting Plato‟s bottom up – top down 
approach to reality
25. Taking the Unwritten Doctrines from Aristotle and comparing 
them to the known teachings of Speusippus and Xenocrates and to what we find in 
the Platonic corpus should suffice to anchor Aristotl e‟s reports accurately. As for the 
teachings  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates  we  are  fortunately  not  relying  solely  on 
Aristotle, but also have the reports of the Platonist Plutarch and Academic Sceptic 
Cicero,  whom,  we  may  assume  had  access  to  other  material  for  sources  than 
Aristotle‟s reports of these two philosophers.  
 
It  is  in  light  of  the  teachings  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates,  along  with  the 
information garnered from the Unwritten Doctrines, that I propose the true driving 
force behind the origins of the Stoic principles is to be found. From the biographical 
tradition  we  have  reports  that  Zeno  studied  in  the  Old  Academy  under  both 
Xenocrates and  Polemo. However  Hahm  pours  doubt  on  the  veracity  of Diogenes‟ 
report:  
 
Diogenes‟  source  for  this  information  is  unfortunately  not 
specified.  Since  much  of  his  material  on  Zeno  comes  from 
Apollonius, one would like to believe that this information comes 
from  him  too.  But  it  is  also  known  that  a  contemporary  of 
                                                 
24 Cf. Simplicius‟ comment that Xenocrates was the “most faithful of all Plato‟s pupils”: Aristotle On the 
Heavens, 12.22-3. 
25 The idea that Plato approached reality from two di rections, bottom up and top down, will explored in 
chapter three. There can be no doubt that Plato thought there was a limit to the explanations that an 
examination of the sensible world could offer, however I will argue that there is a parallelism in his 
philosophy. This means that the formal world, as explained in the second half of the  Parmenides and the 
Unwritten Doctrines, is constructed from an ordering principle and a principle that has order imposed on it 
and that this is paralleled in the sensible world using the “results” of the merging from a level above. 
Viewed  as  a  single enormous  system  the formal  is  thus  understood  as  the ordering principle  and  the 
sensible world is that requiring ordering, even though internally both the formal and sensible are in fact 
compounds of those principles whose roles they play. These ideas, of an ordering principle and a principle 
to  be  ordered  and  that  of  the  relationship  between  the  formal  and  sensible  will  be  seen  to  have  a 
significant place in the tradition of the Stoic principles.  12  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Apollonius  in  the  first  century  B.C.,  namely,  the  head  of  the 
Academy,  Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  was  vitally  interested  in 
maintaining  a  close  connection  between  Zeno  and  Polemon. 
Antiochus, in reaction to the previous skepticism of the Academy, 
had  initiated  an  eclectic  dogmatism  consisting  of  Platonic, 
Peripatetic,  and  Stoic elements.  He  asserted  that  true  Platonism 
was handed down from Polemon to Zeno and thereafter through a 
succession  of  Stoic  philosophers  to  himself.  To  Antiochus,  the 
nominal Academic Arcesilaus was a heretical student of Polemon 
and had led the Academy astray into skepticism. In the view of 
Antiochus,  then,  Zeno  was  actually  teaching  Platonic  doctrine 
under a slightly different guise
26. 
 
The doubt that Polemo taught Zeno should, I think, not be taken too seriously  since 
it rests primarily on the fear that Antiochus is fictionalizing history for his own ends 
to demonstrate scholarly unity. Hahm himself says  it is strange to think that Zeno 
would  be  ignorant  of  Aristotelian  philosophy  since  Theophrastus  was  the  most 
famous lecturer in Athens at  the time
27 and Zeno was said to be voracious in his 
appetite for learning, so it is likely that he heard Theophrastus lecture. So too  it 
would be strange if he did not spend time in the most famous school of the Ancient 
World. However Hahm quite reasonably doubts that Zeno studied with Xenocrates on 
chronological  grounds  but  then  also  thinks  that  the  two  men  would  have  had 
precious little in common to talk about
28. This is a particularly odd statement given 
his theory that the idea that Xenocrates taught Zeno  is the result of a misspelling, 
and that it was in fact the Pythagorean Xenophilus whose lectures Zeno attended. 
The idea that Zeno attended Pythagorean lectures is indeed likely given the interest 
in Pythagoreanism in that and the preceding century and t hat Zeno is said to have 
written on the subject
29. Why, then, Hahm thinks Xenocrates and Zeno  would not 
get on when both had an interest in Pythagoreanism is curious to say the least. In 
fact it will be shown that Pythagorean ideas stand at the root of the  connection 
between the Platonic and the Stoic. 
 
                                                 
26 Hahm 1977, p. 221.  
27 According to DL V.37 Theophrastus was attracting two thousand students to his lectures.  
28 Hahm 1977, p. 223.  
29 DL. VII. 4, many other Stoics are also reported to have written on Pythagoreanism.  13  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
I will be building on the work of Sayre
30 and the ideas of Crombie
31 that: “The new 
mathematical  schema  of  the  late  dialogues  paves  a  way  for  understanding  how 
artefacts  are  related  to  the  formal  world”.  This  “new”  mathematics,  built  on  a 
Pythagorean base, will be seen to be very influential in the philosophy of Xenocrates. 
His concerns will (especially the ones which led to his positing of minimal lines, and 
his theory of perception), in turn, be seen to have resonances with Stoicism and the 
mathematical interests of Chrysippus. The abstract mathematical concerns discussed 
will be seen to have a very real relevance to understanding the mode of existence 
and ability of the material substrate to perform as the  ekmageion of the sensible 
world. By locating the focus here, in the Old Academy, I do not of course intend to 
rule out absolutely any influence from elsewhere, as will be shown shortly and in 
chapter four where I will discuss the intellectual climate of the time.  
 
The  fourth  option  is related  to  the  one  just  discussed  in  that  it  concerns the  Old 
Academy and Zeno‟s relation to it. Sedley argued that the Stoic god can be found to 
have  his  origins  in  the  teachings  of  Zeno‟s  reported  teacher  Polemo.  There  is  a 
problem  with  this  as  Sedley  is  well  aware.  The  problem  being  that  we  have  no 
verbatim  fragment  of  Polemo‟s  physics,  nor  even  the  certainty  that  he  had  any 
interest in physics whatsoever. In order to rescue Polemo from the charge of a lack 
of  interest  in  physics  Sedley  claims  that  Cicero  Academica  I  24-29  is  actually 
reporting Polemonian physics, not Antiochean as is often assumed. Sedley wants to 
claim the physics here for Polemo on the basis that the Antiochean account of ethics 
at Academica I 19-23 is strongly Polemonian. The account of physics here is often 
seen  as  the  bastard  son  of  Stoicism  and  Platonism,  but  since  Antiochus  saw  the 
Stoics as deviant Platonists Sedley argues that any resemblance must be looked at 
with sympathy to Platonic origins. I believe that Sedley is right to claim a link from 
the Timaeus to the Stoa and that this link is to be found in the Old Academy
32, but 
there seems to be no reason to suppose that this link is Polemo himself since there is 
no evidence of any interest of his whatso ever in physics or of his views within it . 
Besides this, Sedley is happy to admit that Antiochus in his effort to bring dogmatism 
back to the Academy was happy to adopt Zenonian arguments, showing that he was 
not above claiming a different school‟s teaching for his own side. Indeed Academica 
II 29 states that Antiochus did not view physics as important as either epistemology 
                                                 
30 Sayre, 2005. 
31 Crombie 1963. pg. 157.  
32 Although I do not think that the Timaeus is the work of the most importance in relation to Stoicism. 14  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
or ethics; Sedley takes this as implying that there is no reason why Antiochus would 
bother to resort to creating an historical fiction of claiming what appears to be Stoic 
physics for Platonism if it is not in fact Platonic. But it is equally plausible that if 
Antiochus  was  uninterested  in  physics  that  he  would  just  plump  for  the  physical 
system that is most easily defensible and does indeed relate to Platonism, though 
not through Polemo. The passage from Academica I seems to me to be fairly safely 
Stoic, and to have been adopted by Antiochus for the Platonist cause because it does 
indeed resemble Platonism; however, it does so because its origins are to be found in 
the pre-Polemonian Academy.  
 
The final option for the major influence on the Stoics‟ physics is Aristotle. In his The 
Origins of Stoic Cosmology Hahm argues strongly for Stoicism‟s debt to Aristotle yet 
there  is  really  nothing  more  than  circumstantial  evidence  to  support  this  claim. 
Sandbach‟s  work  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics  argues  just  as  strongly  that  the 
circumstantial evidence is not indicative of influence or even awareness of Aristotle‟s 
ideas among the Stoics. His point that Aristotle was probably not as important in the 
Ancient world as he is for us is well made and is supported by the free divergence 
from  his  teachings  of  his  students  Theophrastus  and  Strato
33.  Sandbach uses an 
argument from silence par excellence to support his position: there is no mention of 
any interaction, interest or reading of Aristotle in relation to the Stoics - therefore 
there  was  no  relationship  whatsoever  between  the  two  schools
34.  Brehier
35  and 
Gould
36  both argue for Stoic awareness of Aristotle,   though stopping short of the 
extreme debt that Hahm ascribes. The more moderate views of Brehier and Gould 
seem inherently more plausible since as Hahm pointed out it seems likely that Zeno 
attended at least some of Theophrastus‟ lectures. In terms of actual philosophy the 
Stoics do have superficial resemblances to Aristotle, but Sandbach
37 is right to say 
that the same conclusions can be reached by different people at different times quite 
independently of one another. However some Stoic concerns and appro aches to 
physics do resemble Aristotle more strongly than Plato, and it is tempting to see an 
influence even if it was never explicit or acknowledged. Indeed superficially the Stoic 
distinction  between  active  and  passive  principles,  as  well  as  the  nature  o f  the 
                                                 
33 Sandbach 1985, p. 2. 
34 Sandbach 1985, p. 12, 13 where he notes the striking absence of any Peripatetic from Diogenes‟ list of 
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35 Brehier 1951, p. 149-50, where he also accepts Academic influence.  
36 Gould 1970, p. 119-123. 
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passive, appears to resemble the teachings of Aristotle more closely that it does the 
Timaeus.  The  Timaeus  does  not  address  the  issue  of  matter  while  Aristotle  does, 
hence a stronger connection is visible. Despite this superficial resemblance a deeper 
relationship will be seen to exist between the Parmenides and Philebus of Plato than 
between Aristotle and  the Stoics: any  supposition that Aristotle‟s influence on the 
Stoics  is greater than Plato‟s will be seen to be based on the erroneous assumption 
that the Timaeus is the place to look for Plato‟s account of matter. Aristotle talks of 
matter as we expect it, unlike Plato in the Timaeus, and so do the Stoics, but any 
resemblance  is  largely  owing  to  the  fact  that  they  are  discussing  the  same  thing 
rather than due to any direct influence. Similarity in doctrine is better explained by 
appealing  to  the  common  origin  of  both  Aristotle‟s  thought  and  Stoicism  in  the 
Academy. The distinction of active and passive or form and matter that is responsible 
for  the  superficial  resemblance  will  be  found  to  exist  in  Plato‟s  thought.  The 
resemblance, then, between Stoicism and Aristotle is better understood as being a 
result of this Platonic influence on two disparate schools of thought. The relation of 
Aristotelian ideas to Stoic ones will be discussed in the second part of chapter two.  
 
In  regard  to  Plato  we  have  his  dialogues  and  Aristotle‟s  testimony,  for  the  Old 
Academy  we  have  nothing  but  fragments  preserved  in  a  variety  of,  often  late, 
sources.  For  Aristotle  we  have  his  works  and  that  of  the  commentators  and  his 
brilliant, though not uncritical, pupil Theophrastus. However when it comes to the 
Stoics we are not in such a fortunate position. The extant works of the Stoics consist 
of  the  ethical  works  of  Epictetus,  Marcus  Aurelius,  the  collections  of  Seneca‟s 
writings, and the cosmological handbook of Cleomedes which is late and differs quite 
substantially in some areas from what can be understood to be the position of the 
early  Stoa.  There  are  fortunately  several  collections  of  Stoic  fragments  from  the 
virtually  comprehensive  Stoicorum  Veterum  Fragmenta  of  Von  Arnim  to  more 
selective collections like Long and Sedley‟s The Hellenistic Philosophers vols. 1 and 2. 
In assessing which fragments to take as authentic accounts of Stoic theory I have 
followed, as much as is possible, the methodology of Gould in his The Philosophy of 
Chrysippus;  taking  only  those  fragments  which  actually  state  that  they  are  taken 
verbatim from a work of Zeno, Cleanthes or Chrysippus. Second to these, of which 
there are sadly not many, will be those reports which ascribe doctrines to the Stoics 
but which differ from doctrines which are taught by Posidonius. By comparing the 
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hope to eliminate, as much as is possible, doctrines which came in after Posidonius 
and which may deviate too much from the original position of the early Stoa. This is 
to ensure, as much as possible, that post-Posidonian ideas do not contaminate my 
interpretation. Posidonius seems to have followed the early Stoic line in regard to 
physics, and so he will be referred to in support of my interpretation but will not be 
the  main  focus  owing  to  his  relative  lateness  and  the  fact  that  Chrysippus  is 
supposed to have already compiled the orthodox standpoint. 
 
Posidonius  himself  does  not  seem  to  have  moved  too  much  from  the  orthodox 
position of Stoicism in regard to physics, though, as Kidd points out
38, he probably 
revolutionised the expression of the th eories: and it is this revolution of expression 
that most likely accounts for any differences in physics between Chrysippus and 
Posidonius  and perhaps accounts for later misinterpretations . Galen makes use of 
Posidonius in his works, contrasting his more Platonic account of the soul with that of 
Chrysippus
39.  This  tells  us  two  interesting  things:  Firstly  that  Posidonius  was 
probably not quite as orthodox a Stoic as his physics alone would have us believe, 
and secondly that Chrysippus, despite being long dead , was still viewed as the main 
Stoic to refute. Posidonius was a unique Stoic not only for his apparent acceptance of 
a tripartite soul but also for his interest in aetiology – not a primary interest to Stoics 
in general
40. It is not because the Stoics are  not interested in causes, indeed it is 
integral to their position that everything has a cause
41, but, according to Strabo
42 it 
is because Posidonius was seen to be Aristotelianizing. Posidonius, if no earlier Stoic, 
was clearly familiar with and happy to employ the techniques and conclusions of both 
the Platonic and Aristotelian school. The fragments referring to him will thus function 
as a safeguard from too much later interpretation impacting on the account of early 
Stoicism offered in chapter one. The ques tion about the authenticity of doctrines 
ascribed to Zeno in the fragments is also a difficult one to answer as the Stoics were 
not immune, as indeed was no ancient school, from ascribing much later innovations 
back onto their founder. It is thus helpful t o look at Cleanthes and Chrysippus, for if 
something that occurs in Chrysippus is that much more developed than what we find 
in Cleanthes then we know that whatever is ascribed to Zeno must be closer to 
                                                 
38 E&K. Vol. II.1, p. 409. 
39 Especially in his On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato.  
40 E&K. Vol. II.1, p. 73: Strabo II 3, 8: “In Posidonius, there is much enquiry into causes … precisely what 
our school sheers off from…” 
41 Although non-Posidonian Stoics did admit that we would not be able to know every cause because they 
were “obscure to the human mind”.  Cf. SVF II.973, 351  
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Cleanthes than the innovations found in Chrysippus. That said there is reason to see 
Chrysippus  as  the  real  codifier  of  Stoic  thought  and  last  exponent  of  orthodox 
Stoicism. 
  
The fragments themselves pose a problem. Most are from polemical sources, either 
explicitly such as Plutarch‟s On Stoic Self-Contradictions and Against the Stoics on 
Common  Conceptions  or  else  more  subtly  such  as  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias‟  De 
Mixtione. This last work will be discussed in detail in chapter 1.2.3 where I look at 
the interaction of the two Stoic  archai and will demonstrate  how Alexander, while 
seemingly  setting  up  the  Stoic  position  quite  innocuously  for  discussion,  actually 
does so in a way which makes the doctrine of krasis di’holou (total blending) appear 
completely absurd to a general audience. 
 
Cicero  provides  us  with  an  in  depth  and  well  presented  summary  of  the  salient 
positions of the major schools of the Hellenistic period and is invaluable as a source. 
His own position as an Academic (sceptic) philosopher and lawyer presumably gave 
him  the  insight  to  understand  his  opponents‟  (the  dogmatists‟)  positions  before 
laying  judgement  upon  them.  As Powell
43  points out the balanced presentation of 
views should not be mistaken for vacillation or inconsistency but rather indicative of 
his method, and familiarity. Cicero‟s reports are to be taken even more seriously in 
regard to Stoicism when we recall that he was a pupil of Posidonius
44 and how at the 
end of On the Nature of the Gods he concludes that the Stoic position appears to be 
the  correct  one,  a  disingenuous,  not  to  say  meaningless,  statement  if  he  has 
misrepresented the Stoic position to a significant degree. Long
45 notes that for Cicero 
Plato and Aristotle constitute all that is best in philosophy, not in themselves but 
rather  in  their  bequests  to  their  followers  indicating   an  interest  in  the  post -
Aristotelian philosophical schools. As well as being a student of Posidonius‟ he was 
also  a  follower  of  Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  whose  aim  appears  to  have  been  the 
reconciliation of Platonism with Aristotelianism and Stoicism, so if Plato‟s main claim 
to  greatness  is  what  his  followers  did  with  his  philosophy  then  we  should  expect 
Cicero to have sympathy for Stoicism and thus expect reliability in his reports.  
 
                                                 
43 Powell 1995, p. 2.  
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Galen  too  offers  us  verbatim  quotes  from  Chrysippus  but  is  openly  hostile  to  the 
Stoic  position.  His  hostility  to  Stoicism  in  general  and  Chrysippus  in  particular 
perhaps derives from his opinion of himself as a Platonist and the Stoics as deviant 
Platonists,  this  would  also  explain  his  sympathy  for  the  Platonic  psychology  of 
Posidonius  and  his  use  of  him  in  attacking  what  would  then  be  his  wayward 
predecessor.  A  specific  criticism  of  Galen  which  Gill  raises  and  which  I  think  is 
absolutely correct in a broader respect is that he simply fails to “register the wide-
ranging,  indeed  universal,  scope  of  the  Stoic  theory  of  active  and  passive  causal 
principles  and  of  the  associated  idea  of  pneumatic  tension
46”,  it  seems  likely  to 
suppose that Galen lets his antipathy to Chrysippus inform his work to a great extent 
with the result that he often misrepresents the Stoic position. The same holds, in my 
opinion, for Alexander of Aphrodisias whose criticisms all too often rest on the fact 
that the Stoics are just not Aristotelians and so must be wrong. Take the interesting 
example of the Stoic theory of total blending which allows two bodies to be in the 
same place at the same time; if such a theory were really as absurd as Alexander 
and Plutarch would have us believe then why does not Cicero, who is as vicious as 
anyone in his characterisations, make any use of it?  
 
Having discussed the dangers of the evidence and appropriate methods for avoiding 
too many misinterpretations, and put them behind us, we are now in a position to 
look at the actual subject of the thesis: the material principle. The idea of matter is 
not quite so simple as it may at first appear to our modern minds. First of all we can 
split  matter  as  it  relates  to  the  sensible  world
47  up  into  two  types:  prime  and 
proximate.  Proximate  matter  is  the  matter  of  everyday  experience:  wood,   clay, 
bronze, even air and fire. It is qualified in a particular way, has exact dimensions and 
qualities. This type of matter is often discussed by Aristotle and plays an important 
role in his Form/matter distinctions. It is also the type of matter that I   believe 
appears in the Timaeus to the exclusion of the prime matter that many think appears 
in the guise of the receptacle. Although I reject the account of the Receptacle in the 
Timaeus as being an account of matter I will not spend too much time arguing for it 
as space instead. It will be enough to show simply what it is not without digressing 
too far into what it is. The question of what underlies the elements is, in my opinion, 
a completely meaningless one for Plato in the Timaeus. Plato discusses the elements 
in the Timaeus and builds the sensible world from their interaction and order, their 
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transmutation means that at this stage of the discussion there is no need to appeal 
to  something  “behind”  them.  It  will  be  left  up  to  us  to  infer  what  underlies  the 
elements on the basis of Plato‟s metaphysics. This is similar to the defence taken by 
those who deny prime matter of Aristotle: that the elements can change into each 
other by virtue of exchanging one of their two properties for another thus denying 
the need for an underlying substrate
48.  
 
While proximate matter is in itself an interesting topic it is not the focus of this 
thesis, rather I am looking at the first type: prime matter, or as the Stoics term it 
apoios ousia – unformed substance. Prime matter is, broadly speaking, that which 
remains  when  everything  that  makes  a  particular  body  that  particular  body  is 
stripped away. In and of itself it is completely lacking in particularity. It is this fact 
that convinces many that the Receptacle of the Timaeus is in fact prime matter for 
Plato does indeed state that it lacks any qualities. Of course if we strip everything 
particular away from an individual we may not be left with anything at all, this is the 
position of the nominalist who rejects the notion of  prime matter completely. The 
main reasons for rejecting prime matter are 1) that it serves no purpose and 2) that 
it is completely theoretical since nothing can exist unqualified and any appeal to it is 
like arguing that a clothed man is naked because under his clothes he is naked
49. 
Three things need to be said in response to these accusations: firstly  apoios ousia 
performs  a  very  important  function  in  the  Stoic  metaphysical  system  since  “only 
body can act or be acted upon”. Secondly it does not actually exist unqualified at any 
time since it is inextricably linked to the active principle which necessarily informs 
the apoios ousia in some particular way; and thirdly the apoios ousia of the Stoics is 
not  actually  completely  devoid  of  all  properties  because  it  is  said  to  be  three-
dimensional with resistance
50. The second point seems to have brought confusion to 
some commentators, not least Richard Sorabji
51, who have interpreted the constant 
connection between the active and passive principles as indicative of their natures as 
being aspects of a single body underlying both. This however is clearly false since not 
only are the active and passive almost universally referred to as bodies, each in their 
own right, but Cicero‟s comment above that “only body can act or be acted upon,” 
clearly demonstrates that the active could not act on the passive if they were merely 
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aspects of a yet more simple, single, body underlying them both. The Stoic belief 
that only body can act or be acted upon forces them to have two opposing archai yet 
they also claim to be monists. These are two seemingly incompatible positions and 
Sorabji uses this as evidence for his position; however the constant conjoining of the 
two  archai  is,  in  my  opinion, meant  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  their  theory  of 
krasis di’holou which, as we noted above, allows two bodies to be in the same place 
at the same time. If this is the case then the fact that they have two archai ceases to 
meaningfully contradict their claim to monism. The question of Stoic matter becomes 
more  complicated  because  we  have  now  to  answer  the  question  of  what  is  the 
difference between matter and body? After all both the active and passive principles 
are referred to as bodies
52. The passive principle is a body that is inert and qua itself 
unqualified, the active is a rational body. The answer would seem to be something 
like: matter is how the passive principle is characterized when we discuss it qua itself 
– body is how it is understood as the partner of the active principle. After all saying 
“matter can act or be acted upon,” would seem strange since matter is commonly 
conceived of as inert, the acting requiring intentionality that only soul can posses.  
 
The Stoics call their prime matter apoios ousia which, if Hahm is right and the Stoics 
were heavily influenced by Aristotle, is strange since for Aristotle prime matter is not 
a proper substance. In the Categories the controlling definition of a substance is to 
be a subject, the more of a subject something is the more of a substance it is; since 
Socrates  is  a  proper  subject:  he  is  a  substance.  In  the  Metaphysics  though  the 
emphasis has changed somewhat, substance is now a cause, it is that which makes a 
man a man or a horse a horse. Substance can cease to exist; when a bronze statue 
is melted  down  the  substance  has  been  destroyed  and  a  new  substance  with  the 
same proximate matter (the bronze) stands in its place. In Platonism substance was 
regarded as form alone since the forms are the true subject of discourse. Matter is 
an unstable and deceptive aspect of the world. So why then do the Stoics call prime 
matter a substance? This question will be looked at in greater detail in the second 
part  of  chapter  two  where  I  will  show  that  the  Stoics  were  involved  in  a  great 
innovation  which  can  be  seen  as,  but  is  not  necessarily,  a  manipulation  of 
Aristotelianism. It will be seen that the Stoics accepted the conclusions of Aristotle‟s 
discussions when he rejected them
53. Aristotle does consider matter (both prime and 
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proximate)  as  substance  in  Metaphysics  H1  1042a26
54  and  Λ3,  1070a9
55  and  his 
reasons  for  doing  so  appear  to  be  the  ones  which  the  Stoics  favour:  that  prime 
matter underlies all change and there is nothing else which underlies it. The Stoics 
can  thus  be  seen  to  accept  Aristotelian  reasons  for  claiming  apoios  ousia  as 
substance, though this of course does not mean that they could only have reached 
these conclusions after consulting the relevant texts.  
 
Things take an even more interesting twist when we consider further the doctrines of 
the Old Academy and the Platonic teachings not found in the traditional corpus. While 
the forms may act as substance in Platonic metaphysics, it is less than clear whether 
or not there is such a thing as the equivalent of prime matter in any guise in the 
system. It is the contention of this thesis that it is fact in reaction to the doctrines of 
the Old Academy in regard to the  Indefinite Dyad that the Stoics developed their 
concept  of  apoios  ousia  and  its  function  in  physics.  In  the  metaphysics  of 
Speusippus,  Xenocrates  and,  I  believe, in  Plato, the  Indefinite  Dyad  performs  the 
function of material principle to the formal principle of the One: it is in essence an 
incorporeal  matter. The  reason  there  is so  much  disagreement  in interpreting  the 
physical  dialogue  of  Plato,  the  Timaeus,  in  respect  of  its  teachings  about  some 
underlying, permanent, possibly material, substrate is that there is simply nothing in 
that dialogue which can answer to the role. Plato has a singular lack of concern with 
the “material” world and so stops at the elemental level because there is nothing to 
be gained by delving any further, in fact he probably only goes that far because of 
the  precedent  set  by  the  pre-Socratics  in  their  physical  discussions.  There  is  no 
explanatory purpose to gained, in Plato‟s mind, by discussing the very basis of the 
sensible realm since prolonged focus on it as a whole is misguided. However the idea 
of a material substrate is present in some of the written works of Plato and is even 
stronger in the Unwritten Doctrines. This material substrate differs from the Stoic in 
that it is non-corporeal while the Stoic matter is virtually a synonym for corporeality. 
Plato‟s  successors  built  on  his  teaching  of  non-corporeal  matter  but  variously 
attempted to apply it to the sensible realm, more for the sake of completeness than 
any other reason as far as I can see. The matter of the sensible realm in fact turns 
on Pythagorean ideas and the relationship of number to the world. To support this I 
                                                 
54 “The substratum is substance, and this is one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not 
being a „this‟ actually, is potentially a „this‟)”. 
55 “There are three kinds of substance – the matter, which is a „this‟ by being perceived (for all things that 
are characterised by contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum)”. 22  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
will build on the work of Long‟s paper “The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue” to show the 
Stoics‟ interest in number as capable of offering explanations of the order and nature 
of the world. The doctrines of Plato‟s successors will, then, be shown to be far closer 
to  the  “real”  teaching  of  Plato  than  was  imagined,  simply  because  we  have  been 
erroneously  using  the  dialogues as  an  exhaustive  canon.  While  the  Stoic material 
principle may on the face of it resemble Aristotle‟s conclusions about such a principle 
it  will  be  seen  to  have  been  the  case  that  the  Stoics  reached  or  supported  their 
conclusions through Platonic considerations and not Aristotelian.  
 
The discussion in the thesis will run as follows: 
Chapter  one  will  begin  with  a  short  discussion  of  matter  and  its  role  in  physical 
systems. The main part of the chapter (1.2.1 and 1.2.2) will be a discussion of the 
early Stoics and their physical system involving an in depth look at the nature and 
role of apoios ousia and its relation to the active principle. The second half of this 
section  (1.2.3)  will involve  a  discussion  of the  Stoic theory  of  krasis di’holou  and 
demonstrate its application to the archai alone.  
 
Having explained the nature of the object of our search chapter two will begin with 
an  interpretation  of  the  Timaeus  along  traditional  lines.  The  search  through  this 
physical  dialogue  for  a  precursor  to  the  Stoics‟  apoios  ousia  will  demonstrate  the 
fallacy of seeking for a single influence and taking the Timaeus as the sole explicator 
of  Plato‟s  physics.  The  second  part  will  involve  a  discussion  of  Aristotle  and  his 
approach, arguments and conclusion about prime matter and how it relates  prima 
facie more fully to the Stoic account than the account offered in the Timaeus does.  
 
Chapter  three  will  bring  in  other  Platonic  dialogues  and  the  Unwritten  Doctrines. 
These will help furnish an understanding of Plato‟s late ontology which will be seen to 
answer to the role of main influence on the development of apoios ousia more fully 
than either the Timaeus alone or Aristotle. The third part of this chapter will examine 
the  theories  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates  in  light  of  the  revised  Platonic 
metaphysics. It is after this that a defence of the Stoics interest in mathematics will 
take place to tie them in more strongly to the Old Academic tradition of Speusippus 
and Xenocrates. It is in the final part of this chapter that I will assess the argument 
of Sedley‟s “The Origins of Stoic God”, rejecting Polemo as a significant influence on 
Stoic physics. The Parmenides will be seen, along with the Philebus, to furnish the 23  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
main  influence  and  method  of  understanding  the  physics  of  Plato  and  the  Old 
Academy.  
 
Finally, chapter four will discuss the Stoics‟ pre-Socratic heritage with a discussion of 
the  material  theories  of  some  Ionians  and  the  titular  precursor  of  Stoicism: 
Heraclitus. Since the preceding chapter will have shown the main influence on the 
Stoics to have been Plato‟s esoteric teachings as revealed by the Unwritten Doctrines 
and his students this chapter will serve more as a formality and a way of closing the 
discussion  of  matter  in  the  Ancient  world  by  going  back  to  its  origins  and  first 
exponents. The second half of this chapter will, as well as looking at general pre-
Socratic ideas, look at mythological and medical imagery. The Derveni papyrus will 
serve as an example of the interpretation of naïve myth in a pseudo-scientific way. 
This will be compared with the Stoics‟ use of the female and wet as analogous to the 
material  principle.  This  idea  will  be  built  on  by  a  brief  exegesis  of  medical  and 
Aristotelian biological imagery of the woman as receptacle. This discussion will show 
the  way  in  which  matter  was  understood  to  work  in  the  physical  system  for  the 
Stoics rather than develop an understanding of pure apoios ousia. It will also be seen 
that it is likely that, as with their discussion of krasis, their use of everyday language 
to  describe  the  workings  of  matter  is  a  probable  cause  of  the  long  running 
misunderstanding of the Stoic concept of the material principle.     
 
It will only remain for the thesis to conclude that the nature of apoios ousia, its role 
and relation to the active principle owes more to Plato, though not as traditionally 
understood,  and  the  Old  Academy,  though  not  to  Polemo,  than  was  previously 
accepted or supposed.    
 24  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Matter:  
 
The subject of this thesis is matter or, more precisely, the material principle of the 
sensible world. In order to understand the Stoics‟ account of their material principle, 
which they term apoios ousia, it will be helpful to first discuss the general nature of 
matter. The philosophical tradition of the West has grown up with the Aristotelian 
distinction between form and matter and so this is a good place to start with the 
general  understanding  of  matter.  Matter  is  the  passive  receiver  or  bearer  of 
properties or form. This simple explanation will be seen to capture the various uses 
that Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, and indeed all of us who 
think about it, make of matter. 
 
Matter is the bearer of properties. But it can do much more than just fulfil this simple 
role.  It  can  be  a  persistent  substrate:  that  which  is  responsible  for  an  object‟s 
remaining the object it is despite the alteration of its properties. Matter can account 
for persistence over time and through change. I say “can” because there are several 
types of things that we may call matter, each of which can perform slightly different 
activities: 
 
1.  Proximate matter
56; 
2.  Incorporeal matter
57; 
3.  Primary matter.  
 
Proximate matter comes in a variety of guises and is the sort of matter which we 
encounter in our everyday experience. Proximate matter is a matter which is of a 
particular type: stone, bronze, ice, etc. It is the sort of thing that we manipulate to 
create everyday objects. Proximate matter is, like the objects that are made from it, 
a particular. A statue made of a lump of bronze is made from a matter that is already 
a particular lump of bronze. It has definite properties such as the generic properties 
                                                 
56 Proximate matter can be understood simply as the matter underlying anything. In this respect the four 
elements, for ancient philosophers, will be the proximate matter of the things we use in the world – stone, 
metal, etc. However, for the purpose of this thesis I will be using the term “proximate matter” to refer 
only  to  the  everyday  matter  that  we  encounter.  The  four  elements  will  be  referred  to  as  the  “Four 
elements”.  
57 Alexander of Aphrodisias (De Anima 3, 21-4,4 = 17b1 Sorabji vol.2) makes use of incorporeal matter as 
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of  bronze  (e.g.  the  fact  that  it  is  bronze)  but  it  also  has  its  particular  properties 
which belong to that individual piece of bronze – its weight, its size, its shape and its 
particular  colouring.  In  short,  proximate  matter  is  not  the  material  principle  par 
excellence  because  it  already  has  some  properties  necessarily,  without  which  it 
would not be what it was. Perhaps more importantly this possession of properties 
limits what  each  type  of proximate  matter  can  be  made  into:  for  instance  a  ship 
made  of  stone  would  fail  to  fulfil  the  role  of  a  ship,  whereas  wood  or  steel  are 
suitable for such a purpose. Each proximate matter has some impact on what it can 
be made into and so for each type it is true that it cannot be the proximate matter of 
any object. 
 
Incorporeal and primary matter are of an ilk. By this I mean that they perform the 
same  function  but  in  what  may  be  understood  as  different  spheres  or  realms  of 
reality. The Stoics have only one sort of reality: that which is sensible. Only sensible 
things  are  said  to  properly  exist
58.  Accordingly  they  have  no  need ,  or  use,  for 
incorporeal matter
59;  however  incorporeal  matter‟s  relationship  to  primary  matter 
will  be  shown  throughout  this  thesis  to  be  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the 
development  of  the  Stoics‟  own  particular  conception  of  their  apoios  ousia. 
Incorporeal matter has different roles in different philosophical accounts. In Plato‟s, 
which will be discussed in chapter three
60, incorporeal matter can be identified with 
the Indefinite Dyad, the others and multiplicity. This Indefinite Dyad, which exists at 
all levels of the complicated and hierarchical Platonic metaphysics, variously appears 
as a sort of proximate matter rather than a primary matter. However at the highest 
level of reality this Indefinite Dyad is characterless, featureless, devoid of spatial 
extension: it is to all in tents and purposes the ultimate nothing. However it is then 
acted  on  by  its  corresponding  principle,  the  One.  This  manipulation  produces  a 
minimally  qualified  matter  (called  again  the  Ind efinite  Dyad),  which  in  turn  is 
manipulated by its correlate (again a  One). But at these levels, and for some time 
later, there is still an absence of something that is intuitively connected to any 
concept of matter  –  three-dimensional  or  sensible  reality.  This  Indefinite  Dyad  is 
incorporeal matter completely. It acts as the possessor of form at the formal level 
                                                 
58 They do admit of a subset of things such as limits and time which are incorporeal but which are also 
said to only subsist rather than to exist properly, cf. e.g. SE Against the Professors 10.218 (=L&S 27D = 
SVF 2.331, part). This idea will be explained more fully in part 1.2.2.  
59 Indeed for the Stoics the notion of an incorporeal matter is almost contradictory. It will be seen in the 
next part of this chapter that matter and corporeality are essentially synonymous for the Stoics.  
60 The Timaeus will be discussed in chapter two but it is only in chapter three that Plato‟s more developed 
philosophical account involving matter will be found.  26  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
and so in this sense is matter. Aristotle, however, makes use of incorporeal
61 matter 
in a less elaborate way as will be discussed in the second half of chapter two. But 
briefly: he asks what, when we think of a numbe r, is that number is said of
62? If we 
discuss abstract number then it is clearly not said of anythin g. But it cannot exist as 
pure form, and so there must be an incorporeal matter of the abstracted number 
which the number is in fact said of.  As well as in r elation to abstracted number 
Aristotle also makes use of intelligible matter for geometrical shapes. In this case 
plane geometry will be conceived of in two-dimensional Euclidean space.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Stoics have no time for such a thing as incorporeal matter. 
They could make no use of it as there are no proper noetic or formal objects as we 
find in classical Platonism of significance in the Stoics‟ metaphysics
63. The thoughts 
of god, the most likely candidate for archetypal  noetic or formal objects, are in fact 
corporeal dispositions as are any affections of the soul for the Stoics. In fact they go 
further implying that the thoughts of god are not just corporeal but are the very 
objects in the world  – which includes the world itself. God‟s thought, in its guise of 
the cosmic pneuma pervades apoios ousia and imbues it with particular properties. 
God‟s corporeal thought is the formal element of the world: it is corporeal formal 
disposition disposing the passive material principle directly. This brief description of 
Stoic  physics  will  be  much  more  fully  discussed  in  the  remaining  parts  of  this 
chapter.  
 
Primary matter differs from intelligible matter in that it is a principle of the corporeal 
world. It differs from proximate matter in that we do not encounter it or manipulate 
it. In fact it ultimately underlies all proximate matters: so that while, say, iron relies 
on the Four elements for its existence and the Four elements rely on primary matter, 
it in turn relies on nothing. Primary matter is the bottom level and there can be no 
appeal to anything below it, else that thing would be primary matter instead. The 
Stoics take this a step further, and can do so because for them matter is a body. For 
the  Stoics,  as  a  result  of  its  underlying  all  corporeal  proximate  matters,  primary 
matter is itself the principle of corporeality. Just what this means and how it affects 
its use in various system of philosophy will be discussed throughout the thesis.  
                                                 
61 Normally understood as “intelligible matter” in Aristotle.  
62 Metaphysics 1059b14-16, cf. 10361-12, cf. Gaukroger 1980.  
63 Or more strictly just their physics since they did not believe that there was anything beyond physics. 
However the topics that matter relates to are more commonly subsumed under the term metaphysics and 
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The Four elements that proximate matter relies on are the traditional level at which 
the majority of pre-Socratic philosophers seem to have stopped their enquiries. For 
instance Thales (as interpreted by Aristotle and his followers), traditionally the first 
philosopher, appears to have reached the conclusion that the primary matter was not 
primary matter in the sense I will discuss; but rather was the element water
64. This 
idea and its relationship to the understanding that this earliest philosopher has of our 
topic will be discussed in chapter four. If we follow Aristotle then Thales would seem 
to  understand  the  notion  of  “primary  matter”  as  being  the  first  sort  of  disposed 
matter; not that which all things that are material rely on. He was not alone in his 
cessation of inquiry at the elemental level, we have already noted
65 that Plato (in the 
Timaeus  at  least)  does  not  go  below  this  level  either.  Thales‟s  and  Plato‟s  near 
contemporaries did the same. Heraclitus, who in the introduction was noted as the 
person  to  whom  the  Stoics  claimed  their  greatest  debt, seems to  have  ended  his 
enquiry  with  fire  being  primary  matter
66.  Empedocles  went  a  different  way  and 
claimed each of the elements in equal measure: there is no primary matter but four 
primary matters
67 each coming together in different proportions and arrangements to 
make the world, but never being created nor destroyed.  
 
The notion of primary matter in the sense that is the topic of this thesis thus really 
only  comes  about  after  the  pre-Socratic  period  but  their  enquiries  into  nature 
undoubtedly fed the imagination of their successors and some their most pertinent 
ideas will be discussed in chapter four to give a flavour of the intellectual climate that 
material theories were developing in.  
 
The apoios ousia that god permeates is the main subject of this thesis. I will argue 
throughout this thesis that Plato‟s main concern about a substance like prime matter 
is with regard to the incorporeal world. However the sensible world is an image of 
the formal and as such it has its own matter as an image of the  “higher” formal 
matter. Just as we look to the formal world for reality in forms so too to understand 
matter properly we must look not at the sensible matter but rather at the incorporeal 
matter. It is the relationship between his conception of incorporeal matter and the 
                                                 
64 Metaphysics 983b20-2.  
65 See page 16 above.  
66 A more detailed discussion will take place in chapter four.  
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Stoic  apoios  ousia  that  will  form  the  main  discussion  via  incorporeal  matter‟s 
interpretation in the Old Academy. In the second half of chapter two I will argue that 
Aristotle has an understanding of primary matter which is similar to the Stoics‟, this 
will be contrary to King
68 and build on the discussion between King and Solmsen
69.  
 
In order to better understand   the notion of an underlying material which is the 
ultimate bearer of properties in the sensible world it will be helpful to look at an 
alternative theory. It was noted above that quite clearly the Stoics believed this sort 
of entity to exist and I will argue that the same is true of Aristotle
70, but we also saw 
Plato‟s  metaphysics  takes  precedence  over  his  physics  and  that  his  conception  of 
matter in the sensible world will be a pale reflection of incorporeal matter. Primary 
matter serves a fundamental purpose in those theories which accept it, how could 
Plato even begin to explore the nature of the sensible world without primary matter? 
 
Cornford
71 argues that Plato does not need p rimary matter because he is a bundle 
theorist. Each object is not reducible beyond the bundle of properties that it has
72. 
These properties do not inhere in anything so there is nothing beyond the substance 
which is made o f those properties that bears those properties: Socrates has the 
properties that Socrates has because he is Socrates  – there is no matter that is not 
Socrates  under  him  which  Socrates  is  said  of
73. This position does not need an 
underlying substrate of whic h things are said. A popular reason for adopting this 
position is that it is argued that the very notion of a bare substrate – primary matter 
- is simply incoherent. As noted in the introduction Cohen argues that a belief in 
primary matter is akin to a belief that every man is naked because he is not wearing 
anything under his clothes. In the words of Loux
74 what the substratum theorist, that 
is a believer in p rimary matter, is committed to is the following: “In positing bare 
particulars as the exemplifiers of properties, substratum theorists are claiming that 
the literal exemplifiers of properties exemplify none of these properties essentially or 
necessarily.”  This  position,  he  argues,  is  incoherent  as  it  is  not  possible  for 
                                                 
68 King. H.R 1956.  
69 Solmsen 1958. cf. Furth 1988.  
70 No matter how uncomfortable this may have made him.  
71 Cornford 1939.  
72 There are two types of bundle theorist: 1) the properties in the bundle are universals; 2) the properties 
in  the  bundle  a re  property-instances.  On  an  uncontroversial  understanding  of  Plato  he  would  be 
committed to the first as a result of his theory of forms. Cf. Armstrong 1980, pg. 108ff.  
73 This is, in essence, the argument used by Aristotle to argue that Socrates is a sub stance rather than 
Primary matter – this will be discussed in the second part of chapter two.   
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something  to  exist  with  no  essential  properties.  The  Stoics  are  not  immune  from 
these  criticisms  but  their  particular  conception  of  primary  matter  as  a  three 
dimensional body always qualified in some respect by the active principle insulates 
them somewhat. Apoios ousia has properties. This claim can be understood in two 
ways: 
 
1)  It is defined as extended in three dimensions.  
 
2)  It  always  has  some  more  properties  than  this  since  it  is  never  found 
independently of the active principle. The active principle has to act and so it 
always informs the passive principle, even at the state of ekpyrosis when it 
does so as simply as it can by making everything fire.   
 
The first point, that prime matter simply is extended in three dimensions, is really 
the  notion  that  ties the  origins of  apoios  ousia  back  to  the  Platonists.  This is the 
standard definition of mathematical body, and as we will see below and throughout 
this chapter, this vague definition raises several issues. We will see pseudo-Galen 
add  resistance  to  the  definition  of body  in  order  to  make  it  more  understandably 
sensible. However the Stoics use the mathematical definition of body to define the 
material principle (and to some extent the active principle too) since they are coming 
from the Old Academy. The relationship of the material principles of Plato, the Old 
Academy  and  the  early  Stoics  will  be  seen  to  most  likely  rely  on  the  connection 
offered by mathematics. Evidence of the early Stoics‟ interest in mathematics will be 
given  in  chapter  three  and  will  show  them  to  have  been  very  much  in  the  Old 
Academic model when it came to this subject.  
 
We have seen that matter in its various guises acts as something that is manipulated 
to  bear  properties.  In  the  case  of proximate  matter  this manipulation is primarily 
applied  by  human  artisans  and  it  comes  to  bear  only  properties  which  are  not 
inconsistent  with  the  basic  properties  that  make  the  particular  type  of  proximate 
matter that sort rather than another. Briefly we saw Plato‟s use of intelligible matter 
as the instantiating principle for his forms, the Dyad is needed for the form Two to be 
Two rather than something else. Intelligible matter for Plato acts in the same way as 
proximate  matter,  i.e.  as  also  the  bearer  of  the  forms.  Apoios  ousia  acts  as  the 
underlying  “out  of  which”  that  god  makes  the  world  from.  It  is  responsible  for 30  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
objects‟ three-dimensionality and passive nature. It is the aspect of an object that 
helps make it true that everything can be manipulated. God alone, although he too is 
a body, can not be solely responsible for a sensible object‟s ability to be acted upon.  
 
So matter, as the subject of this thesis and the object of our search, will come in at 
least two guises: incorporeal and primary. Primary matter for the Stoics has some 
properties but for Aristotle it has none. But there are key identifying characteristics 
of the object of our search: Matter must be an ekmageion – an “out of which”; it 
must be the least qualitative thing of all; it must remain unchanged in nature while 
facilitating  change;  and  it is responsible  for  the  persistence  of the  object  through 
time and property alteration. The object this describes is, in Stoicism, very clear: it is 
apoios ousia. Proximate matter, it will be shown throughout this thesis, since it relies 
on  principles for  its existence  is simply  the  wrong  sort  of matter.  For  Plato  I  will 
argue  that  the  closest  candidate  for  such  a  thing  is  his  incorporeal  matter:  the 
Indefinite Dyad; while for Aristotle I will argue that his Metaphysics demonstrates the 
need for a qualityless substrate. The thesis will make clear the relationship between 
the Indefinite Dyad of Plato and the apoios ousia of the Stoics via the teachings of 
the Old Academy.     
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1.2.1 The Stoic Apoios Ousia:  
 
This  part  of  the  chapter  will  look  at  the  evidence  of  the  Stoics‟  belief  in  primary 
matter.  It  will  look  at  the  role  that  it  fulfils in  the  world  and  in  their  physics.  In 
looking at the Stoics‟ primary matter, which we have already noted they term apoios 
ousia, I will also discuss the active principle and the relation that exists between the 
two.  
 
The Stoics are complete materialists. Everything that exists which has proper causal 
efficacy is bodily. It is this ambiguous term  “bodily” that will occupy some of our 
time: asking whether or not matter is itself, and in its own right, a body. The reason 
why such a thought would occur comes from two texts primarily.  
 
Firstly there are the words of Diogenes Laertius: 
 
They  [the  Stoics]  think  that  there  are  two  principles  of  the 
universe,  that  which  acts  and  that  which  is  acted  upon.  That 
which  is  acted  upon  is  unqualified  substance,  i.e.  matter;  that 
which  acts  is  the  reason  in  it,  i.e.  god…the  principles  are  also 
bodies and without form
75. (Trans. L&S) 
 
Secondly are the words of Cicero: “that only a body was capable of acting or being 
acted upon
76”. It seems clear that matter is a body, but that it is not the only thing 
that is body in the universe. Given the assertion that “only body can act or be acted 
upon”, and the exclusive disjunctive sense that I understand this to have, it seems 
that the Stoic universe is at base populated by at least two different bodies. If the 
only  sort  of  thing  that  can  act  or  be  acted  upon  is a  body  then  the  principles of 
existence  must  be  bodies,  else  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  the  world  could  get 
started. If the material principle is a body then it follows that it can be acted upon. 
But  if  that  is  the  case  then  it  cannot  act.  However  as  we  will  see  below  it  is 
reasonable to suppose that the Stoics used “body” in two ways: of the principles and 
of the objects in the world. The phrase of Cicero‟s then has two interpretations:  
 
1) In relation to principles only one can act and the other be acted upon;  
                                                 
75 Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (=L&S 44B = SVF 2.300, part, 2.299).  
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2) For things in the world only bodies have any causal efficacy because they are the 
only things capable of acting and/or being acted upon.  
 
The  Stoics  are  employing  the  same  tricks  of  ambiguity  that  Plato  does  in  the 
Parmenides so that confusion seeps in through misunderstanding and polemic. The 
Stoics say one thing of body which is true but takes on different meanings of truth 
depending on the use of “body” – and for the Stoics there are two. If only body can 
act at the level of principles then it follows that there is another body - the active 
principle – whose role it is to act on the passive principle. It then follows that some 
explanation  is  needed  as  to  how  both  a  passive  material  principle  and  an  active 
principle can be bodies.  
 
If there is any doubt that the active principle is to be considered as bodily consider 
Aristocles: 
 
He  [Zeno]  says  that  fire  is  the  element  of  what  exists,  like 
Heraclitus, and that fire has as its principles god and matter, like 
Plato. But Zeno says that they are both bodies, both that which 
acts and that which is acted upon, whereas Plato says that the 
first active cause is incorporeal
77. (Trans. L&S) 
 
The active principle of the Stoics is clearly contrasted to the incorporeal first cause of 
Plato. It follows that Aristocles certainly thinks that the Stoics conceive of god (since 
he is the active principle) as corporeal. The only sense that this can have, given that 
he must differ from the material principle, is that the active is simply active in 
contrast to the material principle simply being passive: These are just their natures
78. 
 
Both  Diogenes  Laertius  and  pseudo -Galen
79  assert  as  a  definition  of  body  the 
standard  mathematical  definition:  “body  is what  has  threefold  extension  –  length, 
                                                 
77 Aristocles (Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation I 5.I4.I) (=L&S 45G = SVF 1.98, part)  
78 God would be the cause of his being active, since it is his nature and he is the principle of quality while 
matter would require no cause of its lack of disposition. God is active  because that simply is what he is 
and matter is passive because that is simply what it is.   
79 On Incorporeal Qualities 19.483, 13-16 (=L&S 45F = SVF 2.381, part) where he adds resistance to the 
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breadth and depth; this is also called solid body.
80” In the light of this it is easy to 
understand why some commentators, such as Sorabji
81, have considered the active 
and  passive  principles  to  be  aspects  of  something  more  fundamental  –  body. 
However this clearly cannot be the case for two reasons: 
 
1.  If this were  the  case  then  apoios  ousia  could  not  be  prime  matter  since  it 
would rely on something below it for its existence, violating one of the key 
attributes of prime matter. 
  
2.  If  “body”  were  a  single  something  that  existed  below  both  god  and  apoios 
ousia then it would violate the principle that Cicero gave us: that only body 
can act or be acted upon.  
 
Instead it seems that the most plausible way to understand the situation is as was 
suggested above: that god and apoios ousia are in fact both bodies, but disposed in 
different ways that correspond to their two very different roles in the world. The next 
section,  which  discusses  the  interaction  of  the  active  and  passive  principles,  will 
explore Sorabji‟s understanding of the two principles as incorporeal aspects of a more 
fundamental body by drawing in more of the Stoics physics as our understanding of 
the active principle increases.  
 
Despite the strong evidence that the principles are corporeal there is the text in the 
Suda,  parallel  to  Diogenes  Laertius  7.134,  which  states  the  principles  are  in  fact 
incorporeal. However the overwhelming evidence is that they are both corporeal, and 
this is reinforced by the absence of the principles from the lists of incorporeals
82. Any 
interpretation that uses this text as support for the notion that the principles are 
incorporeal, or aspects of a more primitive substance, will be shown in the remainder 
of this chapter to be based on further misunderstandings: The most common being 
the mistaken understanding of the nature and role of pneuma. Pneuma will be shown 
to be simply another name for the active principle while it is performing a particular 
function and not a compound of fire and air as is often mistakenly thought.     
                                                 
80  DL  7.135  (=L&S  45E  =SVF  3  Apollodorus  6,  part)  (Trans.  L&S)  This  definition  is  also,  confusingly, 
shared  with  void  and  place  but  this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section.  The  Stoics‟  interest  in 
mathematics will be explored in chapter three.   
81 Sorabji 1998.  
82 E.g. Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 10.218, (=L&S 27D = SVF 2.331, part) “They [the Stoics] 
say that of somethings some are bodies, others incorporeals, and they list four species of incorporeals – 
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Further  evidence  that  the  Stoics  thought  there  was  a  single  underlying  material 
substrate of the sensible world can be found in Calcidius. Calcidius informs us that 
Zeno  believed  in  an  underlying  substrate  and  that  this  is  to  be  understood  as 
“universal body”: “Zeno says that this very substance is finite and that it is the one 
common substrate of everything which exists.
83” and:  
 
And so the universal body, according to the Stoics, is limited and 
one and whole and substance. It is whole, because it does not lack 
any parts; it is one, because its parts are inseparable and mutually 
coherent with themselves; it is substance, because it is the prime 
matter  of  all  bodies…But  while  substance  changes,  it  does  not 
perish either as a whole or by the destruction of its parts…for even 
though all bodies disintegrate by some chance, matter still exists 
always
84. (Trans. L&S) 
 
Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus
85  support  Calcidius‟  assertions  about  the 
Stoics in general, ascribing to them the belief in an “unqualified substance (apoios 
ousia): i.e. matter
86”. This, according to Diogenes, differs, as in Calcidius, from the 
elements in that it is indestructible and  without form. We have, then, substantial 
evidence that the Stoics, from their very foundation, believed in the efficacy of the 
corporeal alone and, further, that they believed in an underlying substrate that fulfils 
the requirements we met above to be classed as Prime Matter: it is indestructible, it 
is  devoid  of  inherent  shape,  it  always  exists  relying  on  nothing  else  for  that 
existence  and  most  importantly  it  underlies  all  change  in  the  corporeal  world. 
Calcidius‟  rather  odd  comment  that  all  bodies  will  disintegrate  while  matter,  or 
apoios  ousia,  will  remain  constant  can  be  understood  as  a  fallacy  on  his  part.  It 
seems likely that he is now referring to the second use of the term “body” where it is 
something that comes about subsequent to the interaction of the two principles
87. It 
                                                 
83 Calcidius 292 (=L&S 44D part, = SVF 1.88, part) (Trans. L&S)  
84 Calcidius 293 (=L&S 44E part).   
85  Sextus Empiricus  Against  the  Professors  9.75-6  (=L&S  44C =  SVF  2.311):  “The  substance  of what 
exists, they [the Stoics] say, since it is without any motion from itself and shapeless, needs to be set in 
motion and shaped by some cause.”  
86 Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (=L&S 44B part = SVF 2.300, part, 2.299). 
87 A not uncommon mistake or criticism. Amongst others Plotinus ( Enneads 6.1 [42] 26 [17-23] = 17c4 
Sorabji vol. 2) in his criticism of the Stoics also makes matter a principle of body, saying that all bodies 
are compounds of matter and form. When he does consider the actual Stoic position, that matter is really 
passively disposed mathematical body, he dismisses it out of hand.   35  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
is of course true to say that the elements, which are formed by the interaction of the 
active on the passive, are bodies too and that they will disintegrate but it does not 
follow that all bodies do so since the indestructible principles are themselves bodies.  
 
We have seen that the Stoics call body that which is extended in three-dimensions, 
and that this will apply to the passive principle and to the active principle. The active 
principle, responsible for all qualities, is, like prime matter, a body; not an aspect of 
an  underlying  body  as  we  noted  Sorabji  suggest  above.  Pseudo-Galen
88  and 
Alexander of Aphrodisias attack the notion of quality as body, using largely the same 
arguments
89. Large amounts of Alexander‟s discussion, though not all
90, seem to be 
directed specifically against the Stoics.  The disparity in the force of the arguments 
could be explained by Alexander‟s discussing the arguments for their own sake and 
the Stoics happen to be a convenient school on which to test them out. Alexander 
notes several arguments against the notion that qualities are bodies. However the 
force of some of his objections is mitigated by the fact that he is taking the notion in 
a  very  common  sense  way  and  not  directly  against  the  more  sophisticated  Stoic 
categorisation  of  “qualifieds”  over  “qualities”.  Alexander‟s  discussion  opens  up  an 
interesting discussion into the notion of pneuma which he does not discuss directly 
here but will have resonances with the discussion of total blending found in the final 
part of this chapter
91. Although Alexander‟s text may not have been written for the 
purpose  of attacking  the  Stoics  it  is interesting  to  note  how  his arguments affect 
them and what their potential responses to the points made could have been. By 
showing the Stoics as being capable of answering the criticisms of a position that 
they are known to have held we will see more clearly the way in which their concept 
of body and its relation to quality may best understood. By understanding the active 
principle‟s function and existence as a body the correlate function and existence of 
the  passive  principle  as  a  body  too  will  be  better  understood.  Pseudo-Galen‟s 
understanding of body as three dimensional with resistance, which really poses the 
greatest  problem  will  be  seen  to  be  based  on  the  same  modus  operandi  as 
                                                 
88 Although they could both be basing their understanding on a third source.  
89 As Dillon (1993) makes clear Alcinous in his Didaskalikos uses five formal arguments in favour of the 
position that qualities are incorporeal. He takes the direction of the arguments to be against the Stoics as 
they are the target to be most likely argued against. The arguments put forward in the Didaskalikos differ 
in style and somewhat in content from pseudo-Galen, though there are in fact quite strong similarities to 
the text of the Mantissa, and this does not discount a possible single source for all three texts. 
90  Alexander  Mantissa  ss6,  123,21-24  would,  as  Sharples  points  out  in  his  translation,  have  no  force 
against the Stoics and Alexander seems too well versed in Stoicism to think it would do.  
91 That discussion is focused on Alexander‟s De Mixtione but he does discuss the notion of two bodies 
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Alexander‟s criticisms: viz. understanding “body” in a common sense way when the 
Stoics do not  even understand mundane body in a common  sense  way, let alone 
body as principle or quality.    
 
I  will  not  discuss  all  the  objections  raised  by  Alexander  but  some  of  the  more 
interesting ones are: 
  
1)  Quality is not a substance because the two are of a different nature. Every 
body is a substance. Therefore quality is not a body
92.  
2)  If quality were a body it would be tangible. Whiteness is a quality but is not 
tangible. Whiteness is not a body. Therefore quality is not a body
93.  
3)  Every body possesses a quality. If quality is a body then every quality will 
have a quality. That quality possessed by the quality will be a body and so 
possess a quality. This will continue  ad infinitum. The implication of this is 
that if this is not the case then the chain ends arbitrarily and there would be 
no reason to suppose that the first quality is a body
94.  
4)  If qualities are bodies then the bodies that they are said of should be either 
increased by their presence or diminished by their absence. This is not the 
case
95.  
5)  If qualities are “chased out” by a new quality coming in then where will the 
“retreating” quality go? If it is a body it must have a place
96.  
6)  Bodies do not perish into non-being but qualities do. Therefore a quality is not 
a body
97.  
Alexander‟s most ingenious argument is really an embellishment of 3 above where 
he argues against the notion of quality as body. This elaboration is found at 123,36-
124,9 where he says: 
 
Moreover, if quality is body, and every body is either matter or 
composed of matter and quality, one or  other of these options 
will apply to quality too. Well, for it to be matter is impossible; so 
what  is  left  is  to  say  that  quality  is  composed  of  matter  and 
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94 123,4-7. 
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quality. But if so, then, first, quality will not be quality but matter 
and  quality  (for  these  are  different  from  each  other),  and 
moreover the quality that is combined with the matter will also 
itself be matter and quality, if it is a body, and so on to infinity, 
and there will be an infinite number of matters in each quality. 
For if matter is quality, every body that is in actuality will not be 
composed of matter and quality, but of quality and quality; that 
is of matter and matter, if matter and quality are the same thing. 
And there will be no difference between matter and body which is 
actual. But if this is so, and matter is without quality, body which 
is actual, too, will be without quality, and either quality will not 
even  exist  at  all,  or  there  will  be  no  body  other  than  quality. 
(Trans. Sharples)  
 
This has a strong resemblance to the argument that we will see him deploy against 
the Stoic notion of total blending vis-à-vis pneuma and matter. This argument has 
very interesting implications for the discussion of the active principle that will take 
place in the next part of the chapter but it will be enough for the moment to suggest 
that for the Stoics things are the other way round. That is: everything is bodily and 
quality is the result of body acting on body. Pneuma, which is responsible for the 
qualities that exist in the world, is indeed a synonym for god and as such is rationally 
disposed  body.  But  that  is  simply  what  god  is,  there  is  nothing  of  which  the 
rationality is “said” in the way that whiteness is said of wood. God is rationality and 
rationality is body rationally disposed: nothing more.  
 
As  with  the  issue  of  total  blending  the  problem  seems to  arise  through  a  lack  of 
understanding of the terminology involved. The Stoics are using language in their 
own particular way. The responses that are presented below are a supposition on my 
part, but they are supported by way of fitting into the framework of Stoicism that I 
have been arguing for and will continue to do so in the rest of the chapter.  
 
For the first objection it is true that for an Aristotelian substance is to be found in 
bodies that are compounded of form and matter
98 but for the Stoics the apoios ousia 
is a substance. Granted apoios ousia is different from quality too but if one principle 
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is  a  substance  then  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  perhaps  not  everyday 
qualities  are  substances  but  that  the  thing  responsible  for  quality  –  god  –  is  a 
substance too.  
 
The second objection rests on a primitive understanding of what it is to be a body. 
However pseudo-Galen
99 does state that a body for the Stoics is three -dimensional 
with resistance which suggests that tangibility is indeed something that is intrinsic to 
body. However the Neo-Platonists accept immaterial bodies. The Stoics quite clearly 
do not but perhaps they shift their understanding of “body” depending on what body 
it is that they are talking about. After all the majority of texts omit resistance from 
their definitions. The bodies that are compounded of matter and god are indeed “with 
resistance”. God can remain a body – extended in three dimensions – without having 
resistance. While it is utterly reasonable to suppose that tangibility is something that 
all bodies posses it is clearly not something to be taken for granted as the Platonists‟ 
acceptance  of  incorporeal  bodies  shows.  By  rejecting  resistance  as  a  necessary 
condition of being a body the Stoics may move into the uncomfortable territory of 
accepting a mathematical definition of body as that of sensible body too, but it would 
hardly be the strangest thing they did. Tangibility is surely itself a quality and is no 
more than implied by the notion of resistance but the connection is no stronger than 
between resistance and three-dimensionality. What we come to in response to this, 
which I see as the most troubling objection, is that the Stoics use the term “body” in 
more than one way; that is they use it to refer to two different sort of things. As 
extended in three dimensions the principles are bodies, but they are not tangible as 
they do not exist by themselves. The bodies in the world are rendered tangible by 
the activity of the active principle on the passive. That is why there are two diverging 
definitions of body in relation to the Stoics. One is a mathematical one, which any 
Platonist  would  accept  as  applying  to  principles,  which  for  the  Stoics  represents 
geometrical mathematics as it has the strongest relation to the sensible world. The 
second is a physical one – “with resistance” – which applies to sensible bodies. The 
principles are not sensible, though they are corporeal, so the second definition does 
not apply to them. Pseudo-Galen fails to take into account the complexities of Stoic 
physics when he used his definition in such a broad fashion. Alexander followed him, 
or  their  mutual  source,  in  this polemic as  is evidenced  by  his continued  use  of a 
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simple understanding of body when the De Mixtione shows him as capable of much 
more.  
 
The third objection can be answered by saying, surely, that every quality is its own 
quality. Whiteness possesses no other quality than that of being white. Besides the 
notion  that  quality  exists  independently  is  mistaken.  Not  even  god  exists 
independently. But a quality such as whiteness is the result of god acting on matter, 
not of whiteness by itself acting on matter or a separately existing body.  
 
The fourth objection, as will be explained in section 1.2.3, ignores the point of the 
Stoic theory of total blending – the theory that allows two bodies to exist in the same 
place at the same time. This theory, I will argue, has the particular application to god 
and matter alone or if to be used in response to this argument to matter and quality.   
The  fifth  and  sixth  objections  rest  on  similar  misunderstandings  that  come  from 
using  an  unsophisticated  and  non-philosophical  understanding  of  the  terms.  The 
qualities are not “chased out”; the qualities are the disposition of the active principle 
in the passive. The weakness of the arguments here makes it likely that the Stoics 
are not being actively argued against so much as being targets to argue against for 
the sake of the examination of the arguments themselves. 
 
The  active  principle‟s  disposition  in  the  passive  can  change,  that  is  all  that  is 
happening. The difference of quality is a difference in the pneuma that is responsible 
for the outward appearance of the quality. Nor does this entail that the quality has 
perished as such. The cause of the quality itself – god – remains and he remains 
essentially unchanged just as body remains unchanged during alterations.  
 
The Stoics are most often attributed with calling this substance which is the “prime 
matter  of  all  bodies”  apoios  ousia,  to  paschon  (the  passive),  hylē  (matter)  and 
aschēmatistos  (shapeless).  In  the  Latin  writers  it  is  often  rendered  as  essentia 
(substance),  substantia  (substrate),  corpus  (body),  silva  (matter).  Most  of  these 
terms  indicate  that  the  substance  under  discussion  is  prime;  it  is  after  all  called 
unformed  and  shapeless,  substance  and  substrate
100. There is  still the distinction 
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between primary and proximate matter but the Stoics are quite clear about this and 
this  will  be  shown  in  the  next  section.  The  terms  that  are  used  here  can  be 
considered  slightly  ambiguous  in  that  not  all  definitively  state  that  the  passive 
principle does not have any properties.  We saw above that the Stoics understand 
their material principle to be subsumed under the definition of mathematical body. 
However Sextus Empiricus suggests that apoios ousia is completely devoid of any 
properties: “The substance of what exists, they [the Stoics] say, since it is without 
any motion from itself and shapeless, needs to be set in motion and shaped by some 
cause.
101” This thing that needs to be set in motion and shaped can only be apoios 
ousia  as  Sextus  makes  clear  a  few  sentences  later:  “So,  then,  the  power  which 
moves  matter  and  guides  it  in  due  order  into  generations  and  changes  is 
everlasting.” It is clear that Sextus considers matter for the Stoics to be without any 
essential  qualities.  That  apoios  ousia  qualifies  as  fulfilling  the  definition  of  matter 
used in the preceding section was shown in the words of Calcidius above and  has 
been reinforced here. It is beyond doubt that the Stoics have a material principle of 
the sensible world that is completely passive, constant in its existence and does not 
rely on anything else for its existence. But it is also becoming clear that it is not 
entirely devoid of all characteristics as Sextus would have us believe. On a primitive 
level it has the property of being passive and being able to be manipulated. On a 
more sophisticated level we can understand apoios ousia not as a simple and bare 
“stuff”  that  Loux  and  Cohen  could  criticise  as  incomprehensible  and  ludicrously 
simple, but  rather  it  is  a  complex  body  to  be  understood  through  the  medium  of 
mathematics and mathematical principles. In the first section of this chapter it was 
noted that apoios ousia is not bare because it is extended in three dimensions. In the 
present section an explanation for pseudo-Galen‟s assertion that resistance is to be 
added to the definition was offered on the basis that the Stoics use the term “body” 
quite  loosely  to  describe  two  sorts  of  things.  Bodilyness  is  clearly  of  the  utmost 
importance to the Stoics and they define the material principle as body and use a 
mathematical definition to  explain the nature  of this body, and if pseudo-Galen is 
reporting actual Stoic doctrine, add resistance to bodies formed of both the active 
and  passive  principles.  The  Stoics  use  mathematics  to  think  of  the  archetypal 
ekmageion  because  they  have  come  out  of  the  Academy.  However  while  the 
Academy uses mathematics to understand the very nature of reality the Stoics have 
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Posidonius wished to separate out the active and passive principles so radically.  
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used mathematics to justify their understanding of apoios ousia but then make little 
further  use  of  it.  For  Aristotle  we  noted  that  he  needs  incorporeal  or  intelligible 
matter to make sense of geometrical objects. The Stoics, I suggest, saw no need for 
this  and  building  on  the  geometrical  atomism  of  the  Timaeus  asserted  three-
dimensional  extension  as  sufficient  explanation. If we  are  to  understand  the  Stoic 
notion of apoios ousia fully it is therefore necessary to go back to the Timaeus and 
look in general at mathematical principles
102.        
 
In the first section of the present chapter it was thought to be helpful to explore the 
main alternative to substratum theory: bundle theory. This was because it is always 
helpful to have an alternative theory in mind to clarify the  pros and cons of any idea 
and also because there is good evidence to suggest that Plato was a bundle theorist 
about the sensible world and he is very important to the background of the Stoic‟s 
material  principle.  The  Stoics  are  often  compared  to  their  contemporaries:  the 
Epicureans. They  famously were not believers in a material substrate at  all. They 
were atomists. Now, whether or not the Stoics do not believe in atomism because 
they  do  not  believe  in  intra-cosmic  void,  or  whether  they  do  not  believe  in  void 
because of their rejection of atomism has no bearing here. Either way it is clear that 
they reject atomism and its implications. But what would prevent them believing that 
all things were bundles of properties with no underlying matter? 
 
1) Bundle theory implies real universal properties
103, but the Stoics are against the 
real existence of universals, Zeno is widely attested to have taught that universals 
are figments of our soul and not really something
104. But the thought was really 
codified by Chrysippus who reduced all statements apparently involving universals to 
logical statements only involving particulars
105, thus forcing a rejection of bundle 
theory.  
 
                                                 
102 The argument for the Stoics‟ interest in mathematics will be given at the end of chapter 3, after the 
discussion of the Old Academy. 
103 Traditional bundle theory requires the actual existence of universals in each bundle. So an object is no 
more than the sum of a bundle of universal properties, which are the same for each object which partakes 
of the same property. With no underlying substrate if an individual gains a new quality then it will become 
a new object, allowing for no persistence through change. It would be difficult in that case to see what 
really existed at all since no thing aside from the universal  qualities would persist and universal qualities, 
existing in this way, are denied by the Stoics so nothing would exist in a primary way at all. It is possible 
to hold a bundle theory where objects are made of bundles of particulars but this  also suffers from the 
same problem of persistence over time and through change  as well as the issue of indiscernibility . See 
Armstrong 1980, and 1978.  
104 E.g. Stobaeus 1.136,21-137,6 (= L&S 30A = SVF 1.65), Aetius 1.10.5 (= L&S 30B = SVF 1.65).  
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2) The Stoics do not rely on matter to act as the principle of differentiation. Instead 
they  rely  on  quality,  and  it  is  possible  for  two  bundles  to  posses  the  identical 
universal  properties  making  two  things  identical
106; a conclusion which the Stoics 
would not accept:  
 
One can hear them [the Stoics], and find them in many works, 
disagreeing  with  the  Acad emics  and  crying  that  they  confuse 
everything by their “indiscernibilities” and force a single qualified 
individual to occupy two substances
107.  
 
3) While bundle theory can account for change through the alteration or exchanging 
of quality it is difficult t o see basic corporeality as a quality that corporeal things 
posses,  since  on  the  Stoic  view  all  things  are  corporeal  things  it  becomes  like 
existence: i.e. not a real predicate.  
    
That the Stoics held that only bodies were capable of acting or being act ed upon 
does not compel them to hold the doctrine that there is a material substrate. After all 
a bundle of properties in the bundle theorists‟ eyes is still a corporeal object. Rather 
their  whole  ontology  suggests  that  bundle  theory  is  not  consistent  and  that  a 
material substrate is necessary.  
 
In  common  with  their  predecessors  the  Stoics  thought  that  the  transmutation  of 
elements  was  not  only  possible  but  rather  a  fundamental  aspect  of  reality.  While 
there  are  those  who  try  to  explain  Aristotle‟s  account  of  elemental  transmutation 
without recourse to primary matter
108 these answers are, in the end, unsatisfactory. 
In his discussion of who believes in qualityless body as the first matter Simplicius 
explains why, in his opinion, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoic s all believed in Prime 
matter: 
 
For  when  first  introducing  matter  by  deriving  it  from  change, 
Aristotle and Plato intend the qualities of the elements to be hot, 
cold, dry and fluid. Since these qualities have the body as their 
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common substrate they change with respect to it, so that body will 
be prime matter.
109 (Trans. Sorabji) 
 
He clearly sees considerations regarding elemental transmutation as fundamental to 
these philosophers, and it is interesting to note that he classes all three together
110. 
King  and  o thers  have  tried  to  get  around  this  by  accounting  for  elemental 
transmutation by means of exchanging one of the two qualities that each element 
possesses
111. The issue of elemental transmutation is relevant to the Stoics as is 
shown by numerous texts, includ ing the justification used above by Simplicius. The 
Stoics clearly make use of the elements and do so in a way that would be familiar to 
most  ancient  philosophers.  The  elements  are  clearly  bodies  and  are  made  the 
elements  they  are  by  the  action  of  the  form ative  principle,  which  I  have  been 
referring to as either god or the active. The full relationship of the elements to our 
topic will be explored in the next section, but for the moment it is worth questioning 
how elements would be supposed to  interact if there were no material principle. The 
active principle can only impart properties to the elements, and it is the properties of 
the objects that interact. But they can only interact because they contain a passive 
aspect and this passive aspect cannot be rece ived from the active principle else the 
Stoics would contradict their assertion that only body can act  or be acted upon. This 
notion rests on the underlying assumption that no body can act on itself. This is the 
reason  the  active  principle  requires the  passive  principle. The  material  principle is 
thus  absolutely  necessary  as  part  of  the  explanation  of  how  the  elements,  and 
ultimately every subsequent body, can interact.      
 
It has been sufficiently shown not only that the Stoics certainly and unambiguously 
taught that a material substrate of the type that was described in the first part of this 
chapter existed, but also that it is integral to their physics. Apoios ousia has been 
shown  to  lack  all  definitive  qualities  being  understood  only  as  three  dimensional 
extension  which  receives  properties.  We  have  also  seen  how  both  the  active  and 
passive principles are to be understood as bodies and how this can be understood, 
                                                 
109 Simplicius in Phys. 227,23-228,20 (= Sorabji Vol.2, 17e.6), this is one of several reasons he gives. The 
others being that the elements‟ generation from opposites underlying body is impossible; that qualityless 
body is irreducible; that Plato needs Primary matter for his account in the Timaeus; that really Aristotle 
should think qualityless body is the substrate and matter else there will be a natural substance which is 
incorporeal.  
110 Although the inclusion of Plato in this group is probably due to Simplicius‟ being influenced by Aristotle 
Physics 4.2, 209b11-13, which, I will show later, erroneously suggests that the receptacle of the Timaeus 
is an attempt to describe matter.  
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and why this would be the case. The next section will build on the work done here 
and explore further the relationship of matter to god and show how together they 
account  for  the  world.  Later  I  will  show  how  the  two  principles  are  so  intimately 
related that they are said to exist in the same place at the same time, and how this 
is one of the Stoics‟ most ingenious concepts.  
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1.2.2 Apoios Ousia and its Relation to the Active Principle:  
 
The  nature  of  prime  matter  has  been  established,  now  its  relation  to  the  guiding 
force of nature will be examined in order to more clearly bring out its role. For, as we 
shall  see,  it  is  in  the  relationship  of  the  active  to  the  passive  that  the  real 
understanding of the nature and role of Stoic prime matter is to be found, not in a 
single  examination  of  prime  matter  simpliciter
112.  The  first  two  sections  of  this 
chapter have suggested the mathematical nature of the passive principle, and the 
bodily nature of both principles. This section, and the next, will look primarily at the 
nature of the active principle and how it is that this principle can be understood as 
bodily too and still perform the function that the Stoics wish. In order to demonstrate 
the  interaction  of  the  active  and  passive  principles  this  section  will  be  largely 
concerned  with  showing  that  the  active  principle  is  also  known  as  pneuma.  The 
reason that showing the active principle to be another name for pneuma is important 
is that the majority understanding of pneuma is as a compound of fire and air. The 
issue that this raises is that pneuma is taken to represent the active principle, with 
the  result  that  the  passive  is  understood  as  the  elements  earth  and  water  –  an 
interpretation especially prevalent in the ancient world. The issues that prevent the 
elements functioning as prime matter were noted above and so any picture which 
supposes that they can act in this way must be wrong. The section following this will 
discuss  the interaction of the  principles in  more  detail by  showing  how  the  Stoics 
argued that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time – their doctrine of 
total  blending.  By  removing  the  need  for  this  idea  to  apply  to  pneuma  qua 
compound, it will be seen that matter is indeed properly understood as a body since 
the theory of total blending applies to bodies being in the same place at the same 
time but can only apply to the principles. So, in order to understand the material 
principle properly it is indeed necessary to discuss and understand the true nature of 
its correlate: the active principle.      
 
The Stoic active principle is often mentioned along with the passive since the two are 
constantly conjoined and only conceptually distinct. The active principle is variously 
characterised  as  god,  reason  (logos),  nature,  Zeus,  a  designing  fire  (pyr 
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technikon
113), fate and “a breath pervading the whole world
114”. These are what the 
active is called and its attributes are as follows: it is a body
115; else it could not act; 
it is indestructible
116  and un-generated
117  and  at  the  end  of  the  cosmos‟  allotted 
lifespan  god  turns  everything  into  fire
118,  meaning:  “[god]  has  the  whole  of 
substance  as  his  commanding  faculty;  this  is  whenever  the  conflagration  is  in 
being
119”. When the cosmos is in this state it is in complete sympathy with itself and 
all is a  complete  unity.  The  evidence  for  the  nature  and  importance  of the  active 
principle is, if anything, even stronger and more consistent than the reports about 
the passive principle. This should not be surprising as the acting reason which directs 
every action in the cosmos and is responsible for its continuing order and eventual 
destruction  would  quite  reasonably  be  the  focus  of  more  discussion  than  that  on 
which it acts.  
 
So, what does the active do to the passive? As noted above the passive principle 
does not actually exist qua passive principle, alone and by itself, at any point. It is 
always endowed with some form. During the time of ekpyrosis, when the current, 
formed, cosmos is not yet in existence, the passive principle is minimally informed in 
the manner of fire. It happens to be that this most simple of instantiations (simple 
because  it  is  a  single  thing  as  opposed  to  the  myriad  complexity  of  the  present 
world) is when both god and the passive principle are as close to their “pure” forms 
as they can be. Following generations of philosophers, but strongly in the footsteps of 
Heraclitus,  the  Stoics  accepted  the  importance  and  primacy  of  fire  among  the 
elements. As Stobaeus informs us fire was, for Zeno and Chrysippus, the element par 
excellence:  
 
                                                 
113 Aetius 1.7.33 (L&S 46A1 = SVF 2.1027, part) calls god a “designing fire”, a fire that either does not 
destroy  other  things  in  order  to  sustain  itself  and  creates  or  else  does  destroy  other  things  but  also 
creates. On either understanding “designing fire” is a completely different sort of fire from everyday fire, 
similar only by virtue of its name. Stobaeus tells us the difference between the two types of fire (see note 
124 below).   
114 Aetius 1.7.33 (=L&S 46A2 = SVF 2.1027, part). (Trans. L&S) 
115 Aristocles (Eusebius), Evangelical Preparation 15.14.1 (=L&S 45G part, = SVF 1.98, part). 
116 Diogenes Laertius 7.137 (=L&S 44F = SVF 2.56, part). 
117 Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 9.75-6 (=L&S 44C4 = SVF 2.311, part). 
118  Plutarch  On  Stoic  Self-Contradictions  1053B  (=L&S  46F  =  SVF  2.605,  part),  Aristocles  (Eusebius, 
Evangelical Preparation 15.14.2) (=L&S 46G = SVF 1.98, part), Origin, Against Celsus 4.14 (=L&S 46H = 
SVF  1.1052,  part),  Alexander  Lycopolis  19,2-4  (=L&S  46I),  Eusebius,  Evangelical  Preparation  15.18.2 
(=L&S 46K = SVF 2.596, part), Philo, On the Indestructability of the World 90 (=L&S 46M = SVF 1.511, 
part). Theophrastus too seems to have marked a distinction between two types of fire, see note 160 below 
for references.  
119 Origin Against Celsus, 4.14 (=L&S46H, part = SVF 1.1052, part). (Trans. L&S) 47  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
The element par excellence is so called because the remainder are 
composed out of it in the first place by alteration and into it lastly 
everything  is  diffused  and  dissolved,  but  it  does  not  admit  of 
diffusion  or  resolution  into  something  else.  On  the  basis  of  this 
account fire is called an element sui generis, since it is not with 
another one
120. (Trans. L&S) 
 
In the continuous never ending, nor beginning, cycle of cosmos and conflagration, 
the world alternates between being in a state when it exists entirely as fire and being 
as  it  is  now.  From  the   state  of  conflagration  there  is  a  procession  by  way  of 
condensation  into  air  and  thence  to  water  and  earth   until  the  present  world  is 
formed. This cycle of transmutation then leads to the more developed world we see 
around us until the force of fire once again overwhelms the other elements and turns 
them all back into itself. So even at the conflagration, the cessation of  the present 
cosmos, the two principles are constantly conjoined. Indeed it is this fact that made 
Chrysippus reluctant to characterize the conflagration as death:  
 
For  since  death  is  the  separation  of  the  soul  (psychē)  from  the 
body,  and  the  soul  of  the  world  is  not  separated  but  grows 
continuously until it has completely used up its matter (hylē) on 
itself, the world must not be said to die
121. (Trans. L&S) 
 
The active principle is the  soul of the “living universe” and the passive principle can 
analogously  be  understood  to  be  its  body.  On  the  basis  of  the  above  passage  it 
seems that at the conflagration god turns everything that exists into something as 
close to “soul” as is possible. Fire is the most fundamental type of form that matter 
can possess so it is to this that god reverts when conflagration occurs so that during 
it  he  “retires  into  himself,  and  is  with  himself
122”,  the  most  perfect  and  divine 
situation.  
 
We have seen that each cosmic cycle begins its existence as fire and it is through a 
system of condensation and rarefaction that the remaining elements come into being. 
This  does  not  happen  from  a  purely  mechanical  cause  but  instead  it  is  god  who 
                                                 
120 Stobaeus 1.129,2-130,13 (=L&S 47A = SVF 2.413, part).  
121 Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1052c-d (=L&S 46E1 = SVF 2.604, part). 
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directs this action through reason and by necessity. The active principle acts on the 
passive in the first instance to ensure the instantiation of this fire (pyr atechnon
123 
[non-creative fire] – to be distinguished from the description of god as pyr technikon 
[creative fire]). But in order to be able to do so god must be a body since only body 
can act or be acted upon. This maxim from Cicero
124  is most likely intended, in the 
context in which it occurs, to refer to bodies that exist in the world; that is those that 
consist of one part of apoios ousia and another of god. However it is clearly one of 
the Stoics‟ most basic maxims that incorporeals have no causal efficacy and there is 
no reason to suppose that this would not be true of the principles
125. There is, as we 
saw above, also the statement from Aristocles
126 to the effect that Zeno taught that 
the principles were both bodies in distinction from Plato who taught that the active 
cause  was  in  fact  incorporeal. Nemesius reports
127  arguments allegedly  used  by 
Cleanthes and Chrysippus to demonstrate that the soul is a body; and above we saw 
Chrysippus‟  own  words  calling  the  active  principle  the  “soul  of  the  world”.  The 
implication is clear: if “soul” in general is body there is no reason to suppose that the 
soul of the world will be of a different nature.  
 
As was noted in the previous section there are those who attempt to understand the 
active  and  passive  principles as  being  two  aspects  of a  single  underlying  body
128. 
Richard Sorabji
129 attempts to relegate  apoios ousia to a lower level of complexity 
than god. If, he argues, god is to be viewed as pneuma then he must be disposed in 
a certain way. This is because Sorabji understands pneuma itself to be a compound 
of form and matter
130. It then follows that what possesses form would in fact belong 
to the third of the Stoic categories, wh ich would be impossible for a principle
131 as 
disposition is posterior to , and relies on,   the principles.  Apoios  ousia  clearly  falls 
under the first category as it is the substrate of all things in the world. God is a body 
and so has to fall under the four categories but cannot fall under the first, third or 
fourth. It then follows that god, as principle of qualification or property giving, is in 
category two. However this does not make it the case that:  “(God in his role as) 
                                                 
123 Stobaeus 1.213,15-21 (=L&S 46D = SVF 1.120, part).  
124 Cicero Academica 1.39 (=L&S 45A = SVF 1.90).  
125 As we noted Alexander above arguing against the Stoics for holding that qualities are bodies. 
126 Aristocles (Eusebius), Evangelical Preparation 15.14.1 (=L&S 45G part, = SVF 1.98, part). 
127 Nemesius 78,7-79,2 (=L&S 45C = SVF 1.518, part). 
128 E.g. Lapidge 1973 argues for an underlying protē hylē beneath both apoios ousia and god.  
129 Sorabji 1988, p. 93-98. Todd 1978 p.140-143 also argues that the principles are to be understood as 
aspects a single body and so to be themselves incorporeal.  
130 The nature of pneuma will be discussed below.  
131 The four Stoic categories are: 1) substrate ( hupokeimenon), 2) qualified (poion), 3) disposed (pōs 
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principle is a compound of matter and intelligence, and is not a simple entity
132”. On 
this picture god is not to be viewed as a single breath which permeates the apoios 
ousia thereby forming it into the cosmos. Instead god becomes a compound within a 
compound.  
 
This picture  leads to  several  problems, not  least  one  which  Sorabji  himself points 
out: that god‟s existence seems to presuppose that which he is supposed to bring 
into existence. At p. 96 Sorabji claims that god in his role as cause is incorporeal and 
so cannot be either the matter on which he acts, the fire or the pneuma which he 
then  produces.  But  the  idea  that  the  cause  par  excellence  is  incorporeal  is  not 
supported  by  any  text  other  than  the  Suda
133  and  in  any  case  is  categorically  
opposed to the Stoics‟ clear preference for corporeal explanations. The clear majority 
of  textual  evidence  supports  the  view  that  there  are  two  distinct,  at  least 
conceptually, bodies both of which are principles and one of which acts on the other 
to  create  the  cosmos.  Sorabji‟s  elaborate  defence  of  making  god  a  compound 
disposed in a certain way acting on himself to form a new compound not only has no 
textual  support  but  negates  any  reason  for  the  Stoics‟  having  a  theory  of  total 
blending, which we will see below can only apply to the relationship of god to matter. 
He also rejects the idea that  pneuma is a synonym for god  qua simple body, but 
rather still sees it as a compound and so as something formed, which means that it is 
a combination of form and matter and so posterior to god and the formation of the 
present  cosmos.  However  as  I  will  show  below  this  conception  of  pneuma  as  a 
compound  or  even  as  composed  of  elements  at  all  is  false  and  that  it  is  in  fact 
nothing  other  than  a  synonym  for  god  qua  all  pervading  life  sustaining  cause.  In 
summary  there  are  six  potential  problems  with  the  view  that  god  and  matter  are 
aspects of a more fundamental body:  
 
1)  It could make god incorporeal.  
2)  It could make god a compound. 
3)  It  makes  god  posterior  to  a  cosmic  order  which  he  is  supposed  to  be 
responsible for.  
4)  It makes pneuma an element, whether fire or air or a compound of the two.  
5)  It disregards the whole point of there being two principles. 
                                                 
132 Ibid, p. 95, which makes god posterior to some other “intelligence” which constitutes part of him.  
133 Which has been shown above at page  31-2 to be overwhelmingly outnumbered by texts that support 
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6)  It disregards the purpose of the Stoic theory of total blending.  
 
Incorporeals cannot  act  nor  be  acted  upon. Why  then  would  the  Stoics  make  the 
active principle incorporeal when by definition it could not then fulfil the very role 
that  it  is  proposed  for?  Besides  which  god,  or  the  active  principle,  is  completely 
absent from any list of incorporeals which instead includes only place, time, void and 
“sayables”
134. God is supposed to be a principle. How can a principle be a compound? 
It would have to rely on something else to account for its composite nature, negating 
the assertion that it was in any meaningful way a principle. Further, how could a 
principle be posterior in any way to that for which it is supposed to be responsible? 
As will be shown shortly it is likely that pneuma is not an element or a compound of 
elements.  Pneuma  is  also  unlikely  to  be  a  composite  of  form  and  matter  so  any 
theory which requires it to be so would be mistaken.  The theory that makes god a 
compound of intelligence and matter completely disregards the evidence that god is 
one of the two principles as the most fundamental Stoic tenet. Demonstrating that 
the nature of pneuma is to be understood as god and not a compound of fire and air 
will serve to show also that any understanding of the passive principle as earth and 
water is mistaken. If pneuma is god then the passive principle remains a principle 
and cannot be understood in terms of elements.  
 
The intelligence pervading matter which together would make this god would surely 
have to count as the active principle, i.e. as the god which it is meant to form half of. 
The  universe  is  a  god,  that  much  is  textually  supported
135,  but it is not  a  god 
posterior to the intelligence and matter which would have to precede it on this 
picture. The cosmos is a god because god as  pneuma pervades every part of matter 
and  so  there  is  no  part  of  matter  which  does  not  involve  god.  Finally  the  theory 
leaves us with no explanation for the theory of total blending and no explanation of 
why so many ancient sources ascribe this doctrine to Chrysippus. It will become clear 
that total blending cannot occur in the cosmos but on the above picture it cannot 
even  occur  among  the  principles  since  they  are  in  different  categories,  with  god 
already partaking of total blending. This last point will be discussed in detail in 1.2.3.  
 
It is clear that the active acts on the passive to create the world and that this is 
possible because both principles are bodies. But it does not act as Plato‟s demiurge 
                                                 
134 E.g. Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 10.218, (=L&S 27D = SVF 2.331, part). 
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does on a literal reading of the Timaeus, from the outside: moulding like a sculptor 
or potter
136. Instead, true to Chrysippus‟ description of it as soul, the active moulds 
the passive from the inside. But again it does not sit inside the passive like water in a 
jug, nor does it sit next to it like a mixture of beans and rice. Instead it completely 
blends with the passive: “They [the Stoics] say that god is mixed (memichthai) with 
matter (hylē), pervading all of it and so shaping it, structuring it, and making it into 
the world.
137” This view, that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time, 
came  under  attack  in  the  ancient  world  but  below  I  will  demonstrate  that  these 
attacks were misguided and that the Stoic theory of total blending (krasis di’holou) 
had only one use and a very important one at that.  
 
But in what guise can the active be said to pervade the passive in its entirety so that 
there is no part of the passive which does not also contain the active? It is true to 
say that the active pervades as  reason (logos), however  reason is more strictly a 
disposition of a body – soul qualified in the archetypal reasoning way. The body that 
is god is indeed disposed in the archetypal rational way but what way is that? The 
Stoics  designate  the  permeating  rational  active  principle  pneuma  –  breath:  “The 
Stoics made god out to be…a breath (pneuma) pervading the whole world.
138” The 
term  pneuma  is  the  source  of  much  discussion  and  gets  the  Stoics  into  more 
problems than they probably wanted or even envisaged. However most of the issues 
that  are  raised  against  the  concept  of  pneuma  in  Stoicism  rest  on  the  mistaken 
assumption that for the Stoics pneuma is a compound of fire and air: “But how will 
the substance of corporeal qualities manage to consist of breath, when breath itself is 
composite?
139”  In  looking  at  the  near  contemporary  uses  of  pneuma  in  the 
philosophical tradition and in medicine I will show that pneuma is in fact just another 
term for the Stoics‟ active principle which is variously categorized as air or fire or a 
mixture of both qualities. The cause of this will be seen to be most likely because of 
the way it acts and because that is how other people, doctors and philosophers, were 
using it and not because it is in fact such a compound.  
 
For Aristotle the term pneuma is closely linked to life itself. It is what makes semen 
hot  and  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  substance  responsible  for  guiding  the 
                                                 
136 Though of course many Platonists, such as Speusippus and Xenocrates as we will see later, conflated 
the demiurge and world-soul.   
137 Alexander of Aphrodisias On Mixture 225,1-2 (=L&S 45H = SVF 2.310, part). (Trans. L&S) 
138 Aetius 1.7.33 (=L&S 46A, part = SVF 2.1027, part). (Trans. L&S) 
139 Simplicius On Aristotle’s Categories 217, 32-218, 1 (=L&S 28L3 = SVF 2.389, part). (Trans. L&S)  52  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
motive power of the semen to manipulate the matter supplied by the woman into the 
form of a child. At De Anima I.2.405b3 Aristotle criticizes those, he names Hippo, 
who claim the soul to be water on the basis that semen is liquid. The implied mistake 
is  taking  the  material  non-rational  or  non-directing  part  of  the  semen  as  the 
important part over its heat and frothiness: attributes which should be ascribed to 
pneuma.  In  his  On  the  Generation  of  Animals  727a25  Aristotle  asserts  the 
proposition  that  since  the  woman  does  not  contribute  semen  to  the  embryo  she 
contributes nothing positively to form and that any resemblance of the child to the 
mother  is  due  to  deficiency  in  the  power  of  the  male  forming  principle,  i.e.  the 
semen, to overwhelm and structure the matter that is the mother‟s contribution
140. 
What this tells us about pneuma in the pre-Stoic generation of Aristotle is that it was 
already  conceived  of  as  a  directing  principle  intimately  linked  to  life,  reason  and 
responsible for ordering aspects of the world. If this is true of an individual human 
being  then  it  is  only  reasonable  to  suppose,  on  the  basis  of  the  Stoics‟  habit  of 
moving from micro to macrocosm, that the same would be true of the living world as 
a whole. However Aristotle does not explicitly tell us what the constituents of pneuma 
for him are. But at On the Generation of Animals 736b37-737a2
141 he gives us a clue 
as to what pneuma might in fact be:  
 
In all cases the semen contains within itself that which causes it to 
be fertile – what is known as “hot” substance, which is not fire nor 
any  similar  substance, but  the  pneuma  which  is enclosed  within 
the semen or foam like stuff, and the natural substance which is 
pneuma;  and  this  substance  is  analogous  to  the  element  which 
belongs to the stars. (Trans. Peck)  
 
There are two interesting points to be taken from this passage.  
 
1)  Pneuma  can  be  called  “hot”  without  it  necessarily  being  the  same  as  (or  even 
constituted of) the hot element – fire;  
and  
2) Pneuma is likened to the substance of the stars.  
 
                                                 
140 Lack of resemblance to the father is due to privation not due to a positive influence from the mother.  
141 In On Fire 44 Theophrastus seems to follow Aristotle in drawing an analogy between the heat of the 
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Point  1  implies  that  pneuma  can  be  responsible  for  the  hot  and  foamy  nature  of 
semen without being either of the elements associated with these characteristics; in 
other words pneuma is not air though it is in fact air-like, nor is it fire even though it 
is hot. Point 2 says that pneuma is like the substance of the stars
142. So what for 
Aristotle is the substance of the stars and what could the substance of  pneuma be if 
it is to be analogous to it? The substance of the stars is aether for Aristotle
143 which 
for  him is   characterized  as  a  separate  element   from  fire  but  for  others can  be 
understood as the purest fire
144.  
 
We already noted how  pneuma  makes  the  semen  hot  and  that  it is the  vitalising 
force because heat is self-moving. Combined with a statement that it is analogous to 
the  aether  we  can  conclude  that  while  it  may  not  be  elemental-fire  proper  it  is 
certainly  fiery
145  in  some  way .  Solmsen
146  argued  forcibly  that  there  was  no 
relationship between the Stoa and the Lyceum, but such a strong assertion, while  
appealing due to its daringness, nonetheless defies credibility
147. Zeno seems to have 
accepted  that  the  nature  of  soul  was  special  and  called  it  “pneuma  enthermon” 
according to Diogenes Laertius
148. It is strange for him to call it “warm breath” since:  
 
1)  if  pneuma  is  a  compound  of  fire  and  air,  warmth  is  presumably  a  redundant 
epithet; and more importantly;  
 
2) he actually thought of the soul simply as fire instead as Cicero reports
149.  
 
                                                 
142 It should be noted that the stars for Aristotle are self-moving in the sense that they direct themselves 
to imitate the Unmoved mover, so it is in a sense reasonable to equate the stuff of the soul for the Stoics 
to the nature of self-moving objects.  
143  Fire‟s  natural  movement  is  up,  yet  at  De Caelo  2.6.289a11-17  he  says  the  motion of  the stars  is 
circular because of what they are composed of, and that this substance must be like fire since it causes 
light by friction. Cf. Meteorologica 1.3.340a18-340b31. However for Aristotle the aether is not itself hot. 
The  heat  felt  from  bodies  in  the  heavenly  sphere,  i.e.  the  sun,  is  generated  by  friction  of  the  sun‟s 
emanations on its way here. But what is important to note is the precedence and since the Stoics are not 
followers of Aristotle at all they are more free to adapt his teachings in the way they see necessary for 
their own end.  
144 Aristotle saw ancient precedent for aether being a term for the heavenly sphere and prime body – De 
Caelo  1.3.270b21-25,  where  he  also  criticises  Anaxagoras  for  misusing  the  term  aether  by  making  it 
equivalent to fire, cf. De Caelo 3.3.302b4-5, Meteorologica 1.3.339b24, 2.9.369b14.   
145 Hence Anaxagoras‟ misapplication of aether as a synonym for fire, see note 35 above.  
146 Solmsen 1986.  
147 Indeed as L&S pg 292 point out the Stoic arguments about mixture seem to be formulated in direct 
response to Aristotle On Generation and Corruption 1.10.  
148  Diogenes Laertius 7.157. The same terminology is ascribed to Po sidonius at Aetius  Placita  1.7.19 
(Stobaeus Eclogae 1.1.29b = 1.34.26 W = Dox. Gr. 302.19 = fr. 101 E&K).  
149 See below note 153.  54  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Fire is clearly not pneuma. I would propose then that Zeno understands the soul as 
fire because he understands the soul to be an off-shoot of the divine nature. The 
divine  nature  is  best  understood  as  fiery. But  as  we  have  seen  the  fire  of god  is 
different from that of the element fire. In order to clarify this distinction  it seems 
reasonable to suppose that Zeno appropriated the fairly common notion of pneuma 
as a description of the soul and attempted to emphasise its divine nature by calling it 
“hot”. Ironically, owing to the fact that we do not have Zeno‟s writings on the matter 
and the polemical nature of much of the surviving evidence, Zeno‟s attempt to clarify 
the position has resulted in much confusion. Pneuma for Zeno, as for his followers, is 
in fact a single thing. Moreover it is the term that god should be called when we refer 
to the divine power within ourselves. This is indeed quite a speculative interpretation 
to foist onto the founder of Stoicism. But there is good reason for supposing that 
even if Zeno himself did not make these notions explicit that they were clear enough 
for Chrysippus to build on.   
 
The  literal  understanding  of  the  soul  as  fire,  if  Zeno  made  the  ascription,  can  be 
explained as just a rough approximation as Aristotle states:  
 
For some writers assert that the soul is fire or some such force. 
This,  however,  is  but  a  rough  and  inaccurate  assertion;  and  it 
would  perhaps  be  better  to  say  that  the  soul  is  incorporate  in 
some substance of a fiery character. The reason for this being so 
is that of all substances there is none so suitable for ministering to 
the operations of the soul as that which is possessed of heat
150. 
(Trans. Ogle, with amendments) 
 
As we will see this explanation of Aristotle‟s, that heat is a way of understanding the 
operations  of  the  soul,  explains  the  Stoic  appeal  to  pneuma  as  soul.  When  Zeno 
claims that the soul is “warm breath” he is characterizing the soul in its two most 
important  ways:  1)  breathy  –  permeating,  and  2)  fiery  –  vitalising.  These 
characteristics need not for Zeno, any more than for Aristotle, be necessarily tied to 
elements alone.  
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This is borne out by Cicero‟s reports that Zeno rejected a fifth element
151. Instead his 
binding force seems to have been fire pure and simple:  
 
His (Zeno‟s) views as to the natural substances were as follows. 
First, in dealing with the four recognised primary elements he did 
not add this fifth substance which his predecessors deemed to be 
the source of sensation and of intellect
152. (Trans. Rackham) 
 
Zeno‟s “predecessors” seem to be ascribed the doctrine that the soul, or the stuff of 
the soul, is the fifth element, but not Zeno: 
 
Now  in  the  whole  of  this  branch  of  philosophy,  on  most  of  the 
important points the Stoics followed the Peripatetics, maintaining 
that  the  gods  exist  and  that  the  world  is  composed  of  the  four 
elements. Then, coming to the very difficult question, whether we 
are to believe in the existence of a fifth substance, as the source of 
reason and intellect, and also the connected further question which 
element constitutes the soul, Zeno declared this substance to be 
fire
153. (Trans. Rackham) 
 
While here we are told that Zeno rejected a fifth element but instead claimed that 
the soul was simply fire, Zeno need not appeal to a fifth element as we will see but is 
again just fixing on one of the roles and characteristics of the soul. I would suggest 
that Zeno, as so many ancient philosophers, could have been engaging in some word 
play. By fire he is not referring to ordinary fire, but to the divine fire – a reference 
that would be missed by the uninitiated. Theophrastus, whose lectures it is possible 
Zeno  attended,  is  reported  by  Huby
154  to  have  tried  to  get  out  of  apparent 
contradictions to Aristotle by explaining that confusion will not arise if we understand 
the different ways in which words are used. It is possible that Zeno is f ollowing this 
                                                 
151 Theophrastus‟ position is not clear on this topic and his discussions could have influenced the young 
Zeno in rejecting the fifth element. See Sharples 1998 (vol. 3.1 pp. 88-94) for a discussion of the main 
points regarding Theophrastus.  
152 Cicero Academica 1.39 
153 Cicero Fin. 4.12. 
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mentality and sees no  problem in using a common word since he knows what he 
means and so will his pupils
155.  
 
Cicero elsewhere, and Diogenes Laertius, tells us that Cleanthes and Chrysippus used 
the term aether. But there are strong indications that the term is not being used to 
designate a separate element as such but rather is yet another name for the active 
principle: 
 
Cleanthes, who attended Zeno‟s lectures at the same time as the 
last named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at 
another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and 
at  another  decides  that  the  most  unquestionable  deity  is  that 
remote  all-surrounding  fiery  atmosphere  called  the  aether…
156 
(Trans. Rackham) 
 
Cleanthes here is clearly said to identify god with the aether, this ascription should 
not strike us as strange since we saw earlier that the active principle is called pyr 
technikon – a designing fire. It seems perfectly reasonable to adopt as a synonym for 
this aether whose association with light and purity needs no introduction. Similarly 
for Chrysippus: 
 
Chrysippus…the  purest  part  of  the  aether;  this  they  say,  as 
primary god, passes perceptibly as it were through the things in 
the air and through all animals and plants, and through the earth 
itself by way of tenor.
157 (Trans. L&S) 
 
Chrysippus follows his teacher in identifying god with this aether, which also explains 
why at ekpyrosis he claims the world to change into light
158: “At the conflagration the 
world…must  either  change  into  flame,  as  Cleanthes  thought,  or  into  light,  as 
                                                 
155 Indeed I have made the same supposition on the equivocal use of words in the preceding section in 
relation to body.   
156 Cicero On the Nature of the Gods I. 37 
157 DL 7.139 (=L&S 47O.4 = part SVF 2.634). 
158  Huby  1999  pg.  55  in  her  commentary  on  Theophrastus‟  psychology  takes  Priscian  Paraphrase  of 
Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul (fr. 278 FHS&G) 9.34-10.1 as implying that Theophrastus saw heat 
and light as analogous. This is an interesting precedent if Chrysippus understood the ekpyrosis as god 
existing in his pure form, in this case light, but also accepted the name of pyr technikon for him.   57  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Chrysippus supposed.
159” Chrysippus takes the use of aether one step further than 
his teacher. If there were any further qualms about identifying god with aether and 
so aether or god with pneuma then we need look only to a report of Aetius‟ where he 
tells us that:  
 
The  Stoics  made  god  out  to  be  intelligent,  a  designing  fire  (pyr 
technikon)  which  methodically  proceeds  towards  creation  of  the 
world,  and  encompasses  all  the  seminal  principles  according  to 
which  everything  comes  about  according  to  fate,  and  a  breath 
(pneuma)  pervading  the  whole  world,  which  takes  on  different 
names  owing  to  the  alterations  of  the  matter  through  which  it 
passes
160. (Trans. L&S)  
 
God is characterized in two ways here:  pyr technikon and pneuma and Aetius even 
hints at why: “takes on different names owing to the alterations of the matter”, god 
qua  driving  force  and  rational  principle  is  a  fire,  but  qua  that  which  pervades  all 
things  he  is  pneuma.  Why  the  change  of  term  when  it  comes  to  god‟s  ability  to 
pervade  through  all  things?  Firstly  it  is  simply  easier  to  conceive  of  breath 
permeating all things than it is fire but secondly there is the pre-Socratic precedent 
of Air being divine and permeating all things:  
 
And it seems to me that that which has Intelligence is that which is 
called Air by mankind, and further, that by this, all creatures are 
guided, and that it rules everything; for this in itself seems to me 
to be God and to reach everywhere and to arrange everything and 
to be in everything. And there is nothing which has no share of 
it
161.  
 
There is here an explicit and well known precedent of seeing god as an all pervading 
breathy substance which rationally directs all things by means of immanent direction. 
                                                 
159 Philo On the Indestructibility of the World 90 (=L&S 46M = SVF 1.511, part). (Trans. L&S) “Light” could 
also be little joke on Chrysippus‟ part since at the conflagration god would be all alone and hence wise or 
“enlightened”. 
160 Aetius 1.7.33 (=L&S 46A =  SVF 2.1027, part), cf. Stobaeus 1.213,15-21 (= L&S 46D = SVF 1.120, 
part). 
161 Diogenes of Apollonia Fr. 5, Diels (From Simplicius  In Phys., 152, 22-30 = Fr. 603 KRS). The passage 
continues making the identification of heat with intelligence, an interesting precedent for the Stoic use of 
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However it is quite reasonable for the Stoics to move away from air as the substance 
of  god  and  replace  it  with  something  fiery  since  fire  is  the  self-moving  and  self-
sustaining element it is reasonable to see it as divine. However it clearly cannot be 
the element fire which is the substance of god since the elements, as we saw above, 
are posterior to god and matter that is why we find god characterized as a designing 
fire  as  opposed  to  the  elemental  and  destructive  fire.  It  seems  likely  that  this 
terminology changed from pyr technikon to aether in order to further distinguish it 
from  the  element  and  to  make  the  divine  nature  of  it
162  more apparent through 
aether‟s close association with the heavenly bodies
163.  
 
The philosophical tradition has furnished us with an understanding of how and why 
Zeno‟s  immediate  successors  could  and  would  have  adopted  the  term  aether  and 
how such an all permeating principle of rationality and life could relate to pneuma. 
But the philosophers were not the only ones to use the term  pneuma and indeed 
they  probably  took  it  from  the  medical  schools,  namely  the  pneumatic  school  in 
Sicily. How was the term pneuma used by the medical community and what relation 
would this community have with the early Stoics
164?  
 
It is possible that either Diogenes of Apollonia or Empedocles is the origi nator of the 
pneumatic theory in medicine
165. Either way it was certainly present in the teachings 
of Philistion, a contemporary of Plato‟s, and it is probably from him and Diogenes 
that pneuma found its way into Aristotle
166. Alcmaeon, a pre-Hippocratic doctor, is 
said to be responsible for the long running medical view in Greek thought that the 
arteries do not carry blood but instead  pneuma
167. What is this pneuma doing and 
how  did  it  get  there?  There  seems  to  be  little  information  about  how  Alcmaeon 
accounted for the presence of pneuma in the body but it must be either innate or 
brought in from outside. Empedocles seems to have been the first to posit an innate 
                                                 
162  Posidonius  reportedly  called  aether  “divine”  cementing  this  interpretation:  Macrobius,  Saturnalia, 
1.23.7 (Cornificius) = (fr. 24 E&K). 
163 A point that Gould 1970 makes quite strongly at p. 120 where he argues that  aether is not to be 
understood as a fifth element but as a term for god citing Diogenes Laertius 7.138-9 (=L&S 47O = SVF 
2.634) in support.    
164 Discussion of the relationhip of medicine to philosophy will continue in chapter 4.  
165 However since Alcmaeon talks of pneuma and he pre-dates both Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia 
the credit surely should go to him; not-withstanding the possibility that none of these are responsible for 
the term.  
166 Longrigg 1993, pp. 80. 
167 Op. cit. pp. 62. Miller 1949, pg. 310 argues that Alcmaeon was s omehow strongly connected to the 
Pythagoreans and shared their notion of opposites as generative principles. That opposites will always be 
two in number and that the Stoic principles are also opposites is also an interesting note of further relation 
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heat, building on the works of Parmenides and his association of life with heat and 
death with cold. Philistion
168 and Diogenes
169 also accepted this idea of innate heat 
and passed it on to the philosophical schools, most likely through Plato
170.  
 
But there seems to be no real explanation of what it is that  pneuma  is  in  these 
theories. “Breath” is not a particularly helpful answer to the question of its nature. It 
does, though, partly answer the question of what its function is. It is generally taken, 
by Empedocles, Diogenes and Aristotle that the purpose of respiration, the drawing in 
of breath, is to cool the innate heat
171. To this end Aristotle thought of the brain as a 
sort of refrigerator cooling the innate heat
172. Empedocles, Diogenes and Philistion all 
seem to have accepted that the innate heat or  pneuma is transferred to the foetus 
via the semen. It is truly innate for them. It was noted above that Aristotle criticised 
Hippo for taking the wetness of semen as indicative of the souls‟ nature as being 
likewise  wet,  Diogenes  having  already  accepted  that  the  principle  is  air  took  the 
semen‟s aeriform nature as indicative of innate breath. This idea of pneuma as air 
pure and simple does not seem to have changed in medicine or philosophy except in 
Aristotle where he says that its substance is analogous to that of the stars.   
 
The  Hippocratic  text  On  Breaths  uses  the  terms  pneuma,  air  and  phusa  (gas) 
interchangeably. Pneuma appears to be a general term for both air and gas. While air 
is that which is outside the body and gas that which is within. It is clear then that at 
least  for  the  author  of  that  text  pneuma  and  air,  just  as  for  Diogenes,  are 
synonymous  terms  and  can  be  used  depending  on  the  circumstances.  In  Greek 
medicine from Empedocles to Erasistratus pneuma is taken as the vitalising principle 
the cause of movement and the absence of which is death. It is not hard to see the 
attraction  of  a  popular  and  expressive  medical  view  among  philosophers  with  a 
materialistic, and proto-scientific, attitude to the world. Medical analogy is not new to 
                                                 
168 Cf. Longrigg 1993. pp. 73-4 where the purpose of breathing is to cool the innate heat.  
169 Ibid. pp 77-80, cf. D.K. 68A140.  
170 Phaedo 96b could refer to Alcmaeon and his theory of the brain as the organ of sense of perception and 
thence  of  knowledge.  Miller  1949,  pg.  311  argues  that  Aristotle‟s  theory  of  perception  owes  much  to 
Alcmaeon.  As  a  result  Alcmaeon  can  be  regarded  as  a  pivotal  figure  in  the  history  of  the  relation  of 
medicine to philosophy. Timaeus 62a-b suggests some sort of innate heat or at least that heat is related 
to health.  
171 As Phillips 1973 pg.48 points out pneuma could be seen as a forerunner of our oxygen.  
172 Aristotle On the Parts of Animals 2.7.652b26; 653a2-4; 2.10.656a22. It is also interesting to note that 
the Stoics followed Empedoclean thought in making the heart the seat of consciousness rather than the 
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the Stoics. For the active principle to be characterised as pneuma fits very well with 
its role as sustaining the cosmic order
173.  
 
We have seen   from the philosophical tradition in Aristotle that  pneuma  is  a  hot 
breathy  substance  responsible  for  life  and  sensation  but  that  despite  these 
characteristics it is not to be understood as air but instead as a substance analogous 
to that of the stars. We also saw that the influence of Diogenes of Apollonia with his 
emphasis on the divine nature of air did not stop with philosophy but clearly had 
some impact on the medical tradition. It is most likely from him that the airy nature 
of  pneuma  came  to  be  emphasised  over  its  heat  leading  to  the  conclusion  that 
pneuma may be hot air, but air it is nonetheless. What this discussion has shown is 
that pneuma as conceived of outside of Stoicism was a single substance whether it 
be one “analogous to the substance of the stars” or air, but there are several reports 
that state “the Stoics”, seemingly alone among the ancient schools, believed pneuma 
to be a compound of fire and air. It is to these that our attention will now move.  
 
Calcidius  reports  Chrysippus‟  own  words  in  relation  to  the  sustaining  and  sensory 
power of the body, i.e. the soul:  
 
It is certain that we breathe and live with one and the same thing. 
But we breathe with natural breath. Therefore we live as well with 
the same breath. But we live with the soul. Therefore the soul is 
found to be natural breath
174. (Trans. L&S) 
 
Here we come across what claims to be a verbatim use of the term pneuma in one of 
the early Stoics. If Chrysippus did in fact use the term breath to characterize the soul 
then it is highly likely that he used the same term to describe the active principle 
since as we saw above he refrained from calling ekpyrosis death since it does not 
involve the separation of the cosmic soul from its body.  Shortly before he quotes 
Chrysippus‟  On  Tenors  Plutarch  describes  these  tenors  as  currents  of  air.  These 
                                                 
173 The same conclusion is reached by Gould 1970 where he says that: “And this dynamic quality character 
of  pneuma,  contraposed  as  it  is  here  to  the  inert  matter  without  quality,  probably  led  Chrysippus  to 
assume that the pneuma and the active power in the universe were one and the same thing. But none of 
the fragments makes such an identification explicit.” 
174 Calcidius 220 (=L&S 53G part (1-6) = SVF 2.879 part). Theophrastus (fr. 346 FHS&G) suggests that 
we have innate heat and keep it by not breathing too much of it out. If we faint it is because we have lost 
too much and cold water will ensure revival as it will spur the innate heat back into action.  61  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
sustain bodies and are responsible for their qualities such as hardness, softness and 
whiteness. Plutarch then goes on to say:  
 
Yet  they  maintain  that  matter,  which  is  of  itself  inert  and 
motionless,  is  everywhere  the  substrate  for  qualities,  and  that 
qualities are breaths and aeriform tensions which give form and 
shape to the parts of matter in which they come to be
175. (Trans. 
L&S)  
 
This reinforces the idea that  pneuma  can  function  as  another  term  for  the  active 
principle since it pervades an “inert and motionless” matter which immediately calls 
to mind the passive principle. It is also important to note that Plutarch refers to the 
quality giving substance as “breath” and “aeriform” and that in the passage quoted 
from On Tenors Chrysippus refers to it as “sustaining air” which it would not be too 
unreasonable to interpret as being as different from elemental air as creative fire is 
different  from  non-creative  fire.  Plutarch  and  Calcidius  both  ascribe  a  doctrine  to 
Chrysippus, using his own words, that makes out the soul of man and hence of the 
world to be an aeriform breath, not a compound
176.  
 
As  for  Cleanthes,  Cicero‟s  Stoic  spokesman  Balbus  in  On  the  Nature  of  the  Gods 
ascribes to him the doctrine that heat is the sustaining principle of all things: “the 
element heat has within itself a vital power which pervades the whole world.
 177” He 
goes on to say that the world must be held together and nurtured by a like element: 
“and all the more so because it must be understood that this hot and fiery entity is 
extended in every nature.” Cleanthes is clearly being said to hold that something like 
fire sustains the world and animals. He has chosen fire over breath since our veins 
“pulsate  by  a  flame-like  movement
178”  and  an  animal‟s  heart  beats  rapidly  like  a 
flame  when  torn  from  its living  body.  Balbus  also  gives  the  traditional  reason  for 
ascribing to fire the role of soul and of what sustains that it is: “roused and activated 
by its own movement
179.” Cleanthes does not seem to have used the term “breath” 
else it is reasonable to assume that Cicero would have too. What we gain from this 
                                                 
175 On Stoic Self-contradictions 1054A-B (=L&S 47M2 = SVF 2.449, part).  
176 If we understand the air we breath to be “aeriform” as seems reasonable.  
177 On the Nature of the Gods 2.24 (=L&S 47C2). (Trans. L&S) 
178 Ibid.  
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interesting  passage  is  the  assertion  once  again  that  the  sustaining  principle  is  a 
single unified substance.  
 
Alexander  spends  a  significant  part  of  his  On  Mixture  criticising  “the  Stoics”  for 
holding that pneuma is composed of a compound of fire and air the resulting tension 
of which, a vacillating in-out motion, is supposed to hold the object together and in 
sympathy with the world. But he fails to ascribe this view to any Stoic in particular 
and certainly not to one of the three early heads of the Stoa. However Galen in his 
On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines reports of Chrysippus the following: 
 
This breath possesses two parts, elements or conditions, which are 
blended with one another through and through, the cold and hot, 
or if one wished to describe them by different names taken from 
their substances, air and fire
180. (Trans. L&S) 
 
It seems that we have here evidence of Chrysippus teaching that the “sustaining air” 
is a compound of fire and air just as Alexander would later report. But how accurate 
are  these  reports?  There  are  other  reports,  from  Plutarch
181,  Galen
182  and 
Nemesius
183 that assert that air and fire are the active elements and water and earth 
are  the  passive.  However  none  of  these  name  any  Stoic  in  particular  but  are 
attributed to “the Stoics” in general; we have no way of telling to which stage in the 
school‟s  development  this  supposed  doctrine  is  meant  to  apply.  When  Nemesius 
says: “The Stoics say that some of the elements are active and others passive: air 
and fire are active, earth and water passive
184”, others have taken the implication to 
be that fire and air make up the active principle while earth and water constitute the 
passive. This is clearly how pseudo-Galen takes the idea: “the breathy substance is 
                                                 
180 5.3.8 (=L&S 47H, part = SVF 2.841, part). Galen seems to be making the link between the “cold and 
hot” to the elements air and fire all by himself and not appealing to a Stoic text or other Stoic authority. 
181 On Common Conceptions 1085C-D (=L&S 47G = SVF 2.444, part), although interestingly in his On 
Stoic Self-Contradictions 1053F-1054B (=L&S 47M = SVF 2.449) Plutarch says that “matter” is motionless 
and that the cause of qualities are “breaths”. If we take “matter” to refer to prime matter then Plutarch is 
offering a picture similar to the one that is described in this chapter of the thesis.  
182 In his On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s doctrines 5.3.8 (=L&S 47H = SVF 2.841, part) Galen claims to be 
reporting Chrysippus‟ position on the passivity of earth and air truthfully and clearly as well as the doctrine 
that the soul (a breath) is constituted by a mixture of the “cold and hot”. Galen takes “cold and hot” to be 
equivalent to air and fire, and it is this false equivocation that I believe leads him to claim on behalf of 
Stoicism the position that total blending occurs in the world. 
183 Nemesius 164, 15-18 (=L&S 47D = SVF 2.418) is emphatic in his ascription of the passivity of certain 
elements to the Stoics. 
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what sustains, and the material substance what is sustained. And so they say that air 
and fire sustain, and earth and water are sustained.
185”  
 
But this seems to be a non sequitur. Fire and air can be classed as active for no other 
reason than because both of these elements appear to be self-moving; water and 
earth  have  a  history  of  being  classed  as  passive  and  inert,  relying  on  something 
external for their motion
186. The referent for “material substance” would most likely 
be, after all, not elemental but apoios ousia – the prime matter. The correlate to this 
is  a  breathy  substance  but  this  breathy  substance  is  none  other  than  the  active 
principle – god, just characterized in a novel way, i.e. no longer as pyr technikon. 
There appears to be confusion among commentators of the Stoics as to who actually 
held that pneuma is a compound of fire and air and over the meaning of the active 
nature of fire and air. What has happened? I agree with Todd when he answers this 
question saying: 
 
The  reports  that  distinguish  the  four  elements  into  active  or 
“tensional” (fire and air), and passive or “tensionless” (earth and 
water)  pairs  results,  I  suspect, from  a  common  confusion  about 
pneuma‟s  relation  to  the  elements,  and  a  failure  to  identify  its 
qualities of heated air in terms of the properties of aither rather 
than two of the four stratified elements
187. 
 
Why and how such confusion could have arisen are impossible questions to answer 
but it does not seem unreasonable to assume that perhaps some  post-Chrysippean 
Stoics  failed  to  grasp  the  correct  message  of  their  school‟s  teaching  and  so 
inadvertently  ushered  in  a  period  of  erroneous  criticism,  or  more  likely,  that 
confusion arose from diverse traditions about pneuma one taking it as primarily fiery 
as from Aristotle, and the other as airy from Diogenes.  
 
                                                 
185 On Bodily Mass 7.525,9-14 (=L&S 47F = SVF 2.439).   
186 See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of water imagery and prime matter. 
187 Todd 1978. p. 153. Sorabji 1988 p. 86-89 also supports the position that pneuma is not a compound of 
fire and air on the basis that the language used by Alexander and Galen (note 71 above) is quite reticent 
and involves supposition and not the direct evidence of a Stoic text. However he then takes pneuma to be 
an ambiguous term alternately applicable to air or fire or aether depending on the function that the Stoics 
expect it to perform at any given instance. But this seems needlessly complicated and would require that 
air and fire are able to fulfil the same purpose in terms of disposition, which given the otherwise exalted 
state of fire over the other elements is unlikely.  64  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
In the next part we will see how such a description of pneuma as being a compound 
of fire and air leads to absurdity in terms of the theory of total blending and this 
combined with the evidence above will demonstrate how such a position could not 
have been that of Chrysippus or the other early Stoics.  65  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
1.2.3 Blending Through and Through:  
 
In his On Mixture Alexander of Aphrodisias criticizes the Stoics at length for holding 
that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time. Since Alexander is an 
Aristotelian this view is particularly abhorrent to him
188, while a writer like Plutarch 
would object perhaps more on the grounds of its being contrary to common sense.
189 
Despite the large amounts of polemical writings dismissing the notion of two bodie s 
in the same place the notion  carried on after Stoicism. The Neo -Platonists argued 
that two bodies can be in the same place, while also arguing that the Stoics were 
mistaken in their position. Some
190 argued that bodies can be in the same place at 
the same time if one lacks prime matter. If one body lacks prime matter then it lacks 
the ability to be divided and so can pass right through each other without dividing 
each other. However this understanding cannot apply to the Stoics since the absence 
of prime matter in a body would have the consequence that the body is incorporeal. 
Arguing that an incorporeal body can be in the same place at the same time as 
another body, whether corporeal or incorporeal, clearly has no relevance to the 
Stoics as the incorporeal is not a real existence.   Alexander clarifies the issue of 
mixture involving corporeal bodies by offering the following definitions: 
 
Chrysippus has the following theory of blending: he first assumes 
that the whole of substance is unified by a breath which pervades 
it all, and by which the universe is sustained and stabilized and 
                                                 
188 Aristotle discusses types of mixing at length in his  De Gen. et Corr. 1.10.327a30-328b24. Later at 
2.7.334b8-335a9  Aristotle  discusses  how  all  compound  bodies  are  made  from  combinations  of  the 
elements in mixture so that bodies can alter by the reduction or addition of the properties of the elements. 
It  is  interesting  to  consider  the  notion  that  Aristotle  agrees  with  the  mixture  of  elements  but  that 
Alexander finds the same idea in Stoicism so ridiculous owing to the notion that on his interpretation the 
Stoics require the elements to be in the same place at the same time. It would not be unreasonable to 
suppose that a part of what Alexander is doing is distancing Aristotle from Stoicism (though Todd thinks –
most likely rightly - Alexander is using the Stoics to represent non-Aristotelian perspectives, and that it is 
the Aristotelian debate that is his main concern) and so uses any tool available, even misinterpretation. In 
his De Anima Aristotle makes the point (418b14-20) that light is not fire, or a body or from a body since it 
would then itself be a body. He rejects the notion of light as fire or another body on the basis that two 
bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. 
189 That Stoicism and the Stoics  in general are so contra -common sense seems to be one of Plutarch‟s 
main criticisms.  
190 Syrianus in Metaph. 85,15-28 (=Sorabji vol. 2, 20e1) explains that for those who accept two bodies in 
the same place, such as light (i.e. the Neo-Platonists), that they do so on the basis that these bodies are 
immaterial and so there is no resistance to get in the way of their mixing. Proclus, in Remp. 2.162,20-
163,9 (=Sorabji vol. 2, 20e13) argues that two bodies can clearly pass through each other, provided that 
at least one is immaterial. By matter he means “what is basic and the substrate of the basic bodies.” That 
which is immaterial clearly does not partake of prime matter in that case. It seems fairly clear that these 
later discussions of the question of two bodies in the same place do not really relate to the Stoics, except 
to show that the notion that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time is not quite so contrary 
to  common  sense  as  some  commentators  would  have  us  believe;  however  much  the  notion  of  an 
immaterial body is contrary to common sense.   66  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
made interactive by itself. Then, as for the bodies mixed together 
in  this  substance,  he  argues  that  some  mixtures  occur  by 
juxtaposition of two or more substances put together in the same 
place, and juxtaposed with one another “by joining”, as he says, 
while they each preserve their own substance and quality at their 
surface contact in such a juxtaposition…Other mixtures occur by 
through-and-through  fusion  of  the  substances  themselves  and 
their intrinsic qualities, which are destroyed together, as he says 
happens  in  the  case  of  medical  drugs  when  the  things  mixed 
together  undergo  mutual  destruction  and  another  body  is 
generated  out  of  them.  Other  mixtures  occur,  he  argues,  when 
certain  substances  and  their  qualities  are  mutually  coextended 
through  and  through,  with  the  original  substances  and  their 
qualities being preserved in such a mixture; this kind of mixture 
he calls specifically “blending”;…for the capacity to be separated 
again  from  one  another  is  a  particularity  of  blended  substances 
and  this  only  occurs  if  they  preserve  their  own  natures  in  the 
mixture.  He  tries  to  support  the  existence  of  these  different 
mixtures  through  common  conceptions.
191  (Trans.  L&S,  with 
amendments) 
 
Although Alexander is here criticizing Chrysippus for his view of mixture it i s not 
unreasonable to assume that the theory predated him, though perhaps not by many 
years. The position that two bodies can occupy the same place at the same time  is, 
after all, attacked by Arcesilaus
192, an older contemporary of Chrysippus‟. But it is 
likely that the idea of total blending found its first real codification with Chrysippus as 
well as its function of explaining the interaction of pneuma with matter rather than 
the “vital heat” of his contemporaries. Alexander here states that Chrysippus thinks 
the universe is sustained and harmonized by an all pervading cosmic breath. Further, 
he states that within the cosmos the main types of mixture are juxtaposition and 
fusion as in the cases of beans and wheat and of mixing paint respectively. The final 
                                                 
191 Alexander of Aphrodisias On Mixture 216.14-217.3. (= L&S 48C, part = SVF 2.473, part). 
192 Plutarch On Common Conceptions 1078B-D (= L&S 48E, part = SVF 2.465, part), mentions Arcesilaus‟ 
criticism of the Stoic theory of total blending: “This is the point presumably at which the leg made famous 
in Arcesilaus‟ lectures arrives stamping with derision on their absurdities. For if blendings are through and 
through, what prevents not only the armada of Antigonus, as Arcesilaus said, from sailing through the leg 
that has been severed, putrefied, thrown into the sea and dissolved, but the 1,200 triremes of Xerxes 
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type of blending and the one that causes Alexander such pain is that of total blending 
whereby two substances exist coextended retaining their individual qualities with the 
ability to be separated out again – i.e. two bodies existing in the same place at the 
same time
193. Chrysippus was said to have used the analogy of a drop of wine being 
extended throughout the whole sea in order to illustrate the idea of total blending:  
 
…certain bodies when helped by one another are in this way united 
together in their entirety so that being preserved along with their 
own qualities they have a complete mutual co-extension through 
one another, even if some of them are rather small in bulk and in 
themselves  unable  both  to  be  spread  to  such  an  extent  and  to 
preserve their own qualities; for in this way also the cup of wine is 
mixed with a large amount of  water and helped by it to such a 
great extension
194. (Trans. Todd) 
 
This example is quoted by other writers
195 so its authenticity as Stoic cannot really be 
doubted. What is in doubt however is the purpose of such an illustration.  Evidently 
some in the ancient world, including Alexander, took this example quite literally; as 
evidence  for  the  Stoic  belief  that  a  drop  of  wine  could  in  fact  disperse  itself 
throughout the entire ocean  while retaining its own integrity
196. However such an 
example should not be taken in this way, it is, in the words of Todd , an illustration 
from which the interaction of pneuma and matter can be: “analogically derived
197.”   
 
Alexander‟s objections to the theory that two bodies can be in the same place do not 
simply  rely  on  common  conceptions  but  also  display  an  understanding  of  the 
intricacies of Stoic physics. Given this it is difficult to see why he would argue against 
the proposition that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time if it was in 
fact  not  the  case  that  the  Stoics  held  it.  One  reasonable  explanation  for  why 
Alexander is under the impression that the Stoics taught that the bodies referred to 
                                                 
193 The particularly abhorrent part of this is that the wine remains actually wine while dispersed. Aristotle 
allows for something to be mixed through another thing and then separated out again, but in this case the 
first  thing  exists  as  itself  only  potentially  during  the  mixture  and  becomes  actual  again  only  once 
separated out again.   
194 217.26-32 of On Mixture (=L&S 48C4-5, part = SVF 2.480, part). 
195 Diogenes Laertius 7.151 (=L&S 48A = SVF 2.479), Plutarch On Common Conception 1078E (=L&S 48B 
= SVF 2.480, part). 
196 Stobaeus 1.155,5-11 (=L&S 48D = SVF 2.471, part).  
197 Todd 1976, p. 70. A view that Sorabji, 1988, evidently does not accept since at p. 81 he states that: 
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are in the world, and not simply the principles of the world, is that at the time he was 
writing so much confusion had crept into the school itself, perhaps through a lack of 
interest in physics, that it had become the accepted view. Another is that Alexander 
is  reliant  on  secondary  texts,  such  as  those  from  Galen  and  Plutarch,  which  are 
obviously  polemical  and  attempt  to  undermine  the  Stoic  position  by  any  means 
possible
198, and that Alexander is simply following this pattern. A final option is that 
just as with the  Mantissa section discussed above Alexander is simply engaging in 
the exploration of arguments for arguments‟ sake.   
 
If  we  look  now  to  Alexander‟s  objections  we  will  see  that  he  says  nothing  that 
Chrysippus would not accept; which leads to two possible conclusions:  
 
1) That the position that two bodies can be in the same place at the same time is a 
genuine  early  Stoic  view  and  the  objections  are  a  perceptive  indictment  of  poor 
quality philosophy from Chrysippus;  
 
or  
 
2)  Chrysippus  would  accept  the  premises  that  Alexander‟s  arguments  rely  on 
showing that the conclusion that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same 
time is as true in a general sense for the Stoics as it is for everyone else.  
 
The  first  option  seems  unlikely  since  Chrysippus  is  fêted  as  one  of  the  greatest 
logicians in the ancient world
199. If the second of these is true it is still the case that 
the theory of total b lending will apply to something and the something that it will 
apply to will still have to be a body. The only real possibility is that the theory would 
apply only to the active and passive principles and that there is no absurdity in their 
being blended “through and through” for an ingenious reason.  
 
The first objection we come across is at 218.15-24 where we are told of the counter-
intuitive nature of Stoic blending due to the fact that if a body is a three-dimensional 
solid it is presumably “full” and as a result will have no room to receive another body 
                                                 
198 A strong possibility since the equivocation of body would be the sort of trick that could be expected 
from polemical writers.  
199 DL 7.180 – “so renowned was he (Chrysippus) for dialectic that most people thought, if the gods took 
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into it. This is indeed a very intuitive thought on Alexander‟s part since that seems to 
be a differentiating quality of place and body. He goes on to ask how this could be 
made  sense  of  even  going  so  far  as  to  posit  void  holes in  body  into  which  other 
bodies could fit
200. This is plainly irrelevant for the Stoics since they do not allow void 
in  body  and  b esides  that  would  constitute  juxtaposit ion  rather  than  blending 
anyway
201. He next goes on to point out that the Stoics absurdly say that blending 
need not admit of the compound taking up a larger space post mixture than it did 
pre-mixture. But we see in every mixture that the volume of the resulting compound 
is greater than before. At the same point he argues that one body will be the place of 
the second body but this is absurd since the first body occupies a place already
202. 
He objects also, at 220.23-29, that in blending the two bodies will retain their own 
distinctive  qualities,  as  this  is  impossible  in  an  Aristotelian  blending  where  the 
ingredients only retain their individual natures potentially and not actually
203. But by 
far the most ingenious and potentially most troubling objection for the Stoics if they 
did want total blending to apply to things in the world  comes at 221.18-19 where 
Alexander rightly states that:  
 
A unified body must be held together by one State (to use their 
term - i.e. hexis) so that in this respect also the bodies that have 
been  blended  would  be  inseparable  from  one  another.  (Trans. 
Todd) 
 
This  is  indeed  true  since  every  body  is  a  compound  of  the  unifying  substance 
pneuma and the material-giving substance apoios ousia.  
 
How do Alexander‟s objections stand up to scrutiny? If, as he asserts it applies to 
bodies in the world then it would seem that he is absolutely correct and the doctrine 
of total blending is reduced to absolute absurdity. Todd argued that it did not apply 
to  the  general  contents of the  world  but  rather  only  to  pneuma  and  the  material 
principle. However he failed to mark the point that pneuma is not to be considered a 
                                                 
200 An option for the Epicureans and other atomists as Aristotle noted.  
201 Lending credence to the possibility that Alexander is indeed discussing arguments just to look at the 
arguments themselves and not to demolish the Stoic position per se.  
202 219.9-22, for this and the preceding point. 
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compound of fire and air
204. As a result he is forced, like so many others, to resign 
total blending to  a position of failure
205.  Alexander tells us that  pneuma,  for  the 
Stoics,  partakes  in  blending  in  both  possible  ways.  223.6-17  states  that  pneuma 
does  indeed  partake  of  blending  as  the  object  that  is  blended  with  passive 
substances. But 224.14-17 tells us that pneuma is composed of fire and air and so 
not a simple body. It would in fact become a thing in the world that would rely on 
tonos  to  exist  –  essentially  the  position  that  was  discussed  in  relation  to  Sorabji 
above.  That would to all intents and purposes presuppose the truth of krasis and its 
application  before  the  existence  of  pneuma  thus  rendering  the  supposed  Stoic 
position so clearly absurd that it is virtually impossible to credit that anyone would 
consider teaching it.  
 
Yet the clue to answering all these objections is given by Alexander himself in the 
first problem he sees. At 218.15-24 he said that presumably a body is already “full”. 
Indeed we can understand the concept of density and its variations but for all that 
just because one body is less dense than another, say wood compared to lead, it 
does not follow that one is less “full” than another. But what is distinctive about both 
wood  and  lead,  as  opposed  to  the  general  term  “body”,  is  that  they  are  both 
particular;  they  are  both,  to  use  the  Stoic  term,  “peculiarly  qualified”.  Peculiar 
qualification comes about owing to the interaction of pneuma on matter. It makes a 
body specific. It is why that body is that body and not another body.  
 
Alexander‟s final point is based on the understanding that for the Stoics bodies each 
have  their  own  hexis,  given  by  the  presence  of  pneuma.  It  follows  that if a  total 
blending were to occur then either these  hexeis would be overlapping or else the 
                                                 
204 Todd 1976 p.36. However Todd 1978 p.149 marks out pneuma as another term for aether and not as a 
compound of fire and air. However earlier in the paper he had argued that god and apoios ousia were to 
be seen as incorporeal aspects of a more primitive body.  
205 Gould 1970 too fails to take pneuma as a single entity while still arguing that total blending occurs only 
in relation to primordial substance and pneuma. Yet his interpretation is rendered untenable since he still 
sees pneuma as a compound of fire and air. Cf. p. 107, 109 for total blending applying only to the pre-
cosmic state, and p. 112 for his assertion that pneuma is a compound of fire and air. Long 1974, pg. 160. 
Nolan 2006 tries to get around the problem of two bodies being in the same place by appealing to the 
modern notion of “gunk”. Using his understanding of “gunk” which posits “no minimal parts” he attempts 
to show that with the theory of infinite divisibility two bodies will be in the same place just in case for any 
part of space you pick, no matter how small, you will find both constituents, so Alexander‟s objections 
carry  no  weight.  While  an  ingenious  idea  and  ultimately  successful  I  do  not  think  it  finds  its  proper 
application in Stoic krasis since Nolan attempts to use the theory to explain how two peculiarly qualified 
bodies can be in the same place at the same time. The evidence that the Stoics would have accepted this 
position is dubious in its authenticity. The idea of reduction to no-minimal points will be seen to be the 
main connection between the Stoic theory of apoios ousia and the Old Academy in section 3.4 below. The 
Stoics will be seen to have had this notion of convergence on the infinite and it is this that indeed renders 
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hexeis would merge and thus it would not be a case of total blending but rather of 
fusion. Alexander‟s second and third objections - that one body will act as place for 
the second and that it is impossible for two totally blended bodies to retain their own 
qualities - can be answered along the following lines: Firstly both these objections 
simply rely on the notion that total blending is absurd, which is yet to be proven. It is 
indeed counter-intuitive but that in itself is not enough to simply dismiss any theory. 
Secondly the first body through which the second is extended will not function as 
place for the second since both are said to occupy the same place – the criticism 
makes sense if one body is the place of the second since then the objector would 
have to posit two different places, viz. the place which the first body occupies and 
another in the first body which the second occupies. However the Stoics can identify 
either the body that pervades, or the one that is pervaded as place for the other. It 
is hardly intuitive or an ordinary way of thinking but does it really make sense to 
suppose that something that lacks particularity, as  apoios ousia does, can have a 
place before it is peculiarly qualified by the active principle? I think the Stoics would 
say that matter without peculiar qualification has no place, but this is a moot point as 
matter does not exist unqualified, and nothing exists without being in a place. As it 
would turn out then, it would be necessary for two bodies to be in the same place if 
any  body  is  to  exist  at  all.  Thirdly  Alexander‟s  assertion  that  two  blended  bodies 
cannot retain their separate qualities is true for him given his Aristotelian perspective 
but is clearly false for the Stoics given the fact that the Stoics are Stoics and not 
Aristotelians.  
 
Given the truth of all these and the largely suppositional evidence from polemical 
sources it seems reasonable to suppose that Alexander is arguing against a position 
that was never actually held by any early Stoic. There is only one case of Chrysippus 
being ascribed by name the position that pneuma is a compound of fire and air and 
this can be dismissed as a misunderstanding of the properties of the breath that he 
believed constituted the soul of both animals and the universe. Clearly Alexander is 
in some sense arguing against a position that the Stoics held. This position is that 
two bodies can be in the same place at the same time. However his objections to the 
Stoics rest on two assumptions that are erroneous. Firstly he states the position as 
being that any two (or more) bodies can be in the same place at the same time. 
Secondly two of the bodies that this is true of are fire and air and it is true of them in 
the  case  of  the  compounded  active  principle:  pneuma.  The  second  assumption  of 72  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
Alexander‟s is a mistake for reasons elaborated on above. The first is the result of 
taking  polemical  writings  too  seriously  and  misinterpreting  the  onus  that  is  to  be 
placed on examples that the Stoics gave of the sort of thing they meant by total 
blending.  Given  the  success  of  Alexander‟s  reductio  ad  absurdum  arguments  it  is 
unthinkable that a great logician like Chrysippus would have been ignorant of these 
conclusions. Since Alexander‟s premises are largely correct and the only reasonable 
conclusion is that it is indeed absurd for any two bodies to be in the same place at 
the same time I can only conclude that for Chrysippus it is not true that  any two 
bodies can be in the same place at the same time.  
 
Let us look at the following claims made about total blending: 
 
  Total blending can occur between bodies that exist in the world such as wine 
and water, fire and iron etc. In short total blending can occur in peculiarly 
qualified bodies.  
  Pneuma is a total blending of fire and air, which are themselves peculiarly 
qualified bodies.  
  Total blending occurs between the active and passive principles.  
  The active and passive principles are not peculiarly qualified bodies.  
 
Alexander‟s reductio works because the first claim in the list above has been almost 
universally accepted when it should not be.  The arguments Alexander  employs all 
criticise the notion that two peculiarly qualified bodies can be in the same place at 
the same time. However following Todd I suggest that this is not the application of 
total blending that Chrysippus envisaged. Any imagery, such as the drop of wine in 
the sea, is simply for explanatory purposes. The only application total blending can 
have if we reject its application to peculiarly qualified bodies is to unqualified bodies. 
The only possible candidates for unqualified bodies are the two principles
206.  
 
Long and Sedley also argue that the Stoic position is best understood in terms of 
interaction between the two principles:  
 
In order to do justice to the Stoic intuitions, we should regard the 
two things that occupy the same place not as two determinate and 
                                                 
206 Although it is not clear if the active principle, being the principle of qualification, is itself unqualified. 
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independently  existing  bodies,  but  as  the  two  bodily  functions 
(breath  and  matter)  which  jointly  constitute  every  determinate 
and independently existing body
207. 
 
However the position that they take is still biased by the conclusion that pneuma is a 
compound of fire and air. But here they understand the limit of total blending to be 
between two things that are not determinate bodies
208 but taking the perspective of 
Sorabji met above that the principles are aspects of a single more fundamental body. 
The  description  of  breath  and  matter  as  “bodily  functions”  is  quite  vague  and 
suggests  that  Long  and  Sedley  understand  the  principles  as  derivative  of  the 
“fundamental body” as Lapidge and Sorabji do. However even if they are “functions” 
the discussion from the Mantissa makes it clear that they would still be bodies since 
“function” suggests quality. It is unclear what Long and Sedley hope this terminology 
will resolve. It is this fact of determination or particularity that is correctly identified 
as the factor that prevents total blending as occurring between two bodies in the 
world.  
 
This position can be clarified by appealing to an argument used by Chrysippus to the 
effect that two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substance at 
the same time. Given the verbatim nature of this passage it seems very strange that 
anyone would, after seeing it, still think that Chrysippus means for us to take the 
analogy of wine blending with water as anything more serious than an illustration. 
The argument follows the parallel lives of Theon and Dion who are supposed to exist 
in the same substance:  
 
Having  first  established  that  it  is  impossible  for  two  peculiarly 
qualified  individuals  to  occupy  the  same  substance  jointly,  he 
says: “For the sake of argument, let one individual be thought of 
as  whole  limbed,  the  other  as  minus  one  foot.  Let  the  whole 
limbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Then let one 
of Dion‟s feet be amputated.” The question then arises which one 
of them has perished, and his claim is that Theon is the stronger 
                                                 
207 L&S p. 294.  
208 They in fact seem to be leaning towards the position of Lapidge and Sorabji, that “breath and matter” 
are aspects of a more fundamental body. However on my interpretation and understanding that it is only 
the particularity of bodies that prevents them partaking in total blending the relegation of total blending to 
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candidate…  “Necessarily”,  says  Chrysippus.  “For  Dion,  the  one 
whose  foot  has  been  cut  off,  has  collapsed  into  the  defective 
substance of Theon. And two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot 
occupy  the  same  substrate.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  that  Dion 
remains while Theon has perished.
209” (Trans. L&S) 
 
The passage introduces Theon and Dion as being two separate people existing in the 
same body. One is the whole person, the other the same person but without a foot. 
This  absurdity  was  clearly  not  accepted  by  Chrysippus  and  indeed  is  completely 
contrary to common sense anyway, and is being used by Chrysippus to respond to 
his  critics.  This  passage  argues  that  two  peculiarly  qualified  individuals  cannot 
occupy the same substrate, though it could be argued that this does not demonstrate 
that two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same place at the same 
time; i.e. partake of total blending in a way that I have been arguing against. This 
could  be  supposed  on  the  basis  that  what  is  being  discussed  in  the  Theon/Dion 
example is a single matter being permeated by two hexeis and not two peculiarly 
qualified instances of matter being in the same place at the same time. But if we 
look at the implication of the passage closely it will show that total blending cannot 
occur in the world. It shows this because if total blending applies to the objects in 
the world, as Alexander would have us believe, then this would require two hexeis to 
exist in the same place at the same time and the absurdity of the situation of Theon 
and Dion shows this is not something Chrysippus accepted. Every body in the world 
is constituted of a mixture of the active and passive principles. It follows then that if 
two worldly bodies are to be mixed in a total blending that two contrasting parts of 
the active principle will have to be in the same place at the same time. That is the 
active principle will have to be disposed in different ways in the same place. Since 
Chrysippus rejects this notion in regard to the above example it follows that bodies 
made up of the active and passive principles cannot be candidates for total blending.  
 
                                                 
209 Philo On the Indestructibility of the World 48 (=L&S 28P2-6 = SVF 2.397, part). Long and Sedley, in 
their commentary on the passage, argue that the purpose of the example, given its context from a book 
On the Growing [argument], is to refute the Academics by showing that even if we accept the premise 
that Theon and Dion are distinct, which Chrysippus wouldn‟t, then their argument is absurd since change 
is shown to be necessary for the continuing existence of the individual, since it is Dion who survives in 
virtue of his foot being chopped off. However, the fact that Chrysippus would reject the idea that Theon 
and Dion start off as two individuals only serves to reinforce the point I wish to make: that two hexeis 
cannot be in the same matter, hence two peculiarly qualified bodies cannot occupy the same place at the 
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But since Chrysippus undoubtedly believed it does occur it remains that it can only 
occur between the principles as these are the only bodies left. We have here a case 
of the type that Alexander raised as a criticism of total blending where he said at 
221.18-19: 
 
A unified body must be held together by one State (to use their 
term - i.e. hexis) so that in this respect also the bodies that have 
been  blended  would  be  inseparable  from  one  another.  (Trans. 
Todd)   
 
In other words there has, if there are to be two peculiarly qualified bodies in the 
same place at the same time, to be a unifying hexis since two cannot overlap. In the 
case of Theon and Dion they are to begin with different but are so due to different 
hexeis but when the matter they both cohere in is made co-extensive it is no longer 
possible for the two hexeis to exist in the same place at the same time. One hexis is 
overwhelmed, expelled or otherwise superseded by the other, in this case by the one 
with  the  longer  history  in  the  matter.  Chrysippus  also  says  that:  “two  peculiarly 
qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate”, and we saw above in 1.2.1 
that  the  Stoics  call  their  prime  matter  “unqualified  substance”  because  it  is  the 
ultimate  substrate.  It  is  not  enough  to  argue  that  substrate  refers  to  proximate 
matter, already qualified bodies, since it is clear that Chrysippus is really arguing 
that two lots of pneuma, hexis, god or whichever name is chosen, cannot occupy the 
same part of apoios ousia. Fire and air are both constituted by a hexis and matter 
each. Like Theon and Dion fire and air cannot engage in total blending, so pneuma is 
not a compound. If it is not a compound then it can only be god. Given that this is 
the case he cannot ever mean to argue that total blending can occur in the world 
where  every  body  is  automatically  a  qualified  individual  since  apoios  ousia  never 
exists without god.   
  
The last section has shown that the application of total blending in Stoicism is really 
only reasonable when viewed in relation to the two archai. This is its only purpose. 
After all this theory has absolutely no use in actual physics and is manifestly false 
and  unnecessary  in  the  sensible  world  of  everyday  experience.  This  raises  an 
interesting  question:  if  it  is  unnecessary  in  the  sensible  world  of  everyday 
experience, why is it necessary in relation to the two principles which act together in 76  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
order to create the world? We met the answer above at the beginning of chapter one 
in a quote from Cicero:  
 
Zeno…[thought]  that  it  was  totally  impossible  that  something 
incorporeal…should be the agent of anything, and that only a body 
was capable of acting or being acted upon
210. (Trans. L&S) 
 
The result of this is that since both  apoios ousia and pneuma have to be bodies in 
order to act, and since pneuma is god and god gets his name from his pervading
211 
nature whence pneuma has to be “inside” the apoios ousia, then the Stoics have to 
have  two  bodies  in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time.  For  the  world  to  be  it  is 
necessary for god to be everywhere that matter is, if this were not the case then 
there would exist somewhere matter that is bare and god which is inactive. These 
two situations are impossible, so total blending becomes the lesser of two seeming 
absurdities.   
 
The apoios ousia of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus clearly fulfils the criteria set out 
at  the  end  of  1.1.1,  that  it  is  qualityless,  accounts  for  the  corporeal  nature  of 
physical bodies, underlies all change and is a principle hence relies on nothing more 
primitive  for  its  existence.  The  early  Stoics  can  be  credited  with  making  two 
important  points  about  matter  which  build  upon  these  basic  criteria.  Firstly  they 
clarified its nature as an ekmageion a pure “out of which” responsible for the three-
dimensional aspect of sensible reality. While Aristotle, as will be seen, moved in this 
direction he stopped short of developing a codified understanding of Prime Matter as 
the  “out  of  which”  par  excellence
212.  They  developed  an  understanding  of  it  as  a 
principle of equal importance with the activating or vitalising principle of the universe 
assigning to matter a place of importance qua matter which it had not had before. 
Secondly,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  under  the  Stoics  matter  was  developed 
from the purely conceptual and incorporeal principle of corporeality that it had been 
in  the  Old  Academy  and  Plato  and,  while  retaining  part  of  this  nature,  became 
instead the corporeal principle of immanent corporeality in the world. The Stoics are 
building on the work of the Old Academy by continuing the tradition of the reduction 
                                                 
210 Cicero Academica 1.39 (=L&S 45A, part, = SVF 1.90, part). 
211 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.147 (=L&S 54A part = SVF 1.1021 part): “For they call him Zeus [Dia] as the 
cause [di‟hon] of all things; Zēn in so far as he is responsible for, or pervades, life [zēn].”  
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of principles. They appeal to only a single level of reality rather than the complicated 
hierarchy  of  reality  that  seems  to  have  been  what  Plato  was  teaching,  at  least 
towards the end of his career if not before. They did not need an incorporeal matter 
for they had little use for incorporeals in the first place: those that they do accept 
they  see  as  subsisting  in  relation  to  the  material  world.  Matter  qua  apoios  ousia 
remains  a  conceptual  object.  It  is  not  possible  to  find  it,  it  does  not  exist  as 
unqualified but is eternally conjoined to the qualifying principle – god. Next we will 
see what the background from Plato in his Timaeus Aristotle was that enabled such a 
doctrine of substance to be developed, before moving onto the Old Academy and the 
Parmenides, Philebus and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato that really hold the key to the 
development of apoios ousia.   
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Chapter 2.  
 
2.1 The Timaeus: 
 
The Timaeus stands alone in the Platonic corpus. It tackles a subject that is generally 
rejected by Plato as unknowable
213 – the nature of the sensible world. In the Phaedo 
97b+  Socrates  describes  hearing  the  teachings  of  Anaxagoras:  that  everything  is 
ordered  by  Mind  and  that  it  causes  all  things.  This  was  greatly  agreeable  to  the 
young Socrates, and we may suppose to the young Plato, but on closer inspection of 
Anaxagoras‟ work he found it unsatisfying since in reality none of the explanations 
offered by Anaxagoras employed Mind in a meaningful way
214. It is this issue that 
Plato is addressing in the  Timaeus. He attempts to demonstrate the force of Mind 
and  teleology,  moving  away  from  mechanistic  explanations  of  the  universe. 
Everything is the way it is by necessity because it is ordered by Mind and such a 
force would order things in the best way possible: i.e. on the schema of the forms. 
Thus the Timaeus stands as a unique work in the Platonic corpus with a theme of the 
natural world and its relation to forms of objects, rather than ethical dilemmas. It 
employs  the  same  terminology  and  ideas  that  for  us  characterise  Platonism,  yet 
gives  a  new  role  for  the  forms and  the  nature  of divine  justice.  This work  is the 
linchpin of Platonism, bringing all previous dialogues to their head by going back to 
first principles
215.  
 
The Timaeus‟ subject of the physical makes it the most obvious place to look for an 
account  of  the  material  principle  in  Plato.  Traditionally,  in  the  ancient  world,  the 
Receptacle of all becoming was identified as prime matter in Plato. It was taken to be 
the “out-of-which” for all objects in the world. A second option is the elements and 
the triangles that are responsible for them. That somehow they fulfil the role  that 
has been established in this thesis by apoios ousia. This part of the chapter will look 
at the Timaeus and see what account it actually gives of a material principle and how 
                                                 
213  In  his  response  to  Krämer  Vlastos  (1981)  goes  to  great  pains  to  explain  that  the  account  in  the 
Timaeus is only a “likely account”, not because it is written down as Krämer suggest, but because the 
sensible world is so devoid of being and stability that whatever is said of it can only ever be likely and not 
true. See Gregory (2007, pp. 147-150) for a comprehensive discussion of the arguments for and against 
the literal interpretation of the Timaeus.   
214 Phaedo 97b-c. “This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no 
use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and 
ether and many other strange things.” 
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this may have been understood by the Stoics. To do this the opposite principle to 
prime matter – god - will have to be discussed as it was in chapter one. 
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2.1.1 The Elements: 
 
Since the first sort of matter that is discussed in the Timaeus is the elements I will 
follow this structure. Following tradition Plato introduces the four  elements as the 
constituent building blocks of the world. The elements are introduced at 31c as being 
the things that are responsible for the world‟s being visible and tangible: “without 
fire nothing could ever become visible, nor tangible without some solidity, nor solid 
without earth.
216” The elements are chosen because of the properties that they will 
bring to that which is created out of them. It is interesting to note that Plato here 
does not say that fire brings heat to the world or earth dryness but rather visibility 
and solidity respectively. The second pair of elements, air and water, are introduced 
not because they are responsible for any particular qualities in the world but rather 
in order to bind the first pair of elements. Two things, we are told, cannot be joined 
together  without  a  third  to  bind  them.  The  fairest  bond  is that  of proportion,  i.e. 
when the middle term is to the first as it is to the last, and as the last term is to the 
middles and the middle to the first, and so all the terms become interchangeable. If 
the body of the all were to be a plane figure then this one middle term would suffice, 
but it is to be three-dimensional
217. As a result a second term is required. Despite the 
fact that earth is responsible for the solidity of the worl d it is the presence of four 
elements  that  is  responsible  for  the  world‟s  being  three-dimensional.  This  three-
dimensional nature is not arbitrary but necessary. 32b tells us that the world was to 
be “solid of shape” and that since this is what the demiurge wanted, having no share 
of envy, there had to be four elements. These four stand in a relation: air is to water 
as fire is to air, and water is to earth as air to water. From these the heavens were 
created.  
 
So far the situation has a fair number of similarities to what would later emerge as 
the  Stoic  position.  The  elements  are  the  proximate  matter  of  the  world,  and  the 
objects in  the  world,  and  they  stand in  a  well  regulated  proportion to  each  other 
according  to  the  wisdom  of  god.  The  implication,  later  spelled  out,  of  the 
                                                 
216 Tim. 31b. (Trans. Bury)   
217 The sensible world is to be three dimensional, because as chapter three will show, it is an image of the 
geometrical level which  involves solid figures. If the solid did not exist in the geometrical level then 
presumably  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  the  sensible  world  to  be  thr ee  dimensional.  But  the 
geometrical level has to have the solid because it is in turn an image of the mathematical level and in 
particular an image of the  tetraktys. The tetraktys is the very principle which causes the instantiation of 
the geometrical principles: the point, line, plane and solid. The sensible world‟s three dimensionality is 
thus a necessity owing to mathematical necessity and the simple existence of the One.  81  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
interchangeability of the terms is that they are transmutable, just as in Stoicism (and 
Aristotelianism). However, when Plato goes on to explain the nature of the elements, 
what it is that their nature consists of, he does so in an unexpected fashion. As for 
the Stoics so for Plato the Four elements are bodies. But while in Stoicism the fact 
that they were bodies could be explained by the fact that they were made from two 
bodies this is not the case for Plato. Rather, in what appears to be (though in fact 
probably  is  not)  a  volte  face  Plato  appeals  to  the  triangles  that  make  up  the 
elements.  The  elements  are  bodies  because  the  triangles  clump  together  to  form 
regular solids: the pyramid, icosahedron, octahedron and cube. The volte face that I 
refer to is this: At 32b Plato explains that the world is three-dimensional because it is 
made of four elements. Solidity is a quality given to it by the presence of the element 
earth. If this is the case why is it now that the elements rely on triangles for the fact 
that they have a three-dimensional existence? The most likely solution is that Plato is 
not  giving  us  an  exact  account  of  the  nature  of  the  material  world  because  it  is 
simply not the right sort of thing to give a true account of. Therefore we should not 
be surprised if there are inconsistencies in an account of an inconsistent world.  
 
This option has in its favour simplicity and textual support. Plato generally seems 
fairly sceptical of the possibility of gaining any actual knowledge or truth from the 
sensible world
218. Indeed one of the first things the character Timaeus tells us is that 
he  is  going  to  offer  us  a   logos  –  an  account
219.  It  is  not  fact,   but  nor  is  it 
unambiguously false. It is likely that the whole account is proposed as a perf ectly 
plausible, though not fool-proof explanation. If there is ambiguity and inaccuracy or 
even  contradiction  we  should  not  be  surprised. Plato  is well  known  for  keeping 
knowledge in the realm of forms, and far away from the sensible world. It follows 
that an explanation of the world is not going to be devoid of problems  nor is it going 
to lead to knowledge and fact . The Stoics, with their ontology and epistemology do 
not have this luxury. Owing to the fact that it is the subject matter that will be 
responsible  for  any  problems  that  arise,  it  may  be  unfair  to  characterise  Plato‟s 
appeal to triangles as being responsible for the elements‟ solidity as a volte face.  
 
                                                 
218 Crombie 1966, pg. 153, argued that Plato thought the sensible world entirely unsuitable for study and 
so any analysis of it was a waste of time.  
219 Tim. 29c says that owing to the nature of the universe, and ourselves, we should not be surprised if the 
account is not true but likely. This passage also refers to the account as a “myth” further reinforcing its 
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The  geometrical  nature  of  the  elements  is  not  actually  discussed  until  just  about 
midway  of  the  dialogue  and  after  the  extensive  discussion  of  the  creation  of  the 
world-soul and the introduction of the Receptacle. In the first part of chapter one 
primary matter was found to be that which underlay proximate matter but which did 
not rely on any further matter or substance below it. In this case the elementary 
triangles are what underlie the proximate matter of the world which we saw Plato 
accept  as  the  four  elements.  It  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  triangles 
would, in this case, fulfil the definition of primary matter that we saw apoios ousia 
do. But  the  similarities between  apoios ousia,  a  bare  three  dimensional  extension 
that  is  body,  and  triangles  seem  fairly  slim
220.  When the triangles are introduced 
there  are  said  to  be  two  types :  the  equilateral  and  the isosceles
221. These  two 
constitute each geometrical figure which in turn constitutes each element. So that 
Earth, being the most stable element , is represented by a  cubic atomic figure and 
that cubic atom is in turn constituted by the isosceles triangles. Fire is constituted by 
a  pyramid  which  is  the  most  dynamic  geometrical  figure,  the  pyramid  is  in  turn 
constituted  of  half-equilateral  triangles
222. Water and Air are represented by the 
icosahedron and octahedron respectively. Both of these are a lso constituted by the 
equilateral triangles. It is this sharing of the same elemental triangle that allows 
these three elements to transmute into one another. Earth, though, is left out of the 
cycle of elements. It is only an illusion which leads us to th ink that it is in the same 
cycle, which is not to say that it does not interact with the other elements. It does 
indeed  do  so,  but  when  its  atoms  are  overwhelmed  and  broken  down  to  the 
constituent triangles they can only form Earth again, but will not do so straight away 
since the atoms of whichever element overwhelmed Earth will prevent this occurring  
immediately.  
 
Primary matter as found in Stoicism is a continuum. This allowed it to be the same 
throughout itself and so entirely malleable. Atomic triangl es and the subsequent 
                                                 
220 Alexander Quaestio 2.13 argues that in every change there is something underlying that change that 
the change is predicated of. In this context he argues that the triangles are the ultimate matter in the 
Timaeus since it is to these that all bodies can be reduced. This position is clearly based on one that 
denies a material role for the Receptacle.  
221  At  53e  Timaeus  states  that:  “For  if  we  succeed  herein  we  shall  grasp  the  truth  concerning  the 
generation of earth  and  fire and  the  mean  proportionals.”  (Trans.  Bury)  We  should  then  be  given  an 
explanation as to why the mean proportionals used earlier in the dialogue during the creation of the world-
soul are in fact imperfect. They fail to resolve back to a harmony, and the elements of fire and earth fail to 
resolve back into one another. Is this perhaps yet another illustration of the imperfection of the physical 
universe? The elements fail in their perfect transmutation because the world is but an image of an eternal 
paradigm and so incapable of admitting a perfect system.  
222  Fire is composed of 24 half -equilateral triangles arranged to form a tetrahedron. 6 half -equilateral 
triangles form each of the 4 equilateral faces. Cf. Tim. 54e-56c. 83  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
shapes they make do not have this flexibility. The element earth is removed from the 
transmutation process as its triangles are of a different sort from the others. Prime 
matter should be a single thing, not two. There is also the added problem of whether 
or not this system of triangles would result in a continuum or not. It seems more 
likely  that  there  will  be  void  inside  the  geometrical  bodies  and  this  is  very  far 
removed  from  anything  the  Stoics  would  accept.    Not  only  do  the  elements  and 
elemental triangles bring the absurdity of multiple prime matters and the potential 
for  void  but  it  seems  that  Plato  is  not  altogether  dedicated  to  minimising  the 
characteristics that they posses. We are told that in the pre-cosmic chaos there is 
motion
223. But in other dialogues
224 Plato makes it clear that motion is caused by the 
soul. It seems that if the  Timaeus is understood literally then before the demiurge 
goes to the effort of creating the cosmos there is something external and somehow 
disposed existing in its own independent way. This is quite clearly not the case in the 
Stoic universe. While for the Stoics, if such a thing can be conceived, “before” god 
acts on matter everything is still since matter has no properties or activating energy 
integral to it
225. Yet for Plato it has to be supposed that there is something, that 
again cannot be primary matter, that has an internal motive power t hat is irrational. 
What god appears to do is take an existing power of motion and make it rational and 
ordered. If we follow the letter of the text the first thing that the demiurge creates 
out of this ambiguous pre-existing stuff is the world-soul
226.  
 
In non-literal readings of the  Timaeus the world-soul is taken to be identical with 
god. This is an interesting parallel with Stoicism in light of the account of the creation 
of the world-soul: where it is taken to be stretched out throughout the cosmos. The 
implication is that there is no part of the cosmos where there is no god. The world is 
even  described  as  the  body  of  the  world  in  the  Timaeus
227  in  a  way  that  seems 
prescient of the Stoic position. The text states that the materials out of which the 
world-soul are created are not the sort of things normally associated with a material 
nor either account of the elements that we have met. Instead they are: 
 
                                                 
223 Tim. 53a and 69c.  
224 E.g. The Laws and Phaedrus.  
225 Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 9.75-6 (=L&S 44C1-2 = SVF 2.311, part). 
226 34b-c: “Now as regards the Soul, although we are essaying to describe it after the body, God did not 
likewise plan it to be younger than the body; for when uniting them, He would not have permitted the 
elder to be ruled by the younger.” (Trans. Bury)  
227 E.g. Tim. 32c, 34b-c.  84  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
In between the Being that is indivisible and always changeless, 
and  the  one  that is divisible  and  comes  to  be  in  the  corporeal 
realm, he mixed a third, intermediate form of being derived from 
the other two. Similarly, he made a mixture  of the  Same, and 
then one of the Different, in between their indivisible and their 
corporeal, divisible counterparts. And he took the three mixtures 
and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing the 
Different, which  was  hard  to  mix,  into  the  conformity  with  the 
Same. Now when he had mixed these two together with Being, 
and from the three had made a single mixture, he redivided the 
whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, each part 
remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different and of Being
228. 
(Trans. Zeyl.)  
 
It appears as though the world-soul is being created out of abstracted ways of being 
rather than out of any matter as would be normally understood. The Stoics‟ active 
principle  is  quite  clearly  bodily  and  co-extensive  with  the  material  principle. 
Furthermore for the Stoic god‟s intellect can be understood as the forms, if forms 
have to be found in Stoicism, and his intellect is bodily and expressed in the objects 
of the world
229. What Plato seems to be implying is that the world-soul has some sort 
of relation to the transient sensible world and to the formal world and so will be the 
connecting link between the two
230. Since the relationship of the active principle to 
the passive principle in Stoicism proved illuminating in the explanation of the passive 
principle it is time to turn to the interpretation of the active principle in the  Timaeus: 
the world-soul.   
 
The account offered at Timaeus 35a-b of the creation of the world-soul is considered 
by  Cornford
231, quite accurately in my opinion, to be the hardest passage of the 
                                                 
228 That is, there are six ingredients: the indivisible and divisible Being, indivisible and divisible Sameness 
and indivisible and divisible Difference.  
229 Rist (1969, pg. 204) argues that the purpose of god is to give shape and form to the world. At pg. 206 
he goes on to argue that for Posidonius the world -soul is the idea of the world and is the shape of the 
world as well as b eing both geometrical and physical number  –  it  exists  as  the  number  comprising 
harmony. This last point will be seen to be as a result of the Old Academic legacy to Stoicism. At pg. 207 
Rist continues and states that it is likely that Posidonius was the first Stoic to say that Platonic forms are 
not merely human concepts (and so by extension god‟s) but to explicitly state that the forms are god‟s 
concepts directly.   
230 Cf. Tim. 37a-b where Plato explains that the world soul touches all things and announces what they are 
similar or dissimilar to. 
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Timaeus.  The  interpretation  of  Proclus  found  support  at  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century after being largely ignored for a substantial time, much to the detriment of 
Academic study since it is almost certainly the correct understanding of this passage. 
The position of Proclus is most clearly explained by G. M. A. Grube in his 1932 paper 
on the passage of the Timaeus, and has since become the dominant interpretation. 
Grube  criticises  those  interpretations  which  identify  the  Same  with  Being,  and 
Difference with the Being which is “transient and divisible in bodies.
232” Instead, says 
Grube, the demiurge makes three divisions in order to get the three things which he 
will blend together in order to create Soul. The three basic ingredients are Existence 
(ousia), Sameness (tauto) and Difference (thateron). Each of these has two types – 
the  indivisible  and  the  divisible.  It  is  the  intermediate  between  each  which  the 
demiurge  is  at  this  stage  interested  in.  That  is  he  is  interested  in  the  Existence 
between indivisible Existence and divisible Existence, and so on for Sameness and 
Difference. There are then three constituents (as indeed Plato makes clear), the third 
kind of Existence, the third kind of Sameness and the third kind of Difference. These 
are then blended together. Having to mix all three Plato first mixes the third kind of 
Sameness with the third kind of Difference, and finally mixes this creation with the 
third  kind  of  Existence  to  create  the  World-Soul.  Cornford‟s
233  translation  of  the 
passage makes this process much clearer and runs as follows:  
 
The  things  of  which  he  composed  soul  and  the  manner  of  its 
composition  were  as  follows:  (1)  Between  the  indivisible 
Existence  that  is  ever  in  the  same  state  and  the  divisible 
Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third form of 
Existence composed of both. (2) Again, in the case of Sameness 
and Difference, he also on the same principle made a compound 
intermediate between that kind of them which is indivisible and 
the kind that is divisible in bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he 
blended them all into a unity, forcing the nature  of Difference, 
hard as it was to mingle, into union with Sameness, and mixing 
them together with Existence.  
 
The nature of these ingredients is not entirely without problem. Xenocrates, Crantor 
of Soli and Posidonius all read the passage in apparently different ways with different 
                                                 
232 Tim. 35a. (Trans. Bury)  
233 Cornford 1956, pp 59-60, Cornford helpfully numbers the points of creation. 86  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
results.  The  disagreement  between  Xenocrates and  his pupil  Crantor  is indicative, 
according  to  Taylor
234,  of  the  fact  that  there  was  no  definite  structure  of 
interpretation  in  the  Old  Academy  and  that  Plato  himself  had  left  the  issue 
unresolved. According to Plutarch
235 Xenocrates interpreted the creation of the soul 
as being no more than the creation of number since soul was self-moving number for 
him
236. However for Crantor the main purpose of soul is not as originator of motion 
but intellection. Following the principle that “like is known by like”, (which Aristotle 
tells us Plato adhered to
237) when Plato says that the soul is created from Being and 
Becoming  it  is  because  the  soul  must  know  both  Being  and  Becoming.  This 
interpretation leads to Posidonius‟ position which is interesting for us since he is one 
of  the  great  Stoics,  while  also  adopting  some  aspects  from  “mainstream” 
Platonism
238.  He  also,  interestingly,  seems  to  take  Crantor‟s  assertion  further  and 
has the soul exist as corporeal, which as we saw is the traditional nature of the Stoic 
god.  1023b of Plutarch‟s On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus gives us the 
account of Posidonius and his followers. They took “divisible in the case of bodies” 
and  its  mixture  with  intelligibles  to  make  the  soul  “the  form  of  the  omni-
dimensionally  extended
239.”  Plutarch‟s  objections  to  Posidonius  are  not  strong;  he 
tries  to  make  sense  of  this  Stoic  position  using  Platonic  concepts,  failing  to 
appreciate that Stoics are not Platonists
240. Either way, he is most likely correct in 
rejecting an interpretation which makes the World -Soul corporeal: but the point to 
note here is that this is a plausible reading for a Stoic to take on the issue
241. If we 
take  the  account  of  Grube  (and  Proclus)  then  we  see  the  most  plausible 
interpretation of the constituents involved in the creation of the soul. Neither, as 
Plutarch
242  and  Taylor
243  point  out  is  Sameness  to  be  identified  with  Rest  or 
Difference with Motion since in the Sophist
244 Plato states emphatically that they are 
different things.  
 
                                                 
234 Taylor 1928 pg. 106. 
235 Plutarch ibid. 1012D = Fr. 68 Heinze. 
236 See the next chapter for details of Xenocrates‟ philosophy and the Timaeus. 
237De Anima a.404b16. In the preceding lines he explains how Empedocles held the same principle.   
238 Dillon (1996, pg. 108) sees Posidonius as influential on the Middle Platonists, and responsible for th e 
intertwining of the Stoic and Platonist schools. A Stoic version of Antiochus of Ascalon.  
239  See the account of Speusippus in the next chapter for a parallel interpretation, although with a 
different result. 
240 For instance he objects at 1023C that the soul cannot be a Form since Forms are static and the soul is 
in motion, and that Forms cannot mix with bodies but the soul does.  
241 Although arguing from the principle that like is known by like and that the world -soul knows corporeal 
existence, it is not so absurd to conclude that the world-soul is in some sense corporeal. 
242 Plutarch ibid. 1013D. 
243 Taylor 1926 pg. 114. 
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Plato then moves on to the particularities of the creation, detailing the method of 
division and mixture that the demiurge used to create the proportion of the soul. 
35b-36c explains the scale of numbers that the demiurge used. I am inclined to view 
the ultimate failure of the account to resolve into a perfect fraction as a deliberate 
device  for  Plato  in  order  to  show  the  inability  of the  Pythagoreans  to  explain  the 
world  via  mathematics.  The  demiurge  splits  up  his  newly  made  creation  in  the 
following division: into a piece, then a piece twice as big, three times as big, four 
times as big, eight times as big, nine times as big and finally twenty seven times as 
big. i.e. 1. 2. 3. 4. 8. 9. 27. Split into lines of the even and odd we end up with 2. 4. 
8. and 3. 9. 27. with 1 being the common origin of both. A reasonable question to 
ask  would  be:  why  these  numbers?  The  even  increase  in  doubles and  the  odd  in 
triples, they are the numbers that in the ratios set out below will give us the full 
harmonic scale. Plutarch also gives us various reasons of esoteric significance but 
they need not concern us here. The demiurge now has to fill in the intervals between 
the  numbers,  he  does  so  using  the  harmonic  and  the  arithmetic  means.  The 
harmonic is achieved by: (  x  )/( ), and the arithmetic by dividing the 
sum of the numbers by the number of numbers, e.g. the demiurge fills the numbers 
4 and 8 with 5 1/3 (i.e. 5.3) and 6, so on the even side we end up with the filled 
ratios: 1. 4/3. 3/2. 2. 8/3. 3. 4. 16/3. 6. 8 and on the odd: 1. 3/2. 2. 3. 9/2. 6. 9. 
27/2. 18. 27. This really amounts to a musical system and is no doubt meant to be 
indicative  of  the  harmony  of  the  soul  as  a  perfect  system  perfectly  constructed. 
However  between  every  4/3  interval  we  can  fit  two  lots  9/8.  But  this  leaves  the 
unresolved ratio of 256/243, i.e. between 1 and 1 1/3 (which is a ratio of 4:3), Plato 
inserts two 9:8 ratios, e.g. 1. 9/8. 81/64 (i.e. 9x9/8x8). 4/3. The ratio between 1 
and 9/8 is 9:8, the ratio between 9/8 and 81/64 is also 9:8, but between 81/64 and 
4/3 it is 256:243
245. This cannot be resolved, i.e. there is no way for the scheme to 
continue perfectly, as Plato well knew, and so we are left with the apparent failure of 
mathematics to account for the nature of the soul. This obvious failure to resolve the 
scheme  of  harmonic  division  perfectly  rather  points  to  the  inability  of  the 
Pythagoreans to create the world satisfactorily out of mathematics. It puts in mind 
the  story  of  Hippasus being  ejected  from  the  Pythagorean  sc hool  for  making  it 
generally known that the square root of two is not a rational fraction thus casting 
                                                 
245  Perhaps  more  clearly  expressed:  between  3and  4,  we  can  insert  3/1x9/8=27/8,  and 
3/1x9/8x9/8=243/64 since both are greater than 3 but less than 4. We could not insert another interval 
since 243/64x9/8=2187/512 and this is greater than 4. But the interval 9/8 did not completely fill the 
ratio of 3 and 4 since 243/64 is less than 4. The gap that remains is 256/243 which is less than a whole 
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into doubt the beauty of mathematics and its ability to explain the world rationally. 
Is Plato here just poking fun at the Pythagoreans? Or perhaps the fractured nature of 
the  mathematics  of  the  soul  mirrors  the  nature  of  the  soul  as  itself  a  fractured 
entity? – The nature of the world-soul is as fractured in sympathy with the sensible 
world. The soul is a conglomeration of things which were stated to be “hard to mix” 
(Being,  the  Same  and  the  Different,  is  this  a  mathematical  instantiation  of  that 
difficulty? If we take into account Cornford‟s opinion that the “wandering cause” is to 
be identified with the circle of the different and his opinion that this demonstrates 
the world-soul to be less than wholly rational this fracture in its nature is curiously 
understandable
246.   
 
According to Cornford Plato‟s decision to stop the sequence at 27 is arbitrary
247, but 
according to Plutach it is not, since the scheme contains seven numbers and also the 
various  ways  of  adding  and  multiplying  the  numbers  used  by  Plato  result  in  new 
numbers of transcendent Pyathgorean importance, e.g. 6. Cornford suggests that if 
musical harmony were Plato‟s only goal then he would be better off staying with just 
one tetraktys – the even, but in order to allow for magnitudes he needs to have odd 
numbers, and hence the second tetraktys
248. The account of the creation of the soul 
shows the close connection between the Stoic active principle and  the world-soul of 
the  Timaeus.  It  also  shows  very  strongly  the  Platonic  emphasis  on  mathematical 
explanations  and  the  core  role  that  it  plays  in  metaphysical  explanations.  The 
importance of mathematics for the material principle will be further demonstrated in 
chapter three as will its relationship to Stoic mathematics.  
 
The creation of the soul was discussed to explain both what it is in the pre-cosmos 
that exists and to show the importance of mathematics for my thesis. One of the 
ingredients  of  the  world-soul  is  the  being  that  is  the  same  and  this  can  be 
understood as being the stuff of the forms. The being that is different is the stuff of 
the  sensible  world,  however  it  seems  unlikely  that  this  should  be  understood  as 
anything akin to a corporeal substrate. The stuff of the elemental triangles, which 
                                                 
246 1956, pg. 76. Cornford also suggests that this leaves open the possibility that the world-soul is not 
completely rational. An idea central to Plutarch‟s On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus is that the 
World-Soul was “evil”, in that it was disordered before the imposition of order on it by the demiurge, 
however  not  even  the  imposed  order  is  perfect.  Tim  36b  is  where  Plato  finishes  the  account  of  the 
intervals and ends with the unresolved 256:243  
247 Cornford 1956 pg. 67: “this compass is determined solely by the decision to terminate the series with 
27, the cube of 3.” 
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existed in a disordered way prior to god‟s ordering, should surely be the same as the 
stuff which constitutes the being that is different and is in the world soul. Plato does 
not tell us what the triangles are actually made from. In fact it appears to be a brute 
triangular atomism. The only thing that suggests that there may in fact be something 
beyond them and more fundamental is that at 81d we are told that the “root of the 
triangles grows slack”. This results in weakened triangles that are unable to cut and 
divide other triangles. Instead they end up being dissolved by other triangles and the 
entity that the old ones make up withers and dies. Geometrical figures are made up 
of planes, planes of lines and lines of points. If we follow the theory of triangular 
atomism to its mathematical conclusion we end up with points being the “stuff” out 
of which the triangles are ultimately constituted. Points do not rely on anything per 
se. This conclusion also explains how the world-soul can be said to know both the 
forms and sensible world. If the forms are essentially mathematical in nature, as will 
be shown in the next chapter, and the world is made up of geometrical points then 
the connection between them becomes clearer. The world is an image of the forms. 
The forms are  essentially noetic numbers, the elemental triangles and solids then 
become the sensible representation of perfect immaterial numbers. It seems that on 
this interpretation of the Timaeus that “point” or all the points, as it were, become 
the ekmageion. The world is made up by god playing a cosmic game of join-the-dots. 
The upshot is that we end up with a matrix much as was suggested by Cornford
249. 
However he made his matrix up from space and this was  based on his interpretation 
of the Receptacle. It is to the Receptacle that attention will now turn as it is the other 
choice in the  Timaeus for a material principle and as yet I have not offered much 
evidence for my mathematical interpretation, which puts mathematics at the centre 
of Platonic physics and metaphysics though this will change as other dialogues are 
brought into the discussion.  
 
                                                 
249 Cornford 1956, pp. 177-188. He argues that the Receptacle is a separate sort of thing since it is not a 
Form nor a sensible body but a nature more obscure than just geometrical space, though we cannot be 
sure how accessible the notion of geometrical space would have been at that time. It could be that Plato 
spends so much time discussing the Receptacle precisely because the notion of geometrical space was so 
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2.1.2 The Receptacle of Becoming:    
 
The Receptacle is brought in after the elements have been introduced but before the 
elemental triangles. Its place in the physics of the Timaeus is not clear as it seems at 
the same time to replace the original purpose of the elements before being in turn 
replaced by the elemental triangles. Timaeus brings in the Receptacle as an integral 
part of existence, a third thing reminiscent of the three constituents of the world-
soul:  
 
A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, considering that 
those  two  were  sufficient;  but  now  the  argument  seems  to 
compel us to try to reveal by words a Form that is baffling and 
obscure. What essential property, then, are we to conceive it to 
possess? This in particular, - that it should be the receptacle, and 
as it were the nurse, of all Becoming
250. (Trans. Bury) 
 
The Receptacle, like the demiurge is s omething which is difficult to grasp. It is 
apprehensible only via “bastard reasoning”. It is not a form so is not a fit subject for 
proper reason, nor is it apprehensible by the senses. Just as the Stoic apoios ousia 
was found to be never devoid of qualities so neither is the Receptacle ever found by 
itself. This makes its nature difficult to grasp.  
 
There is much debate over the nature of the Receptacle. Is it to be understood as 
matter  or  space,  both  or  neither
251?  Aristotle  seems  to  have  been   under  the 
impression that Plato was the first to try to understand what space was but that in 
doing so he conflated it with matter. However there is no direct textual support for 
interpreting the Receptacle as matter. That Plato does not call the Receptacle  hylē is 
not  strong  evidence  as  it is unknown  whether  or  not  the  term  was  in  use  before 
Aristotle in this context. This rather weak negative evidence is supported, though, by 
the  stronger  direct  language  employed  by  Plato  to  describe  the  Receptacle. 
Throughout the Timaeus the Receptacle is referred to by language that indicates it is 
to be understood not as a material principle but simply as space. 52b1, 52b4, 52d3, 
53a2, 53a6, 58a7 are all occasions when Plato calls it space or place. Imagery that 
                                                 
250 Tim 49a. 
251 Options comprehensively discussed by Algra 1988. Lloyd-Gerson, 1996 pg. 59, suggests that there are 
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suggests space rather than matter is constantly used, e.g. mother
252 50d2, 51a4 and 
foster mother/nurse, 49a7, and 52d 5. It is also frequently referred to as  en  hoi 
rather than ex hou; strongly suggesting space or place over matter, especially in the 
sense  that  is  the  subject  of  this  thesis.  However  Algra
253  argues  that  if  the 
Receptacle is taken as space it commits Plato to two different conceptions of space. 
But this is compatible with the complicated nature of Platonic space as will be seen. 
The Receptacle is not normal space but, rather, space for geometrical points and is 
three-dimensional  space  because  of the  configuration  of the  objects it  contains. 
Algra‟s criticism of the Receptacle is valid only if we understand the Receptacle as 
space in a common sense way. The reason that Algra is led to reject Archer-Hind‟s 
statement that the Receptacle is a “masterly piece of analysis
254” is partly because 
he  rejects  the  usefulness  of  the  Unwritten  Doctrines  (which  underpin  my 
interpretation  as  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter),  but  also  thinks  that  each 
Platonic dialogue can be understood alone
255. This, as explained in the introduction to 
this thesis is position that I disagree with. Each dialogue is part of a systematic, if 
developing,  theory  and  is  not  designed  to  answer  all   questions  but  rather  to 
introduce and remind. As such looking at a dialogue, and any doctrine, in isolation 
will inevitably lead to false conclusions.   
 
The strongest reasons for supposing that the Receptacle could be matter for Plato 
are the fact that it is one of the things that is said to exist in the pre-cosmos and the 
use of the gold analogy and perfume analogy to explain its nature. The gold analogy 
occurs at 50a-c in an effort to explain the Receptacle.  In it Timaeus discusses how 
shapes that are modelled in gold are transient and how it is more correct to say that 
the  gold  exists   more  than  these  shapes  do  since  it  is  constant  through  the 
alterations, while the figures change constantly: 
 
Imagine that a man   were  to model all possible figures out of 
gold, and were then to proceed without cessation to remodel 
each of these into every other,  - then, if someone were to point 
                                                 
252 Although Algra, not unreasonably, understands the term “mother” to denote materiality. Discussion of 
female imagery will take place in chapter 4.3.  
253 Algra1988, pp. 72-120.  
254 Archer-Hind, 1888, pg. 44. Though I must agree with Algra that the description of the Receptacle as a 
“masterly piece of analysis” is generous to say the least.  
255 Algra op cit. pp. 75-76. A point with which I agree with Algra (pg. 82) is when he states that we should 
not take Plato to have the same understanding of matter as we do. We understand matter as a corporeal 
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to one of the figures and ask what it is, by far the safest reply, in 
point of truth, would be that it is gold. (Trans. Bury)  
 
This passage suggests that the elemental triangles can be broken down, or are at 
least transitory when compared to what underlies them. The passage confuses the 
issue by suggesting that the triangles are made out of something while the rest of 
the dialogue suggests that the Receptacle is not of such a sort as to have things 
made out of it. However we can understand the shape of the triangles as being in the 
gold much as the geometrical or elemental figures would be in space. To take the 
important message of the gold analogy as being that the Receptacle is matter or that 
the sensible world is shaped out of it is, I believe, to place the emphasis in the wrong 
place
256. The gold analogy builds on the previous explanation of the sensible world by 
reinforcing its transitory nature. The point is not to tell the reader that there is a 
permanent material substrate that is worked by the demiurge ; but to show that just 
as a figure made of gold can continuously change in and out of existence, and so 
have only a very bare claim to existence, so in fact do all objects in the world have 
only a very bare claim to existence. The gold analogy concludes by saying that there 
are  three  things:  “the  Becoming,  that  „wherein‟  it  becomes,  and  the  source 
„wherefrom‟ the Becoming is copied and produced.
257” There is no mention that that 
“wherein” should be thought of either as matter or in fact identifiable with the gold in 
the gold analogy beyond its permanent nature. The elemental triangles breakdown 
and alter their configuration while the Receptacle is constant and unalterable.  
 
As well as the gold analogy the perfume analogy which follows is also taken to be 
proof of Plato‟s intention to view the Receptacle as a material principle. But, like the 
gold analogy, such an interpretation places the emphasis on the wrong aspect of the 
analogy. 50e states that: 
 
Wherefore it is right that the substance which is to receive within 
itself all  the  kinds should  be  void  of all  forms;  just  as  with all 
fragrant  ointments,  men  bring  about  this  condition  by  artistic 
contrivance and make liquids which are to receive the odours as 
odourless as possible. (Trans. Bury)   
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The point of this passage is not to show that the Receptacle is liquid any more than 
the gold analogy was to show it as being material. The perfume analogy shows that 
what receives form must be as far as is possible without form in itself – exactly as 
the  Stoics  claim  of  their  material  principle.  Just  as  the  gold  analogy  showed  the 
impermanence of the sensible world and not the materiality of the Receptacle so to 
the perfume analogy does not imply that the Receptacle is material but only that it is 
formless. The gold analogy showed that it is persistent, the perfume analogy that it 
is without form itself. Taken together with the fact that Plato repeatedly calls the 
Receptacle  space  or  place  it  seems  clear  that  Plato  does  not  intend  it  to  be 
understood as a material principle
258.   
 
If it is space and devoid of all form and it comes after Timaeus has explained that 
the elements are responsible for the  three-dimensional nature of the world then it 
seems that even as space the Receptacle is devoid of this basic quality. What then is 
it space for? It seems reasonable to suppose that at base the Receptacle is space for 
the geometrical triangles and their c onstituent parts  –  geometrical  points.  Clearly 
points  have  no  extension,  but  they  do  have  location.  This  is  perhaps  what  the 
Receptacle functions to provide: the non-extended location  for geometrical points. 
Subsequently, ontologically speaking, the fact that there are four elements serves to 
make this location three dimensional
259.  
 
This account relies on some as yet un-established notions of the role of mathematics 
in Platonic physics. But as I understand the dialogues as connected by a persistent 
theme, albeit one that obviously develops, this is not a problem. Further, as the 
dialogues are to be understood as teaching aids or to jog one‟s memory we should 
not expect either a full account or a clear account. Most teaching, as Dillon points 
out
260, was oral. We place such a heavy emphasis on the written works because that 
is what we possess, but in reality they are merely signposts to the oral discussions 
and conclusions reached in the Academy. The basis of the geometrical interpretation 
that would require a substance such as the Receptacle, which supplies only location, 
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matter in Platonism. Instead it will be shown to be abstract geometrical points. Algra‟s assumption is that 
there is actually a candidate for matter in the Timaeus, and this is not the case.  
259 See note 219 above. 
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will be shown in the next chapter as it will be seen to have its origins in the second 
half  of  the  Parmenides  and  the  complex  metaphysics  that  is  explained  there.  In 
conjunction with the Unwritten Doctrines the second half of the Parmenides will be 
seen to form the mathematical and ontological basis for Plato‟s physics which as we 
have seen does not require a prime matter in a common sense notion. Instead what 
we have is a set of geometrical points that are the basis for elemental triangles that 
are in turn the basis of the macrocosmic world.    95  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
2.1.3 Concluding Remarks About the Timaeus: 
 
The Timaeus is the obvious and necessary starting point for any discussion about 
Platonic physics. Despite being the only dialogue which is explicitly about physics its 
main explanations are based on principles established in other works. Zeno studied 
at the Academy and it was his teachers there who are the only ones likely to have 
dealt  with  physics  and  Chrysippus  certainly  seems  to  have  had  knowledge  of  the 
work too
261. There are some striking and immediate similarities to be found between 
Stoic physics and what is said  in the Timaeus and some more subtle connections 
which will become apparent after further analysis of other Platonic teachings.  
 
The most striking connection between the Timaeus and Stoic physics is the world-
soul. The account of the world-soul‟s creation is complex and relies on harmonics and 
mathematics to link the world-soul‟s nature to that of the sensible world. While the 
demiurge  stands  removed  from  the  object  of  creation  and  the  model  of  creation, 
making the object resemble the model as much as is possible; the world-soul exists 
immanently  in  the  object  of  creation  while  looking  constantly  at  the  model 
connecting the two through his intellect. Not only does Plato tell us that this is so
262 
but a human soul can experience the forms and so it seems likely that the world-soul 
would be able to do so too. There is also the fact that the world -soul is created of 
indivisible ingredients as well as divisible ones and this is inexplicable if it is not in 
order to allow it to be acquainted with both the forms and the sensible world.  The 
demiurge, aside from his creative aspect, has little in common with t he Stoic active 
principle. But in terms of active principle in the world the world -soul is much more 
strongly connected. It has been argued
263 that Polemo‟s understanding of god is the 
main influence on Stoicism on the basis of a single fragment: “Polemo said that the 
world  is  god”,  and  by  arguing  that  Cicero‟s  account  of  Antiochean  physics  in  his 
Academica is actually Polemo‟s physics. These arguments and considerations, which 
will be argued against in the next chapter, are not required to move from Platonism 
to Stoicism. The world-soul is immanent in the world and, as his name suggests, has 
the same existence as the active principle that Sextus described – that the power in 
the material principle is nothing other than the power in us, viz. soul. That the world-
soul  is  created  need  not  pose  a  problem  since  this  understanding  was  explained 
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away as a teaching aid almost as soon as it was proposed
264. If there is in fact no 
creation of the world, and by extension the world -soul, then it seems that the world 
and world-soul are eternally conjoined and never separate just like the active and 
passive principles in Stoicism. It is also extended throughout the world and “knows” 
every part of it, knows the forms and is not anthropomorphic. The active principle of 
the  Stoics  is  likewise  extended  throughout  the  passive  principle  (and  hence  the 
world) nor is it anthropomorphic and since the objects in the world are the thoughts 
of  god  and  there  are  no  external  forms  then  the  Stoic  active  principle,  like  the 
Platonic world-soul, “knows” the forms. This notion of being extended throughout the 
world  is  interesting.  If  this  is  thought  about  from  a  Stoic  perspective,  when  the 
assumption that everything that exists is material is implicit in their philosophy, then 
it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  world-soul  would  be  conceived  of  as 
material. However in the Sophist
265 Plato explicitly criticises those who take all things 
to be material. It is highly unlikely then that Plato could ever mean for god, as we 
may understand the world-soul, to be thought of as extended throughout the world 
in  a  material  way.  This  can  be  supported  by  Neo-Platonic  evidence  that  we  met 
above in chapter two in the discussion of krasis. Two bodies may be in the same 
place if one of them is immaterial. The mathematical nature of the world-soul should 
perhaps be taken as indicative of its immaterial nature which allows it to be extended 
throughout the world. There is one other hint though that may have made a Stoic 
reading the Timaeus pause for thought: 
 
It  (the  universe)  has  come  into  existence;  for  it  is  visible  and 
tangible  and  possessed  of  a  body;  and  all  such  things  are 
sensible,  and  things  sensible,  being  apprehensible  by  opinion 
with the aid of sensation, come into existence, as we saw, and 
are generated
266. (Trans. Bury) 
 
Combined  with  Timaeus‟  earlier  statement  that  things  which  partake  of  Becoming 
come to be as a result of a creator we can see if a Stoic may not wonder: if the 
world-soul has come into existence could it not be that it is tangible, in other words 
could it be a body? This does rely on the inverted logic that all “A”s are “B”s so all 
“B”s must be “A”s which is clearly not true. However such a thought may make a 
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Stoic look at the Timaeus in a more sympathetic light and perhaps inspire them to 
look at the text a little more. 
 
The account in the Timaeus is confused. It describes the creation of the body before 
that  of  the  soul  and  then  claims  that  the  soul  is  older  and  uses  the  elements  to 
explain  two  different  things  in  the  world  which  require  them  to  be  understood  in 
different ways. Indeed, Timaeus himself is sensible to the problems which he faces 
and when he begins his discussion he asks his audience to remember that he can 
only offer them a mythos. He invokes the gods twice in his story asking for their aid 
in  this  most  difficult  of  tasks
267.  This  caution  in  physical  explanation  is 
understandable considering Plato‟s emphasis on the immaterial realm of knowledge 
over that of the sensible world of opinion. It is precisely because the sensible world is 
one that changes and is “never the same” that the account can only ever be a likely 
story
268 and not a true explanation. The imperfection of the sensible world for proper 
philosophical debate is shown by the creation of the world-soul where the ratios that 
go to make it up are imperfectly left at 256:243. If the account was perfect then the 
ratios would surely not leave this unsatisfying “gap”. For Plato physical examination 
will inevitably result in failure. It does not seem unreasonable given this that if we 
really want a true explanation of a material principle we would be better off looking 
not at the sensible world but at that which it is an image of.  
 
The  sensible  world  can  be  reduced  to  the  elements  and  the  elements  to  the 
geometrical shapes which are in turn reducible to the two sorts of triangles. These in 
turn have their basis in mathematics, the perfect science, which relates to the formal 
level. The sensible world is based on the formal via this science and the forms, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, have their nature perfectly explained through the 
medium  of  mathematics  indeed  are  most  likely  mathematical  in  essence.  The 
Receptacle forms the sensible basis for the instantiation of mathematics from pure 
arithmetic  and  numerology  to  geometrical/sensible  instantiation  by  simply  being 
“space” for the geometrical entities to appear in. This results in a sort of cosmic join-
the-dots,  which,  as  will  be  seen,  is  essentially  the  model  that  can  be  found  to 
describe  Stoic  prime  matter.  Both  the  Platonic  and  Stoic  matrix/matter  can  be 
regarded  as  mathematical  principles.  Whereas  the  former  exists  as  a  “material” 
principle most clearly and perfectly at a metaphysical level, for the latter the sensible 
                                                 
267 Tim. 27c and 48d.   
268 A point argued for by Archer-Hind, pg. 15, on the basis of the Heraclitean influence on Plato.  98  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
world and its passive principle is the material principle par excellence, but it could 
not have been conceived as it was without the mathematical predecessor found in 
Plato and the Old Academy.  
 
It  is  in  this  wider  context  of  Platonism  as  a  system  and  growing  school  that  the 
development of the Stoic material principle must be viewed. Through the thoughts in 
other  dialogues  such  as  the  Philebus  and  Parmenides  and  the  developmental 
explanations  found  in  the  Old  Academy  the  connection  between  Platonism  and 
Stoicism will become clearer. The Timaeus forms an entry point to the discussion of 
the sensible world built upon the metaphysics of the Philebus and Parmenides which 
can only be properly understood via the medium of the Unwritten Doctrines.  
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2.2 Aristotle and Matter: 
 
Speusippus and Xenocrates
269 built upon the work of Plato without, in my opinion, 
radically altering it. Their enterprise was rather the explanation and simplification of 
the complicated metaphysics found in the second half of the  Parmenides. This role, 
as  codifiers,  does  not  detract  from  their  importance  or  indeed  ingenuity  as 
philosophers. Indeed the explanation of what is an intricate metaphysics is no easy 
task and could not have been undertaken by anyone who was not a philosopher in 
their own right. We know that these two philosophers were familiar with the Timaeus 
and made some comments on it thanks to Aristotle: 
 
Xenocrates and Speusippus, in attempting to come to the aid of 
Plato, claimed that Plato did not hold the cosmos to have been 
created, but was uncreated, and had portrayed it as created only 
for purposes of instruction and for the purpose of explaining and 
understanding this situation more clearly
270.  
 
There is clear dispute here between the pupils of Plato. Aristotle does not appear 
particularly impressed with Speusippus and Xenocrates‟ claim that the creation of the 
world is allegorical. It is possible that Aristotle is merely being argumentative but 
what it shows is that Plato did not necessarily explain his own doctrines. Even his 
most intimate pupils could argue about what was meant. Doctrine was not hard and 
fast but open to interpretation. Aristotle‟s metaphysics differs substantially from that 
of his contemporaries at the Academy. While Speusippus and Xenocrates continued 
to develop metaphysics and physics along mathematical principles Aristotle took a 
different  approach.  Aristotle  was  really  first  among  philosophers  to  spend  a 
substantial amount of time analysing matter as an object in the way we are looking 
at  it  here
271. Although  I  do  not  believe  that  the  Stoics  were  ultimately  d irectly 
influenced by Aristotle in a positive way , his discussions render more accessible the 
concepts under discussion. It is also interesting to note that he is the first person to 
use the term hylē in the sense of matter.   
                                                 
269 The two successors to Plato as heads of the Academy. Speusippus was Plato‟s nephew and Xenocrates 
a student who was certainly in Plato‟s inner circle (cf. DL IV 8).  
270 Scholion on Aristotle, De Caelo 279b32ff. in Cod. Paris. Graec. 1853 (=E), p. 489ª9-12 (Brandis) (De 
Caelo 279b32ff). Speus. Fr. 61b Taran; Xenocr. Fr. 156 IP. 
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In his various discussions of matter he looks at proximate matter, intelligible matter 
and  prime  matter.  However  while  the  first  two  he  undoubtedly  accepts  as  real 
aspects of the world it is less clear if he accepted prime matter. I will argue that 
whether  or  not  Aristotle  accepted  that  prime  matter  is  a  part  of  the  world  his 
philosophy as a whole certainly strongly implies that it is. Although Aristotle argues 
that his contemporaries, Speusippus and Xenocrates, are mistaken on most things 
he accepts the notion of an intelligible matter with them. Unfortunately he does not 
go  into  great  detail  about  what  this  matter  is  like  while  its  equivalent  in  the 
metaphysics  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates  is  the  subject  of  detailed  discussion. 
Aristotle is sympathetic to the notion of a basic “out-of-which” but it is his sympathy 
to this basic notion that allows ambiguity to creep into his discussions.  
 
On the one hand he accepts, as the Stoics would later, that everything (at least in 
the sensible world) is a compound of matter and form; but on the other he has a 
habit  of  defining  the  matter  part  as:  “by  the  matter  I  mean,  for  instance,  the 
bronze.
272” When we talk about matter and form being the two constituents of all 
things it is strange to think of the material aspect already having some form, in this 
case being “bronze”. However Aristotle is at least open to the possibility of a bare 
matter  as  he  discusses  it  at  Metaphysics  1029a16-24.  In  this  passage  he 
characterises matter just as would  be expected: “by matter I mean that which in 
itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other 
of the categories by which being is determined.” This substrate he concludes would 
be  substance,  except  that  it  lacks  “separability  and  individuality”  which  we  are 
informed are thought to belong to substance primarily. This indeed shows Aristotle‟s 
reluctance to classify prime matter as substance but it does not show that he thinks 
it does not exist
273. He does, in the passage, say that: “substance is predicated of 
matter”.  If  substance  is  to  exist  then  so  too  does  matter.  But  this  sort  of  bare 
qualityless matter lacks individuality and separability so it is reasonable to suppose 
that for Aristotle as for the Stoics prime matter never exists alone qua prime matter 
and  so  in  itself  cannot  be  classified  as  substance.  However  this  superficial 
resemblance  is  not,  I  think,  enough  to  say  that  Aristotle  is  the  main  source  of 
inspiration for the Stoics vis-à-vis the development of their material principle. Since 
matter never exists independently it must always be at least minimally qualified and 
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for Aristotle, as for all ancient writers, the minimal instantiation is provided by the 
elements
274.  At  Meteorology  4  378b33-379a1  Aristotle  discusses  the  notion  that 
matter could in fact be the passive qualities that are associated with the elements 
earth and water. King
275 and Charlton
276 use this passage to justify their position that 
Aristotle neither believed in, nor needed, prime matter. Aristotle himself appears to 
reject the possibility of prime matter at De Caelo 305a22-26: 
 
But, on the other hand, it is equally impossible that the elements 
should be generated from some kind of body. That would involve 
a body distinct from the elements and prior to them. But if this 
body  possesses  weight  or  lightness,  it  will  be  one  of  the 
elements; and if it has no tendency to movement, it will be an 
immovable or mathematical entity, and therefore not in place at 
all
277. (Trans. Stocks)  
 
Here the elements appear to be the lowest instantiation of a material entity and the 
geometrical matrix of Plato is rejected. It has been argued that prime matter is 
unnecessary for Aristotle as he can account for elemental transmutation in a way 
that does not require anything like prime matter. King
278, later followed by Furth
279, 
presents us with a way of facilitating elemental change without recourse to Prime 
Matter. King insists that the:  
 
hot, cold, dry and moist, are not some anachronistic secondary 
qualities  or  even  mere  “attributes”  of  matter,  but…causes  and 
forces,  indeed,  the  very  “stuff  and  guts”  of  the  elements 
themselves.  In  fact,  it  is  simply  by  virtue  of  the  coupling, 
mingling, and re-coupling of the contrarieties that the elements 
are reciprocally generated
280.  
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elements.  
275 King 1956. 
276 Charlton 1970. 
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The  elements,  when  they  change  into  one  another  are  in  the  peculiar  position  of 
retaining  one  of the  contrarieties while  replacing  the  other  and  so  forming  a new 
element. It also explains the rigid method of change; that fire cannot easily change 
immediately into water without first becoming the intermediate: air
281.  
 
This is an ingenious interpretation  and right in a way (I mean, of course, that this 
“swapping” of contrarieties is most likely the method of elemental change). However 
it does have the uncomfortable concomitant of making the contrarieties something 
more basic than the elements which they are said of. King‟s position is based  on 
strong  textual  evidence.  However  there  is  just  as  much  textual  support  for  the 
opposing  view:  that  Aristotle  had  prime matter.  There  are  few  texts that  actively 
deny prime matter so in order to support the position that there is no prime matter 
for Aristotle the position is often reduced to an absurdity: 
 
Even  while  it  lived,  the  doctrine  of  prima  materia  remained  a 
subject of mystery and controversy. For in so far as anything has 
some  recognizable  character,  capable  of  analysis  and  therefore 
exhibiting  in  discourse  some  universal  characteristic,  it  is  ipso 
facto  informed:  and  in  so  far  as  it  is informed  it is a  “this,”  a 
substance, and hence not prima materia.
282 
 
More recently Robinson rephrased the situation: 
 
As  there  is  no  identifiable  matter  more  primitive  than  the 
elements…there is a problem about what underlies such change. 
The  traditional  interpretation  of  Aristotle‟s  treatment  of  this 
problem is that he posits a prime matter, a bare “stuff”, lacking 
all positive determinations, which is the matter of the elements 
and which makes elemental change possible. This prime matter is 
nothing but potentiality…
283 
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The  position  of  King  and  Charlton  relies  on  the  understanding  that  some  of  the 
elements  are  active  and  the  others  passive.  This  interpretation  is  taken  up  by 
Freudenthal
284 and it is possible that it was taken up by those who were interpreting 
the Stoics leading to the issues we saw in the previous chapter to do with the nature 
of pneuma. Freudenthal says that the active elements are active because they are 
hot and cold and these act on the dry and wet passive principles
285. It seems likely 
that the cause of the assertions that we m et in relation to the Stoics, that  pneuma 
was  a  compound  of  the  “active  elements”,  can  be  found  in  this  Aristotelian 
distinction.  Despite  the  interpretations  of  Aristotelian  physics  offered  by  King  and 
Robinson they cannot escape the language of prime matter. When they deny that it 
exists they do so in a manner that asserts a mode of prime matter existing that is 
not accepted even by the Stoics – viz. that it exists by itself as a bare substrate.  
Neither the Stoics nor Aristotle accept this as a possibility, but it does not then follow 
that  they  do  not  both  believe  that  there  is  a  prime  matter  “out  of  which”.  King 
rejects the notion of prime matter on the basis that it must always exist informed; 
but surely if it is informed then it is still prime matter, if it were not then how could it 
be  informed  to  not  allow  it  to  be  prime  matter?  In  other  words  the  form/matter 
distinction would be rejected at this level and there is no reason to suppose that it 
should be. It was noted above that Aristotle appears to reject the notion of a body 
prior to the elements. But rejecting a body prior to the elements is not the same as 
rejecting prime matter. Besides prime matter would not, as King rightly pointed out, 
actually exist prior to the elements. For Aristotle the world is eternal, never created 
nor  destroyed  there  is  thus no  need  to  suppose  that  there  is a  time  when  prime 
matter existed prior to the elements. It is as Robinson said: potentiality. The Stoics 
think that prime matter is a body, as is their active principle, but there is no reason 
to suppose that Aristotle thought of it in the same way. We have already seen how 
Plato‟s  ontology  breaks  down  to  the  immaterial  level  to  account  for  the  sensible 
nature of the world
286. There is no compelling reason to suppose that  Aristotle does 
not go below the level of the elements   in his ontology; but there is likewise no 
reason to suppose that if he did that he made this prime matter a body.  
 
Apart from proximate or elemental matter from which the world is made Aristotle 
also  discusses  the  notion  of  intelligible  matter.  Despite  his  contempt  for  the 
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complicated and formal hierarchies of Speusippus and Xenocrates Aristotle is forced 
to account for the  existence  of abstracted mathematicals and geometrical shapes. 
They clearly do not exist in the sensible mode as not everything that is conceived of 
exists in the sensible world. Gaukroger
287 argues that Aristotle cannot have purely 
noetic objects such as geometricals without a sort of matter because if he did then 
he would be reverting to the Platonic picture. The Old Academic position on this will 
be looked at in the next chapter. Aristotle‟s position seems to be along the lines that: 
just as there is a bare substance under the elements so a similar bare substance 
exists under abstracted number. This is not the case for the Old Academy as we will 
see where the matters become increasingly complicated the closer to the sensible 
they get. Aristotle introduces the notion of intelligible matter as though it were the 
most common thought: 
 
And  some  matter  is  sensible  and  some  intelligible,  sensible 
matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is 
changeable, and intelligible matter being that which is present in 
sensible  things  not  qua  sensible,  i.e.  in  the  objects  of 
mathematics
288. (Trans. W.D. Ross) 
 
He goes on to  expand his understanding and definition of intelligible matter by 
explaining how those things which are not perceptible will have matter too: 
 
For even some things which are not perceptible will have matter, 
since there  is matter in some sense in the case of everything 
which is not “what-it-meant-to-be” anything, that is, not its own 
form itself, but is a “this-something”. The semi-circle, then, is not 
a part of “the circle” in general, but of the individual circles, as 
has been said before; for as there is perceptible matter, so there 
is also intelligible matter
289. (Trans. W.D. Ross) 
 
All thoughts about a circle are about a particular circle, the circle that is being 
thought about. As an individual object in the world can be divided owing to its matter 
so too can the geometrical figure be divided according to its matter. If there is a 
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generic intelligible matter which underlies all intelligible change without itself being a 
particular, and there is no hint that it is a particular, then it seems likely that there 
will be a parallel in the sensible world.  
 
There  are, thus,  two  ways  to  get  to  prime matter  in  Aristotle. The  first  is simply 
through  the  positive  evidence  and  realising  that  his  system  of  elemental 
transmutation just does not make much sense without it. The second is to see the 
use he makes of intelligible matter and seeing that as a reasonable parallel to the 
sensible world.  
 
Aristotle  himself  says  of  prime  matter  that  it  has  a  good  claim  to  being  called 
substance,  good  but  not  good  enough.  There  is  also  the  consistent  and  strong 
suggestion  throughout  his work  that  if it  does exist  it  does not  do  so  separately. 
Metaphysics 1042b9-11 clearly tells us that matter exists as substratum, and that 
this is commonly recognized, but that this is to be understood as potentiality. It is 
because of this potential nature that he rejects it as substance here. He informs us 
that in the search for substance we must look for what is the matter in actuality of 
sensible things. The account that Aristotle gives at De Generatione et Corruptione 
329a23ff  finalises  the  understanding  of  prime  matter  in  an  unambiguous  and 
common  sense  way:  “Our  own  doctrine  is  that  although  there  is  a  matter  of  the 
perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called elements come-to-be), it has 
no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety.
290” Here Aristotle 
explains prime matter in a manner that strongly predicts the Stoic notion. We can 
answer Cohen‟s question; “Why accuse Aristotle of holding to a bare stuff if he insists 
that the stuff is always clothed?
291” by saying that we “accuse” Aristotle of belief in 
prime matter because that is precisely what he says. Solmsen
292 responded to the 
similar accusation by King, that it is unreasonable   to believe Aristotle believed in 
prime matter because it never exists  qua prime matter, in a similar way: that to 
believe  in  prime  matter  is  not  the  same  as  believing  it  ever  exists  separately  as 
prime matter. Sandbach argued later
293 that there was no infl uence of Aristotle on 
the Stoics. This claim, too strong to have complete credibility, was looked at in the 
introduction.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  Stoics  were  completely  ignorant  of  Aristotle‟s 
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thought.  Whatever  influence  his  teachings  had  I  believe  they  would  have  been 
secondary to the influence of the Academy on the development of Stoic philosophy in 
general and in physics in particular. The nature  of an underlying substrate to the 
sensible  world  did  not  originate  with  Aristotle.  The  Stoics  would  not  have  had  to 
recourse  to  his  teachings  to  find  this  as  it  was  strongly  prevalent  in  the  esoteric 
teachings of Plato and the Old Academy. Rather, if there was influence, it came after 
the  fact.  Aristotle  does  forge  one  great  leap  forward  in  the  thought  about  the 
material principle, however, and that is admitting of the fact that prime matter is 
first  of  all  something  pertaining  directly  to  the  corporeal  world  primarily.  He  also 
builds on the Platonic account by making it clearer that we can conceive of a material 
principle without having to conceive of it as existing separately by itself. This notion, 
although  present,  is  not  so  clear  in  the  writings  of  Plato  or  the  Old  Academy, 
although  it is implied by  their  discussions.  This is the  major  relationship  between 
Aristotle and the Stoics. But, as Solmsen
294 points out, it is possible for two different 
people  to  come  up  with  the  same  point  at  different  times  with  no  connection. 
However owing to the intellectual climate of Athens and the anecdotal evidence that 
Zeno studied with many teachers it is so unlikely to suppose that he would have 
been  ignorant  of  Aristotle‟s  teachings  and  if  his  major  interest  was  in  the 
“materialization” of philosophy, that he would not have been drawn to these aspects 
of  Aristotle  –  for  justification  or  codification  rather  than  inspiration.  Aristotle‟s 
similarity  to  the  Stoics  in  terms  of  the  passivity  of  his  material  principle  and  its 
constant conjunction with an active principle is not enough to claim him as the main 
influence on the Stoics. These ideas will be seen to exist in Platonism and if Aristotle 
has them or developed them then it is because he, like the Stoics, was educated in 
the  Academy.  Common  origin  rather  than  dependence  explains  better  the 
relationship of Aristotle to the Stoics.   
 
In  the  previous  chapter  we  noted  that  there  was  a  strong  connection  between 
Aristotle‟s theory  of innate  breath  and  aether  and  the  Stoic active  principle. Here 
again we see a strong connection, but one which I feel again comes after the fact. 
Cicero
295  says that Aristotle sometimes calls the world god (an assertion Cicero 
connects to Plato) and also that the cosmic heat is god. Since this interpretation of 
Aristotle is not one normally associated with him owing to the account in the  De 
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Anima Hahm
296 is cautious in accepting Cicero‟s account. While caution is undeniably 
advisable Cicero‟s story has an edge of plausibility. Cicero attributes these notions to 
a lost work of Aristotle‟s, On Philosophy, and combined with the account of aether 
and  pneuma  seen  in  the  previous  chapter  the  associations  with  Stoicism  are 
reasonably  strong
297.  However  the  connection  would  appear  to  be  more 
circumstantial than anything else. If the Stoics were to be influenced by someone to 
believe that the world was god the most obvious c onnection is again from the Old 
Academy. The single fragment that we possess in relation to Polemo asserts that he 
taught the universe was god and we have seen the account of the world -soul in the 
Timaeus. With the account of aether and pneuma seen in chapter one the connection 
between god qua world and heat is one that the intellectual climate of the time would 
have  fostered
298.  It  is  more  likely  that  any  connection  between  the  Stoics  and 
Aristotle is a result of common origins in the Academy and the intelle ctual climate of 
the  time.  It  would  seem  most  likely  then  that  a ny  further  connection  between 
Aristotle and the Stoics would be more in the vein of the Stoics reinforcing their 
position in light of Aristotelian arguments than relying on them for the format ion of 
their position.  
 
The accounts of the Timaeus and Aristotle furnish the background of the Stoics‟ belief 
in, and explanation of, prime matter. The Timaeus offers vague and difficult glimpses 
into  the  complicated  mathematical  and  geometrical  explanations  that  will  be 
elucidated in the next chapter. The account of matter in the Timaeus is non-existent 
insofar as there is no explicit discussion of it. The discussion that does exist is of 
geometrical  shapes  qua  elements.  This  account  will  tie  into  the  complicated 
metaphysics from the Philebus and second half of the Parmenides, not to mention 
that of Plato‟s students: Speusippus and Xenocrates. The complex metaphysics that 
comes from the Academy furnishes the bare notion of an underlying substrate of the 
sensible world that the Stoics would have built on. However Aristotle furnishes the 
justification,  perhaps,  of  a  prime  matter  that  can,  in  a  common  sense  way,  be 
understood as “material”. He explains how it can be an underlying substance without 
being  in  and  of  itself  a  separately  existing  entity.  His  notions  of  life  sustaining 
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principles and the fifth element also furnish a stronger framework for the Stoics to 
use to clarify the positions that they would already have got from the Old Academy. 
We will never know if Aristotle actually accepted the notion of prime matter, or if it 
was one of those aspects of his philosophy that he felt uncomfortable with and so 
while he discussed it did not actually endorse it. It is also possible that Aristotle was 
simply unaware of the implications of his various discussions, though this seems a 
little  unkind  to  him  as  Metaphysics  Z  3  suggests  that  he  is  unhappy  with  prime 
matter as a substance; rather than unhappy with it per se. But whether he did or did 
not  personally  endorse  it  Aristotle  certainly  improved  the  notion  of  prime  matter 
beyond the peculiar mathematical-matrix of Platonism. The next chapter will explore 
the mathematical notion of Plato‟s esoteric metaphysics from the Philebus and the 
second half of the Parmenides. These will be augmented by the Unwritten Doctrines 
and finally placed in context through their interpretation in the Old Academy where 
they will have been taught to Zeno and thence to his followers. It will be seen how 
the written and unwritten works form the level of understanding necessary for the 
account  of  the  Timaeus  to  be  properly  understood.  While  Aristotle  renders  the 
notions under discussion more accessible for us it is ultimately unnecessary for the 
Stoics  to  have  had  recourse  to  his  works.  All  aspects  of  the  “Aristotelian  prime 
matter” can be found implicitly in the Platonic corpus and Unwritten Doctrines. The 
Stoics  came  out  of  the  Old  Academy  and  even  if  they  did  have  contact  with 
Aristotle‟s philosophy it is likely to have influenced any thought only after its initial 
conception,  and  the  most  important  aspect  of  prime  matter  –  the  fact  that  it  is 
devoid of all qualities in and of itself – can be found in the Platonic and Old Academic 
discussions of matter in their metaphysics which Zeno would undoubtedly have been 
familiar with.  
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Chapter 3  
 
3.1 Plato’s Late Ontology 
 
This chapter will look at Plato‟s physics through the medium of his late metaphysics. 
For Plato the metaphysical is the source of the lesser reality that the sensible realm 
possesses. It is the area in which is to be found not only the truth of physics (in so 
far as there is a truth of it) but more importantly the truth about the ethical and 
good life for man. The lectures given by Plato On the Good were heavily Pythagorean 
in tone and content
299: mathematics leading to, or directing, a “good life”. Porphyry 
links the lectures to the Philebus and this is the basis of Gilbert Ryle‟s suggestion 
that this indicates a “Pythagorean stage” in Plato‟s thought
300. Such a conclusion is 
supported by Aristotle; by the direction and interest of the members, and heads, of 
the Academy and not least by the content of the Parmenides with which the Philebus 
was  so  closely  connected  in  the  Florentine  Platonic  revival
301. The  Timaeus  alone 
cannot,  in  my  opinion,  furnish  us  with  all  the  information  about  Plato‟s  opinions 
about physics for three reasons:  
 
1)  While it appears to offer us a comprehensive account of physics it cannot 
possibly do so since knowledge about physics cannot be reached through 
the  pure  study  of  physics  or  physical  phenomena  but  only  through 
metaphysical discourse.  
 
2)  I am of the opinion that each Platonic dialogue is not really a stand alone 
work  but  can  only  be  fully  appreciated  in  the  greater  context  of  the 
Platonic corpus. 
  
3)  “Appreciated”  only  and  not  fully  understood  since  it  is  clear  from 
assertions  within  the  corpus  and  in  the  seventh  letter  that  truth  or 
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knowledge  is  not  effectively  conveyed  by  the  written  word  but  only 
through dialectic and discussion of teacher to pupil
302.  
 
For these reasons it is important to look not only at the two most metaphysically 
complex works of Plato, the  Parmenides  and  Philebus,  but  also  at  the  reports  of 
Aristotle concerning the Unwritten Doctrines. These three sources combined with the 
teachings  found  in  the  Timaeus  will  furnish  us  with  the  most  complete  picture  of 
Plato‟s late ontology. Once a full picture of Plato‟s late ontology has been established 
it will be much easier to show the path traced through the Academy to the Stoics. I 
will not attempt to assess the truth of the statement that the Philebus and Unwritten 
Doctrines indicate a “Pythagorean stage” in Plato‟s life since the evidence for pre-
Platonic  Pythagoreanism  is  slim.  However  there  is  undoubtedly  influence  of  the 
Pythagoreans and their number mysticism in Plato‟s work, though we are surely at a 
loss  to  pick  out  many  significant  definite  instances.  Burkert‟s
303  reconstruction  of 
Plato‟s metaphysics relies mostly on Aristotle‟s testimony (the Unwritten Doctrines) 
since  he  is  interested  in  the  relationship  of  Plato  to  Pythagoreanism.  While  his 
reconstruction of Plato‟s metaphysics resembles what will be shown in this chapter 
there  are  necessary  differences  since  Burkert  does  not  use  the  Parmenides  or 
Philebus to aid his reconstruction. Where Burkert‟s fascinating reconstruction leaves 
gaps  and  fails  to  explain  the  relationship  of  the  account  found  in  the  Unwritten 
Doctrines to the written corpus I intend to use the Parmenides and Philebus to fill 
these requirements; though I will be looking at these dialogues with the account of 
the Unwritten Doctrines firmly in mind. As a result the picture of the forms that will 
emerge will be rather different from the traditional picture.  
 
The  sensible  world  is  a  brute  fact  for  Plato;  we  can  say  this  since  the  Timaeus 
explains that there was pre-existing “stuff” which was made into the sensible world 
in imitation of the forms. The sensible world‟s order, but not necessarily the brute 
fact that it exists, should be explained by metaphysics. There may be no explanation 
of  why  the  world  exists  but  since  it  does  we  must  furnish  an  explanation  of  its 
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relation to its model. The metaphysics that will be explored in this chapter will thus 
not  explain  the  necessary  existence  of  the  sensible  world  but  will  explain  how  it 
exists  in  the  way  it  exists.  The  series  of  “emanations”  from  the  One  that  will  be 
explained here could potentially stop before the instantiation of sensible number but 
if it did so then the sensible world would not be able to have been modelled on a 
mathematical paradigm. Plato is primarily trying to explain what is and it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that the sensible world is, at least to a limited extent.  
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3.1.1 The Parmenides 
 
The second half of the Parmenides takes as its starting point the discussion of the 
historical Parmenides‟ own doctrine of the One. During the conversation about what 
follows from the assumptions that the One exists and what happens if it has all or 
none “of these characteristics” the following eight propositions are discussed: 
 
I.  If  Unity  exists  (137C),  it  has  none  of  these  characters 
142A). 
II.  If Unity exists (142B), it has all these characters (155E). 
III.  If Unity exists (157B), the others have all these characters 
(159A).  
IV.  If  Unity  exists  (159B),  the  others  have  none  of  these 
characters (160B).  
V.  If Unity does not exist (160B), it appears to have all these 
characters (163B). 
VI.  If  Unity  does  not  exist  (163B),  it  has  none  of  these 
characters (164B). 
VII.  If Unity does not exist (164B), the others appear to have all 
these characters (165D).  
VIII.  If Unity does not exist (165E), the others neither have nor 
appear to have these characters (166B).
304  
 
Discussion of all the hypotheses would be a liberty of digression too far and so I will 
limit  myself  to  an  analysis  of  the  first  three.  These  first  three  give  u s  all  the 
information that makes the second half of the  Parmenides relevant to the topic of 
this thesis. They  can be understood as  explaining the “emanation” of all levels of 
reality from the existence of the first One right down to the basic structure that is the 
sensible world. The second half of the Parmenides acts as a way of re-establishing 
the forms in an altered state following the attack on them in the first half of the 
dialogue. Plato takes the opportunity in this dialogue to move away from a traditional 
theory  of  Forms  to  a  more  elaborate  but  explanatorily  more  effective  one.  The 
character of Parmenides does not want to do away with forms as he sees them as 
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indispensable for knowledge
305; yet in the first half of the dialogue he has shown the 
“naïve” understanding of forms to be inadequate. The inability of the earlier theory to 
account for the nature of the relation of forms to the sensible world is shown all too 
clearly by the first half of the dialogue; and although Parmenides himself states that 
what follows will be a “gymnastic exercise” I think it is in fact much more. To set the 
dialogue in context: it is generally agreed that the writing or composition took place 
following one of Plato‟s trips to the Italian enclaves of the Pythagoreans with whom 
he  seems  to  have  built  up  a  close  relationship
306. It is the belief that Plato has 
adapted  his  theory  of  forms  to  utilise  Pythagorean  notions  that  underlies  my 
analysis. The relationship of Plato‟s later thought to Pythagoreanism and his in depth 
understanding of it has been shown by Burkert
307. Plato takes what is relevant about 
the physics and metaphysics of the Pythagoreans and uses these things to bolster his 
own theory so that we may better understand how to lead the good ethical life: i.e. 
how best to partake of forms. But he also, I believe, took  over another thing. That 
thing is a  penchant for secrecy. In the Republic Plato outlined a strict hierarchical 
society where each person knows their place and at the top sit the Philosopher Kings. 
Such  knowledge  as  enables  a  person  to  be  a  Philosopher  King  would  indeed  be 
powerful and by necessity a guarded secret
308. The Philosopher King is what he is 
since he has privileged access to the f orms on which the state is modelled. The 
second half of the Parmenides shows us glimpses of the method to understand these 
models and their relationship to the world. It is not surprising then that we have to 
use  not  only  our  imagination  but  also  our  knowledge  of  other  dialogues  and  any 
other sources to unearth the true import of what Parmenides is teaching the young 
Socrates
309; letting him into the “sages club”.  
 
The  first  hypothesis  of  the  dialogue  that  leads  to  the  possible  existence  of  a 
transcendent One has an ambiguous relationship to the topic of this thesis. We do 
not  know  if this One  exists or  not,  or  if that  is simply  a  problem  of language. It 
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306 The mathematician Eudoxus is said to have joined the Academy in 368 BC, perhaps the year before the 
composition of the  Parmenides signifying the seriousness of the words above the entrance: “let no one 
enter who is not a mathematician.” According to Aristotle Eudoxus tried to make Forms immanent in the 
world and no doubt utilised his mathematical knowledge to explain how this would work. Plato is also 
seems to have been friends with both Timaeus of Locri (if he was a real person and not simply a fiction of 
Plato‟s) and Archytas of Tarentum, two eminent scientists, mathematicians, statesmen and Pythagoreans.   
307 1972.  
308 The Seventh Letter (341b-349b) says that Dionysius had learnt some of the doctrines of the “greatest 
truths” that Plato had not intended to communicate to him. This could be simply because Plato did not like 
Dionysius or it could be indicative of a more widespread secrecy.   
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seems that if it does exist (though of course “exist” is the wrong term) then the fact 
that it exists explains the existence of everything. The Neoplatonists
310 seem to have 
liked it and seen it as endorsing a transcendent One so marvellously devoid of 
anything that it is not even one, nor even is, nor is not. Whatever the ultimate role 
of this One in metaphysics we cannot know Plato‟s true opinion in regard to it as he 
does not tell us. It may be that this One is not the proper subject for a philosopher 
but rather of some other, possibly higher, discipline or perhaps is a subject fit only 
for  the  divine  intellect.  The  fact  that  it  is  a  super-mystical  principle  no  doubt 
appealed to the mystical penchant of the Neoplatonists.  
 
At the end of the day Plato rejects this notion as either unintelligible or simply not 
relevant:  
 
Therefore  it  is  not  named  or  spoken  of,  nor  is  it  the  object  of 
opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it – It 
seems not – Is it possible that these things are so for the one? – I 
certainly don‟t think so.
311 
  
Whether  Plato  believes  in  this  One  does  not  seem  relevant  to  this  dialogue,  nor 
indeed to this thesis as it cannot have a relationship with a material principle, though 
it is a small digression on an interesting topic.  
 
The second hypothesis is where things get far more interesting. It appears as though 
Plato is saying many, if not all things, of the One now. He is interested in a new type 
of  One,  without  the  issues that  Parmenides‟  One  had.  But  we  must  bear  in  mind 
Plato‟s sense of humour and secrecy and be aware that there may be more going on 
here than meets the eye. Writing is not the medium for transference of knowledge 
and  so  full  knowledge  will  be  absent  from  this,  as  for  all,  written  work.  Like  the 
Pythagoreans Plato is keeping the true doctrines available only to those who deserve 
them: his students. The key to understanding his complicated arguments must be in 
the oral discussions that took place in the Academy; which is not to say, as Cherniss 
would, that we must consign ourselves to never understanding Plato because we do 
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Neoplatonists.  
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not  have  access  to  his  conversations
312. We have access to the doctrines of his 
successors and the accounts of Aristotle and it is these that must act as the guide to 
interpretation.   
 
The conclusion of the second hypothesis is that if the One exists then it has all 
characteristics: 
 
And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all 
similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the 
one – That is perfectly true
313. 
 
If One exists, if there is something, then everything exists. First of all we are told 
that if the One is then it is in virtue of nothing other than Being: “If one is, can it be 
and not partake of being? – No, it cannot.
314”  Immediately after this a separate One 
is  split  off.  This  is  the  One  which  is  the  product  and  which  will  act  on  the  other 
product of the One, Being and Difference. It is this fact that suggests that Plato will 
be  using  the  term  “One”  in  many  ways,  and  that it  will  be  this equivocation  that 
could lead to problems. The difference between these is not to be accounted for in 
their  being  One,  but  can  only  be  accounted  for  by  Difference.  We  can  break  the 
thought down: 
 
1.  “is” signifies something other than “one”.  
2.  Whenever someone says “the one is” they mean nothing other than that the 
One partakes of Being. 
3.  Being is never absent from the oneness part of the “one is” and unity is never 
absent from the being part of “one is”.  
4.  Each part is thus composed of two parts; one and being.  
5.  The  being  of  the  One  is  different  from  the  One  since  the  One  partakes  of 
Being.  
6.  Being  and  the  One  are  different  by  nothing  other  than  Difference.  So 
Difference can be neither the same as One nor of Being.  
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We have three things: One, Being and Difference. This furnishes the Odd and the 
Even. It gives us Two and Three, and from Two and Three there is twice and thrice. 
If there is twice and thrice there is also:  
 
three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice 
three and thrice two?  – Inevitably – Then there would be even 
times even, odd time odd and odd times even, and even times 
odd. – Yes – Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left 
out, which does not necessarily exist? – By no means
315. 
 
From  the  seemingly  innocuous  statement  that  “the  One  is”  Plato  has  beautifully 
created the infinite number series.  
 
These  numbers  exist,  all  numbers  in  fact,  we  are  told  “necessarily”.  The 
rationalisation of the indefinite number series which exists by necessity is reminiscent 
of the notion of reason persuading necessity found in the Timaeus. The One
316 then is 
both one and many since it has many – the indefinite number series, and is one since 
it subsumes everything under a whole – the single indefinite number series. Since it 
is a whole it is limited and if limited then its centre is equidistant from its extremes 
and if it has a beginning and middle and end then it has a shape
317.  
 
Plato is here moving incredibly quickly and deliberate ly obscuring the importance of 
what he is saying. On the basis of the Philebus and Unwritten Doctrines I believe that 
Plato  has  moved  from  ideal  number,  through  mathematical  number  and  is  now 
talking about geometrical
318, or what is the model of sensible, number
319. Plato needs 
at least three sorts of number: ideal, mathematical and geometrical
320. The existence 
                                                 
315 Parm. 143e-144a. The others are presumably found by addition.  
316 Perhaps a different One from the One that exists with Being to create the indefinite.  
317 Parm. 144e-145b. Just like the historical Parmenides‟ own One.  
318  Cornford,  1939  pg.  145,  also  sees  145a -b  moving  from  numbers  to  geometrical  figures  along 
Pythagorean lines. At pg. 153 he is al so struck at how we can move from the simple notion of One to 
deduce the concept of physical being.  
319 Walker, 1938, moves in this direction with her assertion that the sensible world is a combination of the 
One with Multiplicity, as that is indeed how the  Geometric comes about and the Geometric Number will 
itself need to be limited by One. She sees Plato doubling up on principles in an attempt to get away from 
what she describes as: “The facile reduction of the Universe to any single principle – whether Unity or 
plurality – [this] is inadequate to explain the complexity of the metaphysical situation.” 
320 In the interest of simplicity I would suggest that when Plato talks of “ideal triangle” he is not referring 
to triangles at the ideal level but simply to the geometrical level since triangles are an “imitation” of “3” 
and at the geometrical level are still objects of thought and contemplation and hence “ideal” in a sense. At 
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paradigm that the sensible is imitating.  117  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
of all three is postulated by this passage but the argument is terribly obscured and 
justification  and  explanation  of  how  this  happens  will  have  to  wait  until  after  the 
discussion of both the Philebus and Unwritten Doctrines.  
 
It  seems  that  when  Plato  moves  onto  his  discussion  of  how  these  numbers  have 
shape and partake of time both becoming older and younger, are in motion and rest, 
are the same and other than themselves he is talking about nothing other than the 
sensible world. After all, this sort of language in Plato is most often associated with 
objects of which there cannot be knowledge: i.e. the sensible world. However since 
he  also  appears  to  identify  the  number  scale,  which  admits  of  these  things  most 
properly, with the One then he seems to be saying these things of the One. But is it 
the same One that he began with? The answer to this question will, I hope, become 
clearer as this chapter progresses. The fact that the One is now said to have shape 
strongly  indicates  a  shift  in  focus  away  from  a  single  One,  away  from  intelligible 
number,  away  from  mathematical  number  and  points  strongly  to  geometrical 
number; however the fact that it gets older and younger than itself suggests that 
Plato could even be referring to the level below geometry: that of sensible number – 
the numbers that exist in the sensible world. The fact that it is geometry that is used 
by  Plato  in  the  Timaeus  to  explain  the  sensible  world  should  not  be  far  from  our 
thoughts at this stage. The necessarily existing number has led straight through to 
geometrical number (perhaps even further) which contains all things and both is and 
is not the same as itself. It is a remarkably quick demonstration of the necessary 
existence of the sensible world, paralleled by Timaeus‟ discussion of the necessity of 
god ordering already existing things. The conclusion of the second hypothesis states 
that whatever is true of the Others is also true of the One: not surprising since the 
starting assumption was that all things were true of the One. The Others partake of 
the One, since nothing is which does not relate to unity and so since one will in some 
sense be present in all things it follows that whatever existence the Others have they 
share with the One. But if it partakes of these various ways of being then it does so, 
not as the first and highest principle but rather as a principle at each level of being 
each of which has a correlate set of Others. This was shown by the emanation of 
numbers from the initial One.  
 
The second hypothesis has introduced a One which gives rise to an indefinite number 
series which ultimately explains the physical nature of the world. This is an extremely 118  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
simplistic  picture  and  we  will  see  later  on  after  the  discussion  of  the  Unwritten 
Doctrines that the scheme implicit in this account is more complicated than it at first 
appears. Although the discussion moved  straight from the  One to the geometrical 
numbers we need not fear for the forms. I am in agreement with those that see the 
forms survive the Parmenides albeit in a different guise than they had before. But for 
a full explanation of the new type of existence the forms have we will have to wait 
for the Philebus
321.  
 
As  Plato  introduces  the  third  hypothesis  he  explains  that  those  things  which  are 
Other than the One are not completely devoid of it: “And yet surely the others are 
not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.
322” These 
Others, many though they may be, still exist as in a whole and so partake of the 
One. We are then told that the Others have parts and that these too partake of the 
One, and each of these is part of a whole and so partakes of the One. The Others 
have all characteristics, and do so because they partake of the One and the One was 
shown to give rise to all characteristics in hypothesis two. This discussion has taken 
the  derivatives  of  the  One  that  we  saw  in  the  second  hypothesis  and  slowed  the 
process down. There are the Others which partake of the One. This set of Others is a 
“complete  whole  with  parts
323”. These parts are monads, for each can only be a 
single part if it partakes of the One. However these monads are not the One because 
they partake of the One. Instead they must be analogous to the One. 158b starts the 
conversation again and states that if something is other than the One then it must in 
turn be many. We have moved from the Others that are ideal number to the Others 
that are mathematical number. We can see this because although they are made up 
of monads (relating to the One) they are also many: “and things different from the 
one would surely be many”. These are unlimited in multitude hence giving us the 
unlimited number stream that we use for our mathematical calculations
324.  
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in this revised form, restores the primitive Pythagorean conception of the Limit and the Unlimited as the 
two chief opposites  which combine to constitute Form, numbers, geometrical magnitudes  and sensible 
things. Further light must be sought from the Philebus.” However Cornford‟s analysis necessarily suffers 
with his rejection of the Unwritten Doctrines as a valid source of information.  
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324 Vlastos, 1981 pg. 381, discusses Krämer‟s claim: “If there were only the One, there would be no world 
– neither the world of Ideas, nor that of phenomenal existence.” 119  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
The first number series, being the first hypostasis from the One will be, I suggest, 
the ideal or intelligible number series: those numbers that are unchanging and by 
which the objects of mathematics come to be. We are given no information about 
these here except that being closer to the One, and hence Being, they are the most 
unified. The offspring, or parts of this series, will be the number series below ideal 
number – that of mathematical number. These numbers admit of more multiplicity 
since they are further from the One. They appear to be derived from the fact that at 
the level of ideal number there are a multitude of monads. There is the 1 itself, the 2 
itself etc. each of which is, as well as being whichever number it is, is also a monad. 
This would mean that there would be more than one ideal one at the ideal level. This 
is absurd and so gives rise to the multiplicity at the lower level – the mathematical 
level.  But  these  too  get  their  unity  and  being  through  the  relationship  that  their 
“parent”, ideal number, has with the One and Being. These Others are both limited 
and limitless. Mathematical number is a curious thing, and as such is both like and 
unlike itself: mathematical 2 is both 2 and 1, like and unlike itself. Being derivative of 
something  that is itself only  related  to  the  One  and  Being it  partakes  of these  in 
limited amounts.  
 
These three hypotheses give us all the information that we need in regard to the 
nature that late Platonic metaphysics is moving. We have seen that he closely relates 
the  metaphysics  of  his  One  and  the  necessity  of  Being  with  the  sensible  world. 
Further  we  have  seen  that  the  nature  of  the  sensible  world  is  being  explained 
through the medium of geometrical number which given what we find in the Timaeus 
supports a radical reworking of the nature of the forms. By this I mean no more than 
that before, in the other dialogues Plato had failed to give a satisfactory account of 
the  mode  or  method  of  relation  the  forms  have  with  the  sensible  world
325. The 
Philebus  will  build  on  this  leaning  toward  mathematics  as  the  common  thread 
between  the  sensible  and  ideal  realms.  An  issue  that  arises,  as  it  arose  in  the 
discussion of the Timaeus, is: if the sensible world and its relationship with forms is 
to  be  explained  by  way  of  mathematics  why  and  how  is  this  world  said  to  be 
imperfect? We have seen clues in the third hypothesis where the Others were said to 
be both like and unlike themselves. This lack of identity shows the extent of their 
removal  from  the  One  and  hence  from  perfect  being.  Instead  they  display  the 
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hallmark of the sensible world and inability of something that is not unified to relate 
properly to knowledge. 
  
The  further  we  move  from  the  One,  and  the  sensible  world  is  doubtless  as  far 
removed as can be, then the less strong its relationship with the absolute Oneness 
and  Being.  The  sensible  world  is  fine  in  so  far  as  it  is  what  it  is  and  we  must 
understand both it and our place in it but most especially we must understand its and 
our relationship to the forms and this is done via the medium of mathematics. This 
gives  us  the  method  of  study  which  is  necessary  in  order  to  determine  how  to 
implement the form of, say, Justice. If there were no link between forms and the 
world then how would thinking about forms help us with our ethical purpose?   
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3.1.2 The Philebus 
 
The Parmenides introduced the notion of a highly mathematical and necessary sense 
of creation. From the sheer fact that there is something we can deduce many modes 
of existence. The Timaeus furnished us with the idea that the sensible world is a 
brute fact; it exists irrespective of its order. God imposes order on some pre-existing 
essence of the sensible world. In the Parmenides when Plato works out the creation 
of the geometrical number, and thence implies sensible number, he is explaining the 
tools  by  which  the  sensible  world  is  made  to  resemble  the  forms.  However  the 
Parmenides is a very difficult dialogue and the teachings in it are revolutionary for 
Platonism, and if the position that the written works only hint and signpost at the 
true  doctrines  is  right  then  we  must  not  be  surprised  that  there  are  still  many 
questions left unanswered. The Philebus will fill in some of the gaps that were left by 
the account above. When Cornford
326 suggested that we seek further enlightenment 
about the  Parmenides from the Philebus he was undoubtedly right and this makes 
most sense if we see in the peras and apeiron parallels to the One and Others. The 
ideas between the two dialogues are close and the Philebus will help to explain the 
nature  of  the  forms  in  the  new  structure  explained  in  the  Parmenides.  That  the 
Philebus points in the same direction as the Timaeus and Parmenides is suggested by 
the “heavenly tradition” introduced at 16c-e. This is a gift to man from the gods, 
given by a Prometheus. Timaeus refused to enter into an analysis of the principles of 
the triangles saying that: “Principles yet more ultimate than these are known only to 
god, and to the man he holds dear
327”. This suggests that there is an explanation and 
that only a friend of the gods would know it. The Philebus implies that Pythagoras is 
such a friend of the gods and hence it is perhaps in his teaching that the principles 
are to be found
328. Indeed the above interpretation of the  Parmenides has shown us 
that  the  geometrical  numbers  rely  on  a  process  of  emanation  from  the  One.  The 
principles of physics are to be found by the contemplation of metaphysics.  
 
With  these  ideas  in  mind  the  Philebus  should  be  able  to  furnish  us  with  more 
information about the revised metaphysics of Plato‟s late ontology. At the beginning 
of their discussion Socrates questions whether knowing that language is a subject (a 
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single  thing)  and  that  we  can  create  an  unlimited  number  of  sounds  makes  us 
knowledgeable about language
329. He says  that knowing that language is both one 
and many does not make us knowledgeable. Instead when we begin to grasp each of 
the vocal sounds, knowing how many there are and what they do then we are 
literate and have knowledge of language. The same is held to be  true of music. That 
we must grasp each of the units that are applicable to that art just as we do with 
language. The arts of language and music consist of both the One and Many  – the 
One and Others of the Parmenides. We saw in that dialogue that all things consist of 
One and Many. But it is in the limiting of the Many by One, the demarcation of units 
within a multiplicity that ensure that what is other than the One is still something. In 
unity comes closeness to Being. In the Philebus we are now being told that being 
able to recognise these demarcations and being able to see how they relate to one 
another  furnishes  us  with  knowledge  of  the  things  of  which  they  are  parts.  Two 
things are necessary for this: that we recognise the art to be both one and many. 
This will be the case for all things, except the One itself. The further we move from 
the One the less unified things become and the more they admit of multiplicity.  
 
The Philebus ends by giving higher praise to knowledge than pleasure. This, I would 
suggest,  is  primarily  because  knowledge  is  more  unified  than  pleasure.  Pleasure 
admits of many kinds: eating, drinking, listening to music, contemplating geometrical 
figures,  etc.  Knowledge  also  consists  of  a  multiplicity  but  to  a  lesser  extent  than 
pleasure  since  it  is  directed  towards  the  Good.  This  is  why  Socrates  relegates 
pleasure to a lower level than knowledge in his closing remarks. However the real 
conclusion, for the ethical life, is to live a life not in isolation but in mixture. A life of 
pleasure devoid of knowledge is worthless, a life of knowledge devoid of pleasure is 
better but still lacking. Instead, as with all things, life must partake of mixture. We 
must “limit our lives to prevent multiplicity”, as the One does the Others, and thus 
limit our removal from the One. This is the conclusion reached at 27d, that a life 
combining knowledge and pleasure was the best.  
 
The idea that the forms have changed slightly is reinforced by the Theuth language 
analogy introduced by Socrates at 18b-d. The story explains how a god first realised 
that sounds that would make up language exist in an infinite variety and that by 
limiting them he could create the art of literacy. First of all he recognised that vowels 
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are not one but unlimited, second he recognised this of semi-vowels, and then of 
mutes. Having recognised this he proceeded to “limit” each by marking them off into 
finite number and each of these he called a letter. The story finishes: “And as he 
realised that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them, taken by 
itself without understanding them all, he considered that the one link that somehow 
unifies them all and called it the art of literacy.” (Trans. Frede). This technē is both 
one and many
330. It is a single art and there are many parts to it. As an “art” it is a 
single thing. But there are many ways to instantiate it. There are many languages 
that exist. Within each language there are also the many sounds that actually make 
the language up. This is a pattern that is repeated in the technē of music. It is a 
single art but we must have knowledge of the notes and the gaps between them if 
we are to understand it properly. The Theuth story perplexes Socrates‟ audience and 
they  wish  to  know  what  bearing  this  explanation  of  one  and  many  has  to  their 
discussion of which out of pleasure and knowledge is preferable. The answer that 
Socrates supplies shows that the nature of one and many exists in all forms. It is a 
question though of extent that dictates the preference for one form over another: 
 
This  is  the  very  point  in  question  to  which  our  preceding 
discussion  obliges  us  to  give  an  answer:  to  show  how  each  of 
them  (pleasure  and  knowledge)  is  one  and  many,  and  how 
instead  of  becoming  unlimited  straightaway,  each  one  of  them 
acquires  some  definite  number  before  it  becomes  unlimited
331. 
(Trans. Frede)  
 
The dual nature of one and many inherent in each thing that is not the One is 
reiterated  here.  The  Theuth  story  has  shown  that  f orms  partake  of  this 
fragmentation  just  the  same  as  the  sensible  world   does  as  is  shown  in  the 
Theaetetus
332  and  Timaeus.  Benitez  sums  up  the  situation  in  his  analysis  of  the 
Philebus  when  he  says:  “Why  someone  would  not  be  wise  if  they  knew  only  an 
                                                 
330 Benitez, 1989, pg. 40, seems reluctant to allow the unlimited into the forms on the basis that it is 
unprecedented. However I believe that it is implicit in the Parmenides and that we are to use the Philebus 
to improve our understanding of metaphysics. It may be that the doctrine is split over many dialogues and 
the  oral  teachings.  Besides  if  the  notion  is  new  to  Plato  then  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  it  is 
unprecedented. However as he goes on (pg. 58) to note, in the Euthyphro Plato says that piety is a part of 
justice and so is hardly denying that each form is a undifferentiated unity.  
331 Philebus 18e-19a.  
332 Theaetetus 152d-153 (Cf. 157b-157c) says that being and becoming are the product of motion and 
that inactivity result in death. This can only apply to the sensible world and indeed has parallels to the 
position  that  I  will  argue  Xenocrates  held  about  the  necessary  motion  in  the  sensible  world  for  its 
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undifferentiated unity is easy to understand. Protarchus knows that there is a single 
class of things called „pleasure‟, but he is not wise about pleasure, since he is not 
aware of its various kinds
333”. He knows that there is a thing called “Pleasure” but he 
would not know how to relate an instance of pleasure to the  overarching form of 
pleasure. Knowledge that there is a form is useless unless we know about its types.  
 
In  order  to  properly  understand  the  system  of  unity  and  many  that  exists  in  all 
things we must turn to the use of the terms peras and apeiron in the Philebus. As 
Gosling points out, there has been a tradition of interpreting Plato‟s use of apeiron as 
a first move towards an Aristotelian concept of matter
334. If the apeiron was in fact a 
type of proto-hyle in the Aristotelian sense then it would no doubt be this amorphous 
entity that could be seen as the precursor of the Stoic material principle. However if 
Plato were to make such a use of that concept in the Philebus it is inconceivable that 
he should be so vague about the subject in the Timaeus. So while the apeiron is a 
parallel term to the Others of the Parmenides and in some respect, which is yet to be 
shown,  it  does  act  as  an  “out  of  which”  for  the  sensible  world  it  is  clearly  not  a 
primitive version of an Aristotelian matter. The doctrine of the limit and unlimited is 
explained as having come down to us mortals from the gods, more directly from a 
particular  friend  of  the  gods:  Prometheus.  It  was  noted  above  that  the  common 
interpretation of Prometheus is Pythagoras and that it is his teachings that offer us 
the  explanation  of  things.  Aristotle  reports  that  the  Pythagoreans  taught  that 
everyday  objects  were  made  up  of  numbers
335. The  Parmenides  showed  how  the 
existence  of  the  One  entailed  the  existence  of  all  numbers  and  that  this  led  to 
geometric number. Geometric number is in turn the tool by which the stuff of the 
sensible world is made to resemble the first emanation from the first One. It is the 
teaching that all things contain both limit and unlimitedness, both one and many, 
that makes each thing what it is and capable of interaction with other things. The 
heavenly tradition thus explains how all things are both one and many and it is this 
piece of knowledge that will aid us in our understanding of the sensible world and its 
relation to forms.  
 
                                                 
333 Benitez 1989, pg. 55. 
334 Gosling 1975 pg. XVII.  
335  Metaph.  XIII.8,  1083b12  –“bodies  should  be  composed  of  numbers,  and  that  this  should  be 
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The  Philebus  divides  the  things  that  exist  into  four:  the  limit,  the  unlimited,  the 
mixture of the two and the cause of the mixture of the two. The unlimited is then 
explained using the example of temperature. The hotter and colder do not admit of a 
limit since we can always think of something hotter and colder than the last. This has 
been understood to indicate that the unlimited is a material substrate
336. However 
temperature, like language, music, pleasure or  knowledge, is a form. It is a form 
with infinite types in theory but each temperature is actually a monad, marked out 
by the limit. This is true for any sort of concept that admits of the “more and the 
less”. The unlimited are at this stage left as undifferentiated multiplicities. There is 
no internal coherence to them. They are a jumble just like the pre-cosmic chaos of 
the Timaeus. This is the role of the limit which in the Philebus takes on a different 
nature than just unity. Instead the limit is formed of the class of things which do not 
admit of the “more and the less”. Instead it is formed of those things which have 
opposites: the equal and unequal, double and half, etc. These are the sort of “tools” 
that can be used by god to rationalise the jumble in the unlimited. We are told that it 
is  the  presence  in  the  unlimited  of  the  limit  that  creates  the  sense  of  proportion 
within each unlimited that makes it beautiful. Socrates then moves to the fact that 
limitation and proportion in things is good for us, for our health and for the world as 
it  is  responsible  for  the  seasons.  Just  as  he  did  in  the  Parmenides  Plato  moves 
quickly from one sphere of reality to another
337. The limit will act on the unlimited 
stuff of the world since the world is a something and the heavenly tradition explained 
that  everything  that  is  partakes  of  the  limit  and  unlimited.  The  world  is,  as  is 
everything, by itself unlimited. It therefore requires limit to rationalise it. This is what 
the demiurge did in the  Timaeus. He took a chaos and imposed the uniformity of 
geometry on it. When Socrates says: “but see what I mean by the third kind: I treat 
all the joint offspring of the other two kinds (the limit and unlimited) as a unity, a 
coming-into-being  created  through  the  measures  imposed  by  limit
338”,  he  is  not 
saying  that  the  form  of temperature  or  the  form  of  pleasure  exists in  this world. 
Rather he is saying that the third kind is the result of the mixture of a limit and an 
unlimited  that  exists  independently  in  the  sensible  realm  and  the  limiting  of  the 
                                                 
336 E.g. Davidson 1990 leans in this direction. Bury, Friedländer, Hackforth, Rist, Taylor and Waterfield all 
subscribe to this view which is not unreasonable given the Presocratic use of the term. Gosling however 
disagrees, while Benitez seems to think the apeira are identical to the Receptacle.    
337 Gosling, 1975, pg. 202, takes the division into four not to be one of genus but of a division into the 
tools used for understanding the world. This  is the position of Benitez, 1989, who appears to sympathize 
with the notion that the  apeira are material or quasi-material elements from which the sensible world is 
formed.  
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sensible‟s  unlimited  is  in  imitation  of  the  formal  realm‟s  limiting  of  the  formal 
unlimited. The third kind at the formal level is the unlimited that has been limited. It 
is the undifferentiated temperature scale differentiated. The third kind at the sensible 
level  is  the  unlimited  stuff  of  the  sensible  world  limited  so  that  it  resembles  the 
formal  world.  It  is  this  “stuff”  of  the  sensible  world,  the  pre-cosmic  “stuff”,  the 
principles known only to god and his friends that is the object of the search of this 
thesis. It is not though as has been supposed that the “unlimited in general” is a 
material substrate. Plato constantly uses the same term to denote many things at 
many different levels. This has the advantage of ensuring the connection between 
those levels and the advantage that the uninitiated will be lost by the results of such 
equivocation
339.      
 
The “things which are said always to be” could be interpreted in any of four ways as 
outlined by Benitez: “(I) as referring to sensibles only, not to Forms. (II) as referring 
only  to  Forms.  (III)  as  referring,  separately,  to  sensibles  and  to  Forms.  (IV)  as 
referring, collectively, to Forms and sensibles.
340” He concludes his investigation of 
the  phrase  by  saying:  “[the  phrase]  does  not  refer  separately  to  Forms  and 
sensibles. It refers to Forms and sensibles collectively, as members of the open set 
of  things  named  by  a  general  term.
341”  Benitez  uses  this  option  to  argue  that 
“unlimited” refers not to some aspect of the form, but rather the form and  all its 
types which comprise then a limited part of an unlimited set of things comprised by a 
general term
342. However it seems most likely that the “things which are said always 
to  be”  refers  to  both  forms  and  sensibles  in  the  same  way  meaning  simply  that 
everything  that  exists  consists  of  both  one  and  many.  When  Socrates  assigns 
pleasure  to  the  class  of  the  “boundless”,  he  is  doing  no  more  than  saying  that 
pleasure is less unified and has many kinds. It is removed from the One. Socrates is 
not arguing that it is a sensible object. 27b1-2 implies that Mind is the cause of all 
mixtures, including those at the formal level, and while Benitez does not think this 
should  be  taken  seriously  I  can  see  no  reason  why  it  is  implausible.  The  forms 
require  limiting  and  rationalising  in  the  same  way  as  everything  else.  The 
Parmenides produced undifferentiated series and these would be limited by god to 
                                                 
339 Gosling, 1975, pg. xvii, understands the talk of mixture to be of concepts – whose disposition account 
for the material world - but understands that the interpretation of the apeiron as a move towards matter 
is understandable given the language used in the dialogue. Benitez, 1989 pg. 63, sees the use of peras 
and apeiron change during the course of the dialogue.  
340 Benitez 1989, pg. 39.  
341 Ibid pg. 41. 
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ensure that partake of the One as much as possible. The forms act as the model for 
the sensible world but the One acts as model for the formal world.  
 
The  tools of mathematics  give  us the  method  that  god had. He  used  his tools to 
delineate the forms and then to rationalize the world. We can use the same tools to 
understand the process that god used. If we do so then we will understand the forms 
and then strive for unity as we note that all things come to be from the One and are 
more real the closer to the One they are.   
 
The Philebus has reiterated the notion that unity and multiplicity are to be found at 
all  levels  of  reality;  that  all  things  naturally  partake  of  multiplicity  and  require  a 
principle of demarcation. We can know what is higher up, and therefore more worthy 
of our time, by finding out its various kinds. The more kinds a form has the less 
unified it is and the further from the One it is. The further from the One something is 
the less worthwhile study of it is. That is why pleasure is first of all shown to have 
many  parts  and  then  shown  to  be  inferior  to  knowledge.  That  mixture  is  not 
something we should be ashamed to posit of the forms is shown by the assertion 
that  the  good  life  is  one  which  partakes  of  mixture.  The  implication  from  this 
dialogue, along  with  the  interpretation  from  the  Parmenides  is  clear:  the  sensible 
world  is  the  most  removed  from  the  One  and  therefore  deserves  less  of  our 
attention. It does however exist and its relationship to the formal world is strong.   
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3.1.3 The Metaphysics as it stands 
 
The Parmenides has furnished us with part of an explanation of the direction that 
Plato‟s metaphysics was moving in towards the end of his life. The Philebus has, as 
Cornford  suggested,  furnished  us  with  further  information.  This  section  will 
summarize  the  picture  of  the  metaphysics  so  far.  The  picture  will  be  seen  to  be 
incomplete and hence the next section will complete the account by appealing to the 
Unwritten  Doctrines.  The  Parmenides  serves  to  vindicate  the  existence  of  the 
sensible world as a necessary emanation from the One. If the One is then the world 
is. This notion mirrors the lack of envy of the demiurge described in the Timaeus: the 
notion  that  goodness  always  spreads  itself.  The  demiurge  orders  the  pre-cosmic 
chaos because he has no share of envy: it is incumbent upon him to do so given his 
nature. Likewise the One necessitates things other than the One owing to its very 
nature. The Parmenides suggested the change in nature of the forms from purely 
abstract concepts to a mathematical relationship of resemblance. The Philebus built 
on this idea suggesting how a system of limiting may be the way to understand the 
revised nature of forms in this later metaphysics. The system that appears in these 
dialogues is different from that of the earlier ones and the difference is most likely 
attributable to a Pythagorean influence. Not only has Plato‟s system become more 
mathematical, primarily I believe to explain in a more rational way the system of 
resemblance, but it has also become more hidden. 
 
The second half of the Parmenides started with the simple assertion that the One is. 
Although  it  is  postulated  as  a  doctrine  of  Parmenides  himself  it  is  a  reasonable 
starting point for a Platonist. Indeed at On the E at Delphi 393b Plutarch expresses 
the  integral importance  of the  One:  “Being  must  have  Unity,  even  as Unity  must 
have Being.” If there is something then there is One, and it is pretty clear that there 
is something. The One of the Parmenides was shown to be because of nothing other 
than Being. If this is the cause of the One‟s being then it is not the One. If they are 
not the same then they are different by nothing other than Difference. It was this 
train of thought that led to the creation of the indefinite number series. This is most 
likely a timeless process and although “emanation” suggests a process it is the most 
convenient term for the relationship of the One to the Others and lower levels of 
reality. Everything that exists does so because of the One‟s relationship to Being. 
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we saw above, moves very quickly from the immediate offspring of the One to the 
geometrical  level.  The  intervening  stages  will  only  be  able  to  be  described  or 
understood  with  the  aid  of  the  Unwritten  Doctrines
343. The geometrical numbers 
which we end up with are the models that the sensible wo rld is based on. In some 
respect they move and have shape
344. It appears that the principles of the basic 
geometrical  propositions  -  the  point, line, surface  and  figure  –  will  also  be  the 
principles of the elemental triangles that Timaeus stated were known only to god and 
those  whom  he  loves.  But  since  these  principles  and  the  method  by  which  the 
geometrical  principles  are  actually  derived  from  the  One  are  not  explained  the 
Parmenides  we  cannot  prove  to  be  a  friend  of  god‟s.  The  One  of  the  second 
hypothesis is a One that is different from the One of the first hypothesis. Whereas 
the first One had no characteristics the second One has all characteristics; that is 
what makes the discussion, in the end, turn to be one about the principles of the 
sensible world. The Others are intricately connected to the One. They are in a way a 
part of the One, because as we saw Plutarch suggest all things that are partake of 
the One as well as of Being if they are to be. To disentangle every mention of a One 
from that of the Others is not only fruitless it is simply impossible. The Parmenides 
thus furnishes us with a very sparse background of the metaphysics that will form 
the basis of Platonic physics and the analysis of the material principle of the sensible 
world. I would suggest that the limiting principle of the One that exists at each level 
is  internal  to  that  which  is  limited.  The  One  at  the  level  of  ideal  number  is  an 
imitation of the One above, but internal to the number stream that makes up the 
ideal number. Likewise the One at the mathematical level is an imitation of the One 
at the ideal level and is internal to the mathematical number stream, and so for the 
geometrical  level.  This  notion  of  the  limiting  principle  being  internal  to  the 
subsequent mixture is expanded on in the Philebus.   
 
The  Philebus  analyses  the  nature  of  the  forms  in  the  new  system.  It  offers  an 
account  that  reiterates  the  close  connection  of the  One  and  Others. Each  form  is 
compounded  of  unity  and  multiplicity.  The  terminology  has  changed  and  is 
deliberately suggestive of Pythagoreanism indicating that it is in the interaction of 
number or in an analogy to this that the basis of reality is to be found. The nature of 
                                                 
343 Although it is perfectly possible to fill in the gaps without the aid of the Unwritten Doctrines to do so 
would be pure speculation and although some may question the veracity of the Unwritten Doctrines it is 
better to have some evidence in support of an interpretation than none.  
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the forms is suggested as comprising of both One and Many. As we expect given the 
Parmenides  the  closer  to  One  in  nature  something  is  the  better  it  is.  Knowledge, 
owing to the fact that it is less differentiated – has fewer types - than pleasure, is 
judged highly. The sensible world, by extension, owing to its inherent fragmentation 
and  multiplicity  is  obviously  judged  lowly.  The  limit  and  unlimited  used  in  the 
Philebus have clear parallels to the One and Others of the Parmenides. They are the 
“stuff” of the forms and indeed of all things to some degree. The limit is described as 
mathematical principles and it is these which curtail the unlimited to resemble the 
One  as  much  as  possible.  But  again  the  Philebus  account  does  not  offer  us  an 
explanation  of the  emanation  from  the  first  One  and  how  it  relates to  the  formal 
level. Nor does it really explain the connection between the formal level, which is the 
subject of the Philebus, and the sensible world. The situation remains ambiguous in 
its details.  
 
We have a One at the highest level from which emanates necessarily, given the fact 
that it is, an unlimited number stream. This is limited by an inherent one. This gives 
rise  to  the  forms.  They  are  the  result  of  an  implicit  limiting  by  a  One  that  is 
necessarily present in any multiplicity. Owing to the nature of the unlimited there can 
clearly be many forms, though not an unlimited number since the forms must be 
closer to the One than sensible things – and even these are not entirely unlimited in 
number.  The  forms  are  created  by  the  limiting  within  their  unlimited  nature  to  a 
finite series of modes of being. The more of these a form has the lower it is on the 
scale of the good. The higher something is on the scale of the good the more we 
should  exert  ourselves  to  identify  with  it.  In  terms  of  a  material  principle  the 
situation  appears  quite  ambiguous.  In  the  Philebus  the  unlimited  is  traditionally 
understood as a material principle. It is that which is acted on by the limit to produce 
the  world.  However  there  does  not  seem  to  be  much  evidence  to  support  the 
interpretation that the unlimited is a matter for the sensible world. Yet in terms of 
being  the  passive  principle  to  the  limit‟s  active  then  the  unlimited  can  indeed  be 
understood  as  analogous  to  the  Stoics‟  apoios ousia. The  unlimited stream  is one 
part of the nature of the forms, it is the aspect of them that is unlimited in itself but 
that comes to be limited by the limit. However the difference between the unlimited 
and apoios ousia are two in number: 
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1)  The  unlimited  still  appears  to  be  immaterial  in  contrast  to  the  definite 
corporeality of the Stoics‟ apoios ousia.  
2)  The  unlimited  still  does  not  appear  to  be,  in  any  meaningful  way,  the 
substrate for the sensible world. There has been only the suggestion that the 
unlimited is somehow also manifested as the geometrical principles and that 
for some reason these underlie the sensible world.  
Plato is clearly sympathetic to the notion that in every thing that exists (apart from 
the One, Being and Difference) there is a combination of something activating and 
something  acted  on.  The  limit  is  the  acting  principle  and  is  part  of  the  unlimited 
when they are mixed. In the case of number this is easier to see: the limit is the One 
(at  whichever  level)  and  for  mathematical  number  each  number  is  a  collection  of 
monads,  these  monads  are  grouped  together  by  the  One  that  exists  at  the 
mathematical level perhaps itself the first mathematical monad. As such the limiting 
factor is both different from that which its limits – because that is unlimited – and 
the same since it is a part of the mixture. 
 
It is this notion that every thing that exists is a combination of active and passive 
and that the active and passive are intimately and intractably connected that is the 
main connection to the Stoics so far. However the  relationship of the geometrical 
principles  as  underlying  the  elemental  triangles  will  be  seen  to  have  a  strong 
connection to the Stoic notion of apoios ousia. The hierarchical structure of forms will 
also  separate  Plato  from  the  Stoics  and  it  remains  for  his  successors  at  the  Old 
Academy  to  render  the  metaphysics  more  sympathetic  to  the  Stoic  position  of 
immanent formal materialism.  
 
The next section will use the Unwritten Doctrines to expand the metaphysics that 
have been extracted from the Parmenides and Philebus. In looking at the Unwritten 
Doctrines the gaps that have been left in the account will be filled out as much as 
possible and the scene set for the metaphysics of the Old Academy that will have 
formed the immediate backdrop and intellectual atmosphere for Zeno and thence for 
his students.        
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3.2 The Unwritten Doctrines 
 
Aristotle ascribes Pythagorean sounding doctrines to Plato throughout his works and 
frequently refers to Plato and the Pythagoreans in the same sentence as comrades in 
arms
345. These doctrines only vaguely resemble any teachings found in the Platonic 
corpus  and  have  been  dismissed  by  some  as  spurious  ascriptions  on  Aristotle‟s 
part
346. However the closer that we look at them the more serious they appear as 
indicators of Plato‟s later thought. For instance, Aristotle‟s assertion that Plato had as 
his matter the Great and the Small
347 can easily be accommodated to the picture 
that has been revealed in this chapter. Aristotle also clearly thinks that he can move 
from one set of conclusions that he has from Plato‟s works and words to others that 
are not found in the corpus and find analogues between the two. He finds the Great 
and  Small,  which  he  asserts  to  have  been  Plato‟s  matter,  to  be  analogous  to,  or 
perhaps even another expression for, the Receptacle of becoming in the Timaeus
348. 
Plato‟s most eminent pupil thought that throughout the doctrines found in the works 
of Plato there exists a consistent metaphysics. That there is an underlying train of 
thought ranging throughout Plato‟s works from the Parmenides onwards has indeed 
been one of the major assumptions of this thesis; but another is that the written 
works  are  not  the  sole  key  to  understanding  Platonic  metaphysics  and  hence  his 
physics. Rather the written works set out a vague framework filled with questions 
that invite debate and stimulate the mind to search for answers, but in a way that 
directs the reader towards a Platonist position. The real teaching is not in writing but 
in  the  spoken  word.  Hence  Plato  gave  his  lecture  or  series  of  lectures  on  the 
Good
349. It is from these talks that it is assumed most of Aristotle‟s statements that 
have  little  textual  support  are  believed  to  have  come.  These  esoteric  teachings 
should  be  taken  seriously  as  offering  an  insight  to  Plato‟s  thought  for  several 
reasons: 
 
                                                 
345 E.g. Metaph. III.1 996a6, III.4 1001a9. Vlastos (1981, pg. 401) sees any person attempting to justify 
an esoteric tradition in Plato simply on the basis of the Timaeus as “wasting our time”, and in this he is 
surely right. He is in general sceptical of any account of an esoteric doctrine.  
346 Crombie (1963, vol. 2, pg. 441) is of the opinion that the Unwritten Doctrines make so little sense it is 
like “trying to guess what the defence was by reading the concluding speech of the prosecution” and that 
if Aristotle‟s reports are accurate then any competent scholar would assume Plato had outlived his sanity. 
This is, needless to say, a position I disagree with. 
347 Physics I.4 187a17.  
348 On Generation and Corruption II.1 329a14, more properly Aristotle is comparing the “boundless”.  
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1.  In his seventh letter Plato himself states that writing is not the medium in 
which knowledge can be properly transferred
350.  
2.  Aristotle‟s reports fit in to the picture that has been developed here, which is 
a  circular  argument,  but  the  Unwritten  Doctrines  support  and  develop  the 
picture, they do not create it. 
3.  The Unwritten Doctrines do indeed seem to have strong parallels to what we 
know of Pythagoreanism before Plato, which is not very much, and we know 
Plato had an interest in Pythagoreanism so doctrines which are similar and 
developments of that school‟s should be taken seriously.  
4.  Speusippus‟  and  Xenocrates‟  systems  resemble  what  Aristotle  attributes  to 
Plato lending it credibility.  
5.  Aristotle is taken to be an accurate source for the doctrines of Speusippus and 
Xenocrates, as well as many others. He mentions these philosophers in the 
same context as the unwritten doctrines, why should we doubt his accuracy in 
this sentence and accept it in the next?   
 
Sayre, in his discussion of the Unwritten Doctrines, offers a different picture. In his 
opinion we have two options: 
  
1.  that  Aristotle  is  simply  misreporting  Plato:  “Aristotle  was  notoriously 
unreliable in reporting the views of his predecessors”
351,  
 
or;  
 
2.  that Plato did not write these thoughts down and: “the dialogues which have 
inspired philosophers for twenty five centuries are devoid of the true Platonic 
vision.
352”  
 
Neither  option,  as  he  points  out
353,  is  very  appealing.  However  on  balance  it  is 
unlikely that Aristotle made up the Unwritten Doctrines, as Cherniss would have us 
believe, and also likely that the written works are not the last word on metaphysics 
so we should take the reports with at the least a degree of seriousness. Cherniss‟ 
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view  that  the  “unwritten  doctrines”  do  not  actually  apply  to  a  set  of  lectures  or 
specific teachings but could be simply conversations or points made in discussion is 
reasonable and has the advantage that off the cuff remarks taken too seriously or 
out of context could be responsible for any statements that are at variance with the 
rest or our expectation
354. On balance then, it seems reasonable to trust the broader 
statements of Aristotle relating to the Unwritten Doctrines, and the benefit of the 
doubt should be given to their accuracy.   
 
If we look at the doctrines that Aristotle recorded for us we will  see a complicated 
metaphysics  emerge,  but  one  that  will  not  be  alien  to  us  by  now.  Most  of  the 
interesting statements Aristotle has to give us in this area occur in the  Metaphysics. 
The  first  time  that  Aristotle  brings  in  a  doctrine  that  falls  into  the  sphere  of  the 
Unwritten  Doctrines  is  at  988a26:  “Plato  spoke  of  the  great  and  the  small,  the 
Italians of the infinite, Empedocles of fire, earth, water and air, Anaxagoras of the 
infinity of homogeneous things.” Aristotle has been discussing first principles, in this 
case he is discussing the material principle which clearly places Plato in the group he 
has just mentioned of those who have more than one first principle. That Plato is to 
be distinguished in philosophy from the Pythagoreans is also clear as the “Italians” 
are listed separately. Aristotle has here given us a name for the material principle of 
Plato. That it is meant to be a material principle for the sensible world, and not some 
kind  of  matter  for  the  intelligible  is  suggested  by  Aristotle‟s  listing  it  with 
Empedocles‟ four elements.  
 
This position is echoed by Aristotle in a different work: “Now these are contraries, 
which may be generalized into excess and defect. Compare Plato‟s „Great and Small‟ 
– except that he makes these his matter, the one his form, while the others treat the 
one which underlies as matter and the contraries as differentiae, i.e. forms.
355” The 
excess and defects are the contrarieties of the traditional elements. The Great and 
Small are being characterised as matter as in the Metaphysics. The One acts on the 
Great  and  Small,  it  acts  as  the  limit  on  the  intrinsic  infinite  unlimitedness  of  the 
Great  and  Small.  This One  is  tacitly  identified  with  the  forms  which  ties  the  new 
metaphysics neatly in with the original theory
356. The forms still act as the unifying 
                                                 
354 Cherniss 1945. 
355 Physics I.4 187a17. 
356 In the  De Anima (404b23-27, 404b16) Aristotle mentions that the forms are numbers according to 
Plato. This has been seen to be the implicit suggestion in the Philebus and if this is the case then it makes 135  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
or limiting factor on some sort of inherent disorder. The Great and Small are clearly 
thought to be infinite and in need of limiting: “It is for this reason that Plato also 
made the infinites two in number, because it is supposed to be possible to exceed all 
limits  and  to  proceed  ad  infinitum  in  the  direction  both  of  increase  and  of 
reduction.
357”  Although  Aristotle  says  that  Plato  makes  the  Great  and  Small  his 
“matter” this should be understood with caution. The disorder inherent in an infinite 
which stretches in opposite directions is indeed reminiscent of the pre-cosmic chaos 
discussed in the Timaeus and the One will indeed serve to limit and rationalise it. 
However the same infinite stretch exists in the forms themselves so the fact that the 
Great and Small are also infinite is not enough to justify any thought of them as 
sensible matter. Instead we must look further for this justification.  
 
In  explaining Plato‟s metaphysics Aristotle informs us that Plato taught that there 
were three levels of reality: “Plato posited two kinds of substance – the Forms and 
the objects of mathematics – as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible 
bodies.
358” But as Aristotle admits elsewhere this is still too simplistic. It is not just 
that there are three realms, one with forms, another with numbers and another with 
the sensible. No: “Plato says it is different; yet even he thinks that both these bodies 
and their causes are numbers, but that the intelligible numbers are causes, while the 
others are sensible.
359” Aristotle is here separating out the levels of reality that are 
the strict metaphysical hierarchy of Platonic metaphysics. The forms are separated 
out from mathematical number and the “substance of sensible bodies”. Number is 
held by the second account to be responsible for all things and Aristotle suggests 
that  there  is such  a  thing  as  “sensible  number”,  which  given  what  has  been  said 
before would seem to  be the most likely candidate for the “substance  of sensible 
bodies.”  
 
The  connection  between  Plato  and  the  Pythagoreans  is  re-established  by  Aristotle 
later in the Metaphysics: 
 
Further,  there  is  the  question  which  is  hardest  of  all  and  most 
perplexing,  whether  unity  and  being,  as  the  Pythagoreans  and 
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Plato  said,  are  not  attributes  of  something  else  but  are  the 
substance  of  existing  things,  or  this  is  not  the  case,  but  the 
substratum is something else.
360 
 
This passage reconnects the Unwritten Doctrines to the  Parmenides.  We  are  told 
that, just as we found in the Parmenides, the One and Being are the “substance of 
existing things”. They are the principles which function as the ultimate explanation of 
all things and so in that sense they can be understood as the substratum of reality. 
The One and Being are not substrates in the sense that apoios ousia is but they are 
the principles by which things come to be. Any doubt about the nature of the One 
and Being as principles in the most perfect sense – uncaused and independent – is 
dispelled by Aristotle‟s description: “Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being and 
the one were nothing else, but this was their nature, their substance being just unity 
and  being.
361”  There  is  nothing  that  either  the  One  or  Being  rely  on.  They  are 
entwined perfectly and rely only on each other and together explain everything. This 
appears to be a rather stronger monistic system than might be expected. However 
the necessary emanation from the One are the Others. Matter exists necessarily from 
the existence  of the One. Yet the  emphasis is certainly on the One as a  “higher” 
principle than the Others as even if there was no time of generation the Others are in 
a sense posterior to the One. This resembles what we know of Eudorus‟ metaphysics 
and his account of Pythagoreanism. However as Dillon
362 points out, there is nothing 
in Eudorus‟ metaphysics and monistic system that could not be found in the Philebus. 
In the Philebus Mind acts as the equivalent higher principle over the lower principles 
of limit and unlimited which it uses: it appears that Plato discussed the possibility of 
a monistic system too. So too there may be a higher One in the Parmenides whose 
existence necessitates another limiting principle and an unlimited, which could be the 
predecessor of the Neo-Platonists
363 and Eudorus.  
 
The change in Platonic metaphysics from the naïve position criticised in the first half 
of the Parmenides to what we met in the second and the picture that emerged from 
the Philebus can be explained by the integration of Pythagorean philosophy by Plato. 
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It is this fact and Aristotle‟s method of reporting on the two schools‟ doctrines that 
make it, as Burkert
364 says, so very difficult to find out what is Platonism and what is 
Pythagoreanism  and  in  what   the  substantial  difference   really  consist s.  The 
permanent connection and inter reliance of a dualistic principle system that was seen 
between the One and Others at the lower levels is here repeated, albeit in a different 
form – though this we should expect given that level‟s supreme transcendence – as 
there is nothing being acted on per se, the One and Being eternally entwined and to 
all  intents  and  purposes  indistinguishable  except  in  thought.  This  very  clearly 
parallels  the  level  of  interdependence  and  indistinguishability  of  the  two  Stoic 
principles.   
 
The  revised  nature  of  the  forms  found  in  the  Philebus,  that  they  are  not  in  fact 
entirely one, is supported by Aristotle when he again draws a parallel between Plato 
and the Pythagoreans: 
 
Some,  as  the  Pythagoreans  and  Plato,  make  the  infinite  a 
principle as a substance in its own right, and not as an accident of 
some other thing. Only the Pythagoreans place the infinite among 
the  objects  of  sense  (they  do  not  regard  number  as  separable 
from these), and assert that what is outside the heaven is infinite. 
Plato, on the other hand, holds that there is no body outside (the 
Forms are not outside, because they are nowhere), yet that the 
infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but in the Forms 
also. Further, the Pythagoreans identify the infinite with the even. 
For  this,  they  say,  when  it  is  cut  off  and  shut  in  by  the  odd, 
provides things with the element of infinity. An indication of this is 
what happens with numbers. If the gnomons are placed round the 
one, and without the one, in the one construction the figure that 
results is always different, in the other it is always the same. But 
Plato has two infinites, the Great and the Small
365. (Trans. Hardie 
and Gaye, emphasis added) 
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The rejection of the naïve theory of forms in the Parmenides can safely be taken to 
have been as a result of the interaction between Plato and the Pythagoreans. Here 
we have Plato explicitly placing the infinite in the nature of the forms. The infinite 
can have no clearer exemplification than the unlimited of the Philebus which we saw 
established as the “material” element of the forms. It is the part that is limited and 
demarcated to make them useful as paradigms that can then be employed as models 
on a mathematical scheme. The forms remain incorporeal and so we know that any 
talk  of  number  in  this  regard  is  not  in  relation  to  the  sensible  world  and  that  if 
anything that sounds similar to this picture is said in relation to the sensible world 
then it can only be in analogy and not the same objects.  
 
The  picture  that  we  have  been  given  by  Aristotle  reaffirms  the  idea  that  Plato‟s 
metaphysics  and  theory  of  forms  underwent  a  change  and  that  this  change  was 
facilitated by the introduction of Pythagorean theories. The nature of the forms as 
consisting of an unlimited which is somehow limited and uncontrolled was seen to 
have confirmation in the words of Aristotle. The Great and Small were introduced as 
parallel to the One and Others of the Parmenides and the limit and unlimited of the 
Philebus. This mirrors Aristotle‟s assertion that Plato has three levels of substance – 
the formal, the mathematical and the sensible. All three levels exist because of the 
same limiting action on an inherent infinite and the connection between the levels is 
thus  easily  understood  as  akin  to  an  instantiable  mathematical  formula.  However 
because the different levels rely on different sorts of number, the mathematical on 
mathematical number the sensible on geometrical or sensible number, the way of 
instantiation will necessarily be different. This however is not explained in Aristotle; 
nor is how all this is supposed to relate to the sensible world – but this will be made 
clear in the next section when the teachings of the written and Unwritten Doctrines 
are combined into a single theory.  139  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
3.2.1 The Written and Unwritten Doctrines 
 
Combining the metaphysics that was gleaned from the doctrines of the Parmenides 
and Philebus with the Unwritten Doctrines should furnish us with the most complete 
picture of Plato‟s late ontology. Comparing this synthesised metaphysics with that of 
Speusippus and Xenocrates will place it in context and, I believe, support the idea 
that this interpretation of Plato is, if not entirely correct, then at least reasonable. 
The  theory  is more  mathematical  and  elaborate  than  anything  else  in  the  written 
doctrines but this should not be a cause for scepticism. The personal connection with 
Pythagoreanism no doubt played an important role in Plato‟s revision of his theory 
and  Aristotle  is  certainly  happy  to  talk  of  the  two  in  the  same  breath;  an  action 
unthinkable if it were not at least very plausible and it could be so only if the theories 
are  in  fact  similar.  We  noted  in  the  introduction  Plato‟s  frustration  with  the 
Pythagoreans  for  having  a  theory  that  is  very  helpful  but  making  no  use  of  it 
themselves. It is plausible that Plato took it upon himself to rectify this under-use of 
mathematical explanation.  
 
Whatever is made of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides it seems unlikely that 
such  a  transcendent  One  has  any  role  in  philosophy,  though  perhaps  it  does  in 
theology or mysticism. However aside from this One we are offered a second One 
which differs from the first in that it is, whereas we could neither affirm nor deny this 
of the previous One. This One is because it is related to Being and Being is a single 
thing because it partakes of this One. It is a reciprocal relationship and the two are 
only known to be separate because they are different and are different because they 
partake of the Different (presumably the Different is, and so partakes of Being and 
also of One). These three things give rise to the indefinite stream of numbers. We 
saw Plato move straight from this to geometrical number and the sensible world. It is 
up to us to slow the process down since there must be intervening levels as Aristotle 
informs us there are the forms and mathematicals before the sensible. The stream 
that comes from the One is limited. We are not told to what extent they are limited 
but  Aristotle  gives  us  a  clue  when  he  says:  “he  makes  numbers  only  up  to  the 
decad.
366”  The  decad  contains  in  principle  the  unlimited  number  series  since  all 
numbers  are  made  from  it.  As  a  supreme  principle  of  number  ten  seems  like  a 
plausible number to stop at. These would be the ideal numbers. They are whole and 
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unitary. The number 3 that exists at this level is not a collection of 3 X 1 but is a 
simple 3. It is one thing and has no parts. The same is true of all the other numbers 
of the decad. It is likely that in some sense these are to be identified with the forms. 
There could be only ten of them and so we would have a hierarchy of forms, but 
since  in  the  Sophist  Plato  had  already  identified  the  Five  Great  Kinds  it  is  not 
unreasonable to expand this to ten. What these would be (apart from perhaps the 
Five Great Kinds) we are not told, but that some forms are higher  than others in 
Plato‟s estimation is reasonable. This is especially so given the conversation in the 
Philebus  which  rates  knowledge  as  higher  than  pleasure  on  the  basis  of  its  more 
unitary nature. The ten highest forms would be the unified forms which are closest to 
the One. Later writers, the Neoplatonists - Iamblichus in particular in his Theology of 
Arithmetic
367 - would exploit what they assumed to be a Pythagorean doctrine of 
identifying numbers with gods. It does not take much of a leap to suppose that Plato 
heard the Pythagorean saying: “justice is four”, and decided that the identification of 
some forms with particular ideal numbers was reasonable.  
 
We have to move from the ideal numbers down a level but there seems no particular 
reason to do so. It may be that from the perspective of necessary emanation there is 
not.  However  it  is  a  fact  that  (as  far  as  Plato  is  concerned  anyway)  there  is 
mathematical number and that it differs from ideal number. Mathematical numbers 
are numbers that are themselves constituted of multiplicities. The mathematical 3 
differs  from  ideal  3  in  that  whereas  ideal  3  is  a  simple  thing  mathematical  3  is 
actually made of 1 + 1 + 1. It is not a single thing. It can be divided and be a part of 
other numbers too, unlike ideal 3. Since this is the case there must be a relationship 
between mathematical and ideal number. Because mathematical number is we must 
find a cause for it in the level above. The ideal numbers do indeed create. Each is 
one and so apart from the first ideal One there are a number of other ones
368. This 
would result in the absurdity of having multiple ideal Ones  – absurd because ideal 
One would then be, in a sense, a multiplicity. I would suggest that these Ones create 
the next level of mathematical number. That One1 is the first of the mathematical 
numbers and exists with an indefinite number stream that is limited according to the 
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imposition of form by the One1. This limiting is done in imitation of the level above. 
Are these mathematical numbers to be identified with the remaining forms, or do 
they exist separately but at the same level? We do not know because we are never 
told.  
 
We are told by Aristotle that the forms are numbers and by Plato in the Philebus that 
the forms are constituted by the limiting of the unlimited which is what the ideal One 
did to the stream of mathematical Ones1. However it may be that rather than being 
identical to the mathematical numbers the forms are analogous offspring of the ideal 
numbers which can be understood in terms of mathematics. There are two options 
for the relationship of forms and mathematical number: 
 
1.  that the forms (whichever are not the “Ten Great Kinds”) are identical to the 
mathematical numbers (or some of them at least); 
 
 or,  
 
2.  that the forms are analogous offspring like the mathematical numbers to the 
decad, but are not identical to the mathematical numbers.     
 
However since we there is no evidence either way we will have to end speculation 
there; but the second option seems more likely given that Aristotle told us that forms 
and numbers are causes, and forms are presumably still to be thought of as single 
and so could be only analogously like the mathematical numbers
369. This has shown 
us two of the levels that Aristotle reports exist in Plato‟s system: the formal and the 
mathematical. But it is the sensible that is of most interest to this thesis. The method 
of emanation and limitation we have so far seen points the way for the method of 
the  ordering  of  the  sensible  world  and  the  nature  of  the  underlying  substrate  of 
sensible things.  
 
The  analogous  relationship  that  exists  tying  each  level  together  continues:  “the 
infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but in the Forms also.
370” Just as 
the  first  offspring  of  the  One  were  unlimited  and  then  limited  to  form  the  ideal 
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numbers and the next offspring were also unlimited before being demarcated as a 
collection  of  monads  so  too  does  the  sensible  world  have  in  it  the  infinite.  Again 
there  is  no  definite  account  of  the  necessity  of  the  sensible  world.  But  given  the 
account of the Timaeus this is not necessarily surprising. Just as it is necessary to 
account for mathematical number since we use it everyday, so too it is necessary to 
account for the sensible world since we live in it. Even so we have jumped a step. For 
between  mathematical  number  and  the  sensible  world  is  geometrical  number. 
Geometric shapes exist in the same way that mathematical numbers do. They are 
objects of contemplation. The geometrical numbers will be the next level down from 
mathematical number  and somehow the  existence of mathematical number is not 
contained in its level but, like ideal number before it, it somehow “spills over” into 
the next level. The One2 for the geometrical level somehow limits the infinite number 
stream into geometrical shapes which are an attempt to “mimic” the ideal number. 
We can see the clear progression of imperfection the further we move from the initial 
One.  The  perfect  unity  of  the  first  One  was  captured  to  its  best  extent  by  ideal 
number, then to a lesser extent by mathematical number, and now it is even more 
imperfectly  captured  by  geometrical  number.  These  numbers  exist  as  incorporeal 
extension and are the principles of the elemental figures.  
 
The  Timaeus  tells us that  the  world is constituted  by  the  elemental  triangles and 
implies that these can be broken down to more basic principles
371. These more basic 
principles  are  known  only  to  god  and  his  friends  who  we  identified  above  as 
Pythagoras, the Prometheus and friend of mankind and god. The principles of the 
triangles in the world will be mathematical principles. But the mathematical numbers 
are numbers, not shapes. This is why we have the geometrical level. For at that level 
the triangles will exist in perfection (though triangles are imperfect representations 
of higher principles
372) to be mimicked by the sensible world. Aristotle has told us 
that the infinite exists in the sensible world just as it does in the other realms. All 
other realms have been formed by the limiting of an infinite and it is the case that 
the demiurge creates order out of chaos by imposing limit. The pre -cosmic chaos is 
chaotic because it is unlimited. It is, I would propose, an infinite extension ,  an 
infinite collection of physical monads. Each divisible monad, which exist in multiplicity 
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as the Great and Small, we were told by Aristotle were infinite in  both directions: 
there are an infinite number of monads and  each monad  can be divided into two 
equal monads ad infinitum. These are geometrical points. They have to be limited. 
Since they exist in this way the only method of order there can be is the imposition 
of  geometrical  form.  They  already  exist  in  space  –  the  Receptacle,  which  is  as 
multidimensional  as  the  things in  it.  The  demiurge‟s  action  makes  the  Receptacle 
three  dimensional  by  joining  the  infinite  number  of  points  together  into 
representations of the level just above – the geometrical.  
 
The sensible world is the end point of the “emanation” from the initial One since it is 
the final thing to be explained. It has to be  explained and have a relation to the 
forms, which are now understandable in a numerical way, since we exist in it. The 
sensible world is a brute fact but it must have a relationship with higher, “purer”, 
levels of reality. The sensible world is made of a matrix of an infinity of points which 
are  collected  or  limited  in  imitation  of  geometrical  points
373.  They  are  made  to 
resemble geometrical objects because they cannot be made to directly resemble 
mathematical or ideal numbers. The forms have been supposed to exist as some sort 
of mathematical formula and it is this formula, initially expressible in a mathematical 
way, that is being implemented in the sensible way but as geometrical formulae 
which  are  more  complicated  and  thus  further  removed  from  the  One  and  so 
inherently less perfect. The semblance of reality that the sensible world possesses is 
explained by its relationship to the first One via the intervening levels of reality and 
emanation.  
 
The final object of the search has been found. The substratum of the sensible wo rld 
has been found to be an infinite series of points
374. These are acted on by a One in a 
parallel situation to the levels of reality that exist above it. Each level is unlimited 
until limited by a Onen which in turn forces an “excess” down to the next level where 
it in turn is limited to make it resemble the One as much as possible for this is the 
best and inherently tied to Being. The relationship of this to the Stoic apoios ousia 
will  be  shown  at  the  end  of  the  next  section  where  the  Stoics‟  interest  in 
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mathematics  will  point  the  way  to  a  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  their 
material  principle  as  a  geometrical  body  infinite  in  divisible  potentiality.  The 
underlying principle of the sensible world for Plato, must, as for the levels above it, 
be intimately and constantly tied to its limiting or active principle which we know to 
be the One. The picture that has emerged from the discussion of Plato‟s written and 
unwritten teachings is one that actually quite strongly resembles the Stoic position. 
Any appeal to Aristotle as the “real” or most important influence on the Stoics for 
their  doctrine  of  matter  has  thus  been  shown  to  be  unnecessary  and  this  will  be 
reconfirmed when we see the teachings of the Old Academy who are the indisputable 
direct teachers of Zeno and so may well be the ancestors of Stoic physics.  
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3.3 
 
The Old Academy 
 
The preceding section introduced an interpretation of Plato‟s late ontology based on 
the dialogues and understood with the aid of the Unwritten Doctrines. The picture 
that  emerged  was  one  of  a  highly  mathematical  metaphysics  leading  to  a 
mathematically based physics. With this interpretation behind us we can see how, in 
the Timaeus, the elementary figures exist in “place” or the Receptacle of becoming, 
acting as the material substrate of the sensible world in an analogous way to the 
Indefinite  Dyads  or  unlimited  number  streams  at  the  higher  levels  of  reality.  The 
elementary figures are the elements of the sensible world owing to the fact that they 
are the minimum instantiation of sensible reality; if we break them down further we 
remove  their  sensible  nature.  The  elementary  figures  are,  at  least  conceptually, 
reducible to a collection of points in this cosmic join-the-dots: just as the material 
principle of the mathematical level is reducible to collections of monads. This peculiar 
mathematical structure of the sensible world has a relationship to the Stoic account 
of matter, although the connection may not be wholly apparent at this stage. But 
there is more to the tradition than simply Plato and the Stoics. After Plato‟s death the 
Academy flourished and Zeno himself studied there for a time under its third head: 
Polemo.   
 
The Old Academy was a continuously existing entity. It thrived after Plato‟s death 
producing  philosophy  and  philosophers  of  both  note  and  merit.  However,  like  the 
Unwritten  Doctrines,  the  Old  Academy  has  not  received  the  attention  it  deserves 
from  the  English  speaking  world.  The  philosophical  systems  of  Speusippus, 
Xenocrates  and  Polemo  have  been  brushed  aside  until  relatively  recently
375. 
Nevertheless, even if the metaphysical systems of the Old Academy have not been to 
the taste of all modern scholarship, they constitute the intellectual b ackground in 
which Zeno studied. In regard to the relationship between Plato and Stoicism these 
three  figures  have  an  obvious  place.  Not  only  was  Polemo  Zeno‟s  teacher  but 
Xenocrates was Polemo‟s and Xenocrates was a student, along with Speusippus, of 
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Plato‟s. Polemo‟s apparent lack of interest in metaphysics and physics
376, in contrast 
to Xenocrates, will be shown to be an important consideration in the influence the 
Old Academy could have had on the development of the Stoic material principle. As 
interesting as the metaphysical schemes of these successive heads of the Academy 
are,  a  detailed  exploration  of  these  systems  and  criticisms  thereof  is  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  thesis.  Instead  I  will  focus  on  how  the  ideas  we  saw  in  Plato  were 
adopted and adapted in their systems and show how the idea of a geometrical matrix 
continued down to the time of Polemo to have been the interpretation of Platonic 
physics that would have been passed down to Zeno.  
 
The lengthy exploration of Plato‟s ontology demonstrated that it is as impossible for a 
Platonist to discuss a material principle without explaining its corollary, the limiting 
or form giving principle, as it was for the Stoics. While the Platonists had a complex 
structure  of  hypostases  of  being  the  Stoics  had  only  the  sensible  world.  But  this 
sensible world had the same two principle structure that was seen in the Parmenides, 
the Philebus and the Unwritten Doctrines relating to metaphysics. This two principled 
metaphysics was transferred, in the end at the expense of the naïve theory of forms, 
to physics by Plato. Plato‟s successors continued this two principle system in their 
metaphysics and by necessity into their physics. They made alterations in terms of 
the hypostatisation of their ontologies but the basic structure remained intact to be 
passed on to the Stoics.  
 
Since the material principle of the sensible world was not of the first importance for 
the Platonists it is best understood by its relation to matter at the higher levels. The 
formal realm continued to be the realm which possessed most reality. The matter 
that corresponds to this realm is thus understood as matter most properly. It is the 
“out of which” for the things that are most properly said to exist. The matter that 
exists in the realm below this exists as matter analogously to the matter at the level 
above. Just as mathematical number exists in a resemblance to formal number so 
too its matter is a resemblance to the matter of the formal level. The matter of the 
highest level is clearly identified as an indefinite series in every Platonic system. The 
immediate result of the One and this Indefinite varies in the different philosophers. 
However the matter at the intermediate level seems to be a system of monads which 
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are then ordered according to the Ten Great Kinds of the realm above. The monads 
are grouped together in imitation of the forms or ideal numbers at the level above to 
create the mathematical numbers. The matter at the sensible level is again like the 
monads  of  the  intermediate  but  exists  as  sensible  points  and  these  are  collected 
again in resemblance of the mixture at the intermediate level. Having as their model 
the geometrical the resulting groupings of sensible points serve as the principles for 
bodies in the sensible world. The matter of the sensible world is thus most clearly 
understood as the lowest link in a chain of imitation or resemblance to the formal 
realm‟s  matter.  It  is  with  this  structure  in  mind  -  that  sensible  matter  stands  to 
geometrical  matter  as  geometrical  matter  stands  to  mathematical  matter  as 
mathematical matter stands to formal matter  – that this section of the thesis will 
progress. There will be a short discussion of the formal levels and their matters in 
the  philosophical  systems  of  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates,  as  this  is  “matter  most 
pure” for them; followed by a discussion of the middle level and finally we will see 
how the sensible world‟s matter relates to the preceding matters.  
 
Fig. 1. Speusippus’ Metaphysics
377: 
     One? 
 
 
  Diffusion of goodness 
One  + Multiplicity 
 
 
 
One1 + Multiplicity1 = Ideal Number limited to the decad  
(level of world soul?) 
 
 
One2 + Multiplicity2  = Mathematical Number 
 
 
 
One3 + Multiplicity3 = Geometrical Number 
 
 
 
One4 + Multiplicity4 = Sensible World 
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employs; though, of course, any schematic representation of metaphysics is doomed to inadequacy. There 
is the issue of whether or not the mathematical and geometrical levels are actually inferior to the ideal as 
this diagram suggests. Plato mentions “ideal triangle” and this poses the potential problem that “triangle” 
exists  below  the  ideal  level.  However  I  suggest  that  a  possible  explanation  is  that  “what-it-is-to-be-
triangle” is just ideal 3, so that “what-it-is-to-be-three” is essentially the same. See note 320. 
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Fig. 2. Xenocrates’ Metaphysics
378: 
 
One (intellect, Zeus, god, monad)  +  Matter (female, indefinite dyad) 
  contains 
 
 
Number 
 
 
 
Ideal  Mathematical Geometrical 
       
                
 
Tetraktys 
 
 
 
Forms                  Indefinite number (principle of 
world) 
 
             
 
+         Minimal lines 
 
           
 
Sensible World 
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3.3.1 Formal Level: 
 
Plato  had,  quite  clearly  as  we  have  seen,  as  his  top  principle  the  One.  His  two 
primary successors utilised this One in two different ways. Speusippus seems to have 
been  more  influenced  in  his  ontology  by  the  first  hypothesis  of  the  Parmenides. 
Speusippus‟ first One is, as a result, unknowable. Xenocrates‟ One is, on the other 
hand, much more interesting since it is available as an object of discourse. This is 
not indicative, as Guthrie would have us believe, of Xenocrates‟ “inferior intellect
379”, 
but rather owes something to his attempt to reduce the complexity of the Platonic 
system.  
 
Both Speusippus and Xenocrates were of the opinion that the creation myth of the 
Timaeus was a teaching aid
380: a way of explaining the universe and the interaction 
of its parts for those of us who lack Pla to‟s genius. The characters of the demiurge 
and world-soul will thus appear very differently in these two philosophers‟ schemes 
compared to the Timaeus itself. In Stoicism, it will be recalled from the first chapter, 
the roles of the demiurge and world-soul become conflated. The soul of the world, for 
the Stoics, is also the world‟s ordering principle and supreme cause. For Plato the 
forms  remain  separate  mathematical  paradigms  that  act  as  a  model  according  to 
which  the  world  is  ordered.  For  the  Stoics  the  forms  as  separable  entities  have 
disappeared.  Instead  the  individual  instances  that  exist  at  any  given  time  in  the 
world can be understood to take the place of the forms. The sensible world is formed 
by  the  thoughts  of  god;  the  Stoics  created  an  impressive  idealism  mixed  with 
materialism. The underlying questions for this part of the thesis then become: “What 
happened in the Academy in the years after Plato‟s death and the birth of Stoicism? 
How did the separate forms of Plato, and separate cause, become immanent in the 
sensible world? And above all: how much did the material principle of the sensible 
world actually change in the Old Academy and in its transference to the Stoics?” 
 
When  it  comes  to  the  philosophical  system  of  Speusippus  the  answer  to  the  first 
question is: not a lot happened. The whole scheme just becomes more convoluted. 
The One for him has certainly become even more transcendent than Plato‟s and one 
of Aristotle‟s main criticisms of him is that he multiplied principles beyond reason
381. 
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Speusippus‟ ontology is extremely elaborate and, given that only fragments of his 
work survive, difficult to reconstruct and so I will not endeavour to give a full account 
of his whole theory, just those aspects relating to the previous section. His reason for 
removing the One from a discursive level and removing all qualities from it seems to 
be: that that which is a cause of something else having a particular quality cannot 
itself have that quality: 
 
…supreme beauty and goodness are not in the beginning, because 
the beginnings both of plants and animals are explanatory factors 
whereas  beauty  and  completeness  are  in  what  proceeds  from 
those beginnings
382.  
 
And: 
 
Now, since it is equally impossible to exclude the good from first 
principles and to include it among  them in the manner of these 
men,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  something  wrong  in  the  way 
principles and the most primary beginnings have been conceived. 
No  one  has  the  right  grasp  on  them  who  co -ordinates  the 
universal  principles  with  those  of  animals  and  pla nts,  on  the 
ground that the more complete always evolves from the indefinite 
and incomplete; the philosopher who declares such a doctrine 
about things primordial is forced to conclude that unity itself is not 
even something that is
383.  
 
Of this One clearly  nothing can be asserted, else the whole point of positing such a 
One would be made redundant. How anything like this sort of One can be seen as a 
cause is difficult to understand. But such a problem arises most clearly if we are 
reading Speusippus‟ system as a temporal event. However there was no time when 
there was just this One and then something else came to be as a result of the One. 
Rather it is an explanatory principle: every chain of explanation must, to a Platonic 
mindset,  lead  back  to  some  ultimate  principle  of  explanation,  whether  this  is  the 
One,  the  Good  or  god.  Speusippus‟  reason  for  taking  the  first  hypothesis  of  the 
Parmenides as explanatorily relevant can, thus, be understood. But it is clear that as 
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far as a first principle goes this has no relevance to the Stoics. They have no need for 
such  an  explanatory  principle  either  temporally,  owing  to  their  doctrine  of eternal 
recurrence, or explanatorily, since they have god.  
 
As we would expect this One has a correlating matter which is the indefinite of the 
Speusippean  system;  which  he  terms  Multiplicity  (plēthos).  However,  given  that 
nothing can be predicated of the One it is unclear how such a One would relate to a 
material  principle.  Since  there  is  no  temporal  creation,  though,  this  may  be  the 
wrong perspective to take. Dillon points out in The Heirs of Plato that the problem 
with a monistic system, or ones in which differentiation between principles does not 
exist,  is  that  from  a  single  thing  or  undifferentiated  cause  no  difference  between 
creator and created is possible
384: the One and Multiplicity may be propertyless in 
different ways; that is: nothing can be said of the One but everything can be said of 
Multiplicity reducing the meaningfulness of any assertion to nothing. It is unclear if 
this Multiplicity is derived, either temporally or timelessly from the One, or if it is 
simply inferior.  
 
At the level below the transcendent One and Multiplicity Speusippus appears to have 
posited another One. This One also has a corresponding matter. However this One 
has properties of its own: things can be said of it. Dillon sees this One as acting back 
on one of its constituents: the original Multiplicity. Dillon says of the second One that 
it  acts  by:  “mating,  so  to  speak,  in  an  incestuous  union,  with  its  mother  (which 
Speusippus has been careful to characterize, as we have seen, as „a totally fluid and 
pliable  matter
385‟).
386”  However  there  is  no  evidence  for  this  “incestuous  union” 
interpretation and there is no evidence that the One would act on this Multiplicity. 
However from a union with its matter somehow, we are not told how, the numbers 
are created. This One1 is the cause of the formal numbers. It acts on some type of 
Multiplicity1,  which  is  most  likely  qualityless  in  a  different  way  from  the  previous 
Multiplicity.  It  is  perhaps  better  understood  as  analogous  to  the  Indefinite  of  the 
Philebus  when  it  would  become  an  indefinite  number  series.  That  is,  rather  than 
being a generic undifferentiated Multiplicity of somethings – a “we know not what” – 
it is a Multiplicity of number. The reference to this Multiplicity as being a “fluid and 
pliable matter” should not be understood to indicate that it is like a plastic lump or a 
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lump  of  gold.  Rather  Speusippus,  as  reported  by  Iamblichus,  is  most  likely  just 
representing its qualityless nature in an analogy to matter at lower levels: it is no 
more  indicative  of  Multiplicity‟s  corporeal  nature  than  the  Gold  Analogy  of  the 
Timaeus is. The matter of this formal level for Speusippus, as well as for Plato, is 
undifferentiated (that is infinite) number series
387.  
 
Xenocrates‟ philosophy is, in my mind, the crucial link between Plato and the early 
Stoics.  The  account  of  his  heavily  theological/mythological  ontology  that  we  have 
runs as follows:  
 
Xenocrates, son of Agathenor, of Chalcedon, [holds] as gods the 
Monad  and  the  Dyad,  the  former  as  male,  having  the  role  of 
father,  reigning  in  the  heavens,  which  he  terms  “Zeus”  and 
“odd”  and  “intellect”,  which  is  for  him  the  primary  god;  the 
other as female, in the manner of the Mother of the Gods, ruling 
over the realm below the heavens, who is for him the Soul of 
the Universe
388. (Trans. Dillon) 
 
We will come back to this passage throughout the discussion of Xenocrates but at 
present it is important to note what we are told about the  active principle: the 
Monad. Contrary to both Plato and Speusippus, at any level
389, we are given a great 
deal of information about the One: It is “male”, “father”, “reigning in the heavens”, 
“Zeus”,  “intellect”,  and  “odd”.  All  these  titles  are  fairly  clearly  related  –  “male”, 
“father”,  “Zeus”  and  “odd”  these  are  the  traditional  marks  of  the  active  principle 
throughout theological creation stories
390. “Intellect” is no doubt best understood as 
the rational directing force of the active principle: the “Reason” of the Timaeus, and 
we  will  see  its  connection  to  sperm  –  the  directing  principle  of  life  –  in  the  last 
chapter.  Locating  the  active  force  of  the  universe  at  the  heavens  is  likewise 
understandable and should not, I think, be taken too seriously as a physical location 
for god; rather it is symbolic of his pan-universe rule. The Monad is, for Xenocrates 
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most clearly of all the Platonists, the active and directing force of the universe. What 
is strange, and indicative of his reductive tendencies, is that this Monad is the first 
One. There is not even a hint that there may be a higher principle. Xenocrates has 
taken  the  first  step  in  reducing  the  complex  transcendent  and  abstract  active 
principles of Plato and Speusippus to a more accessible understanding of it as god.  
 
What  is  also  clear  from  the  passage  is  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  levels  of 
reality. There is no mention of a “formal matter”. The matter for the Monad is the 
female  principle  that  is  in  the  sub-lunar  realm.  The  first  active  principle  is  not 
removed from the intermediate and sensible realms in the same way as in Plato or 
Speusippus. There is no formal level at the top existing independently, followed by 
the intermediate and then sensible. Instead the formal, intermediate and sensible 
aspects are all much more closely related. However they are still to be understood as 
analogous  to  each  other  rather  than  more  intimately  connected.  While  Plato  and 
Speusippus have multiple active principles, one for each level, Xenocrates needs only 
the first active principle since it acts directly on a single matter creating all that there 
is.  But  the  important  thing  to  note  in  Xenocrates‟  philosophy  is  the  reduction  of 
hypostases: the fact that where there were three very separate levels of reality there 
are now only aspects to a single reality.  
 
Speusippus  has  maintained  and  built  on  the  abstract  side  of  Plato‟s  ontology: 
keeping his first One as a transcendent entity and leaving his second One1 (and all 
subsequent) to be understood as number rather than as a theological entity or cause 
in a common sense way. Xenocrates, on the other hand, embraced, as we will see, 
both the mathematical and theological aspects of Plato‟s ontology. His One is god in 
a way that would be understandable with the minimal amount of explanation. His 
One clearly has a strong and “personal” relationship with the passive principle in a 
manner akin to that of the Stoic principles. The nature of number, the intermediate 
level of reality, will furnish us with more explanations of the direction the Academy 
was moving in. 
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3.3.2 Intermediate Levels:  
 
In all of the Platonic systems looked at, Plato‟s, Speusippus‟, and Xenocrates‟, the 
union of the One and Dyad produces, in some sense, number. We saw in the first 
half of this Chapter that in Plato‟s system, as found in the Parmenides, the unlimited 
number stream that acts as the Dyad is a necessary product of the One
391. From the 
union of these two were yielded the ideal numbers which were found to be most 
likely identical to the decad. The mathematical numbers exist at the level below this 
and  are  comprised  of  monads  grouped  together  under  the  image  of  the  ideal 
number. It was suggested that these explain the “lower level” forms (those that are 
not the Five Great Kinds or, presumably, five other “Great”, but unidentified, forms). 
The  sensible  world  was  still,  as  a  result,  constructed  as  an  image  of  these 
mathematical objects which remained separate entities. The way in which number 
and  forms  are  to  be  understood  in  Speusippus  and  Xenocrates  will  show  us  the 
adaptation of a material principle from these thinkers to the Stoics.   
 
Speusippus kept the distance of forms and number from the sensible world as great 
as  possible  but  Xenocrates,  as  we  have  begun  to  see  already,  did  not.  The 
characterisation of the forms as numerical objects continued in Speusippus  whose 
reduction of forms to numbers clearly shows his focus is slightly different from that 
of his uncle. The decad for Speusippus, as for Plato and Xenocrates, held a special 
place of significance. This is attested to by Iamblichus in his On the General Science 
of Mathematics and in the pseudo-Iamblichean text The Theology of Arithmetic. For 
Speusippus  the  proper  object  for  the  Philosopher  had  become  mathematical.  The 
forms as abstract ideas had lost their privileged position. They had already begun to 
do so in Plato‟s late ontology as interpreted in the last section but he still shied away 
from  reducing  the  understanding  of  forms  to  the  understanding  of  number 
completely. For Plato mathematics was a tool to enable a Philosopher to access the 
truth. By studying mathematics a student was acclimatised to the idea of immutable 
and non-sensible objects of truth. For Speusippus on the other hand mathematical 
truth  seems  to  have  superseded  knowledge  of  the  forms  qua  traditional  abstract 
entities.  
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We  know  that  Speusippus  had  a  keen  interest  in  mathematics  as  Iamblichus 
preserves  a  large  section  of  Speusippus‟  On  Pythagorean  Numbers  for  us.  The 
Theology of Arithmetic shows Speusippus as having a special place for the decad
392 
but it is not clear if the decad itself is the first level of creation from the transcendent 
One and Multiplicity.  
 
It would seem reasonable to suppose that the decad is in fact a level below the One. 
Aristotle has, after all, criticised Speusippus for multiplying principles
393. Let us take 
the first One1 as the principle of number which is then instantiated in the series of 
the decad by its limiting of a Multiplicity1 that exists in imitation of the Multiplicity 
above. As Tarán points out
394 Aristotle does seem to have been of the opinion that 
virtually all of his predecessors held creation to be from opposites, and clearly he 
classed  Speusippus among  this group  with  his One  and  Multiplicity.  But  if each 
principle is to consist of opposites is i t not reasonable to suppose that the created 
One1  must  have  a  different  “matter”  to  oppose  it  than  the  Multiplicity  which  is 
partially responsible for it? It is likely then that there is a separate Multiplicity1 from 
the first Multiplicity and that it is this that is acted upon by the One1 to create the 
decad. From the decad the same emanation will ensue so that mathematical number 
is created for the same reasons that Plato had.  
 
All  we  can  infer  about  the  mathematicals in  Speusippus‟  scheme  is  that  they  are 
“many the same
395”. They are addable and the type of number which we refer to 
when  we  say  that  3+3=6.  If  these  cannot  be  3s-in-themselves  or  the  6-itself  it 
follows that the most likely candidate is that they are collections of monads grouped 
together under the class or image of 3 and 6.  
 
Given the absence of the traditional forms but Speusippus‟ desire for knowledge to 
be  attainable,  though  not  through  empirical  work,  and  also  the  influence  of  the 
mathematical  on  the  sensible,  the  decad  is  likely  to  be  the  highest  object  of 
knowledge and reachable only through intuition or union rather than dialectic. The 
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mathematical numbers that we just noted the creation of are thus a stepping stone 
to this end of knowledge.   
 
For any system that has reverence for the decad and places it in a privileged position 
the  tetraktys  is  also  special.  Speusippus  appears  to  appeal  to  a  principle  for 
geometrical  entities  which  we  will  see  later  are  of  great  importance  for  this 
discussion. According to Tarán‟s interpretation of Speusippus we would only know a 
line or triangular object when we came across one if we first had the idea of 1 or 
3
396. The monad, we are told by the author of the Theology, is the stable and perfect 
source of all number since it remains ever the same
397. If mixed with larger numbers 
it is still a monad, if divided it is still a monad. The matters that exist at the level of 
ideal number and mathematical number are then of two types: the first would be 
analogous to the matter that constitutes the material element for the creation of the 
decad; that is: indefinite number or Multiplicity 1.  The  second  type  would  be  the 
indefinite  collection  of  monads  which  are  bound  in  resemblances  of  the  formal 
number above, which are themselves resemblances of the original decad. These are 
formed from a One2 which is an image of the One1 and acts on a Multiplicity2 which is 
also an image of the Multiplicity1 from above. The limiting of Multiplicity2 by One2 
creates the mixture that is mathematical number. 
 
There are, then, at least two levels of number for Speusippus. But Aristotle also talks 
of geometrical number:  
 
These  thinkers,  then,  generate  magnitudes  from  this  kind  of 
matter, but others [Speusippus] from the point – they regard the 
point as being, not one, but like the one – and another material 
principle which is like Multiplicity, but not Multiplicity; yet in the 
case  of  these  principles  nonetheless  we  get  into  the  same 
difficulties. For if the matter is one, then line, plane, and solid will 
be the same; because the product of the same elements must be 
one and the same. If on the other hand there is more than one 
matter – one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the 
solid – either the kinds are associated with one another or they 
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are  not.  Thus  the  same  result  will  follow  in  this  case  also;  for 
either the plane will not contain a line, or it will be a line
398. 
 
We will have no idea of a line or plane unless we have the idea of two or three first; 
that much we saw above. It is at this point that Speusippus‟ metaphysics reaches its 
most complicated area and leads into the nature of matter. As such the discussion of 
physical number will have to wait until the next part. What has been shown is that 
the middle level of principles are held together by resemblance. The sensible world 
for  Speusippus,  as  much  as  for  Plato,  is  still  an  image  of  a  separately  existing 
paradigm far removed from it.  
 
Mathematics and number furnish Speusippus with the tools for the middle level of 
reality, as it does for Plato, but we need more than just these for a full explanation 
of the intermediate level of reality. It is also at this level that the world soul exists – 
an entity not discussed in my analysis of Plato‟s metaphysics outside the Timaeus. 
Aetius informs us: “Speusippus [declares God to be] Intellect, which is not identical 
with the One or the Good, but has a nature peculiar to itself.
399” Indeed god is not 
the One, since we know the One is transcendent. But nor is this transcendent One 
Good. It is possible that Aetius‟ account is confused owing to the complexity of the 
system which he is attempting to report. What seems most likely is that Aetius is not 
trying to tell us that Speusippus‟ god is the transcendent One, or that god exists at 
the  level  of  the  Good.  God  should  not  be  at  the  level  of  the  Good  since  for 
Speusippus the Good and Beauty and other such Forms exist only at a relatively low 
level. They are held to have no meaning at the higher levels. God, therefore, would 
perhaps exist at a level between these two. This would place him perhaps at the first 
level  of  offspring,  the  One1  that  is  principle  of  the  decad.  We  know  other  things 
about  Speusippus‟  god  and  theology  that  will  help  explain  the  relationship  of  the 
active principle to the material. We know that he understood the image of creation in 
the Timaeus to be no more than a teaching aid
400. Any talk of temporal creation was 
for  explanatory  purposes  only  and  not  to  be  taken  as  indicative  of  Plato‟s  real 
meaning. We saw in the second chapter how such a reading of the Timaeus leads to 
a conflation of the demiurge and world-soul, and so such a conclusion is likely to 
have been reached by Speusippus. We also know that he called the world-soul: “the 
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form  of  the  omni-dimensionally  extended
401”  (idea  tou  pantēi  diastatou)  and  the 
omni-dimensionally extended is an imitation, ultimately, of ideal number. 
 
Mathematics,  previously  the  tool  for  the  philosopher  to  get  to  something  else, 
became,  in  Speusippus‟  philosophy,  all  pervading.  The  conclusions  reached  by 
Speusippus in regard to the matter of the sensible world will be seen to be largely 
the same as those reached by Plato; but we can see that he has approached the 
subject from a very different direction. Speusippus‟ emphasis on mathematics has 
maintained the separate nature of the paradigms from the sensible world as object 
of creation. In terms of active principle and middle principles Speusippus has not 
moved  Platonism  any  closer  to  the  Stoic  position,  but  with  his  interest  in,  and 
emphasis on, mathematics as an end in itself this is not surprising. So far the only 
possible  relationship  that  could  exist  between  Speusippus  and  Stoicism  is  in  the 
person of the world-soul, which he has not moved any further away from a Stoic 
position at least; and the material principle of the sensible world, but we will have to 
wait until the next section for an explanation of both and the relationship they have 
to each other.  
 
Xenocrates‟  enterprise  seems  to  have  been  almost  entirely  different  from  that  of 
Speusippus‟. While Speusippus was multiplying entities and maintaining a rigid and 
formalised hierarchy of being, Xenocrates was doing what he could to reduce the 
clutter of Platonic hypostatisation. The way in which he attempted to do this drew as 
much criticism from Aristotle as Speusippus‟ increased elaboration did
402.  
 
Xenocrates‟ “middle level of reality” consists of, as we would expect, the world-soul 
and number: the same as his predecessors. Just as Plato was identifying forms with 
numbers and Speusippus was replacing forms with numbers so too did Xenocrates 
follow this tradition. In a sense Xenocrates can be seen as close to Plato on this 
issue: 
 
He holds that the Forms and numbers have the same nature and 
that other things – lines and planes – are dependent upon them; 
                                                 
401 Iamblichus De Anima (ap. Stob. Ecl I 363, 26-364, 7 Wachs. = Fr. 40 Lang/Fr. 54 Tarán/Fr. 96 IP)  
402 E.g. Metaph. 1080b21 (Fr. 34H/Fr. 108IP).  159  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
and so on down to the substance of the heavens and the sensible 
realm
403.  
 
However while I have interpreted Plato as identifying different forms at different 
levels of reality Xenocrates identified forms with mathematical number and placed 
them unambiguously in the world-soul. Mathematical numbers are not single things 
and so neither Plato nor Speusippus saw them as adequate candidates for knowledge 
of the sort that is the object of the Philosopher‟s search. The passage also tells us 
that numbers, whatever their state, are still the cause of the sensible world. Lines 
and  planes  are  indeed  ultimately  dependent  on  number  and  form  in  Plato,  why 
should they not be so in Xenocrates? Everything is dependent on number down to 
the very bottom of the sensible realm, so far nothing strange at all. But while Plato 
has  a  more  rigid  structure  of  the  formal  numbers,  mathematical  numbers  and 
geometric numbers, Xenocrates appears to be classing all these under the general 
term “number”. According to Aristotle this results in the absurdity that either formal 
number is done away with or mathematical number is done away with since they 
cannot  exist  together.  According  to  Aristotle  Xenocrates  is  trying  to  treat  formal 
number as though it were mathematical number by saying that the form of Two can 
be added to the form of Three to make the form of Five: 
 
Others  [sc.  Xenocrates],  wishing  to  preserve  both  Forms  and 
numbers, but not seeing how, if one posits these [sc. The Monad 
and the Dyad] as first principles, mathematical number can exist 
beside  form-number, identified  form-number  with  mathematical 
number  –  but  only  in  theory,  since  in  practice  mathematical 
number is done away with, because the hypotheses which they 
propound  are  of  a  peculiar  nature  and  not  mathematical
404. 
(Trans. Dillon)   
 
In fact what Xenocrates is doing is trying to remove the charges of absurdity that 
Aristotle  levelled  against  Speusippus  whom  he  thought  was  needlessly  and 
unhelpfully multiplying levels of reality by having analogous principles at every  level 
of reality. For Xenocrates the tetraktys will function as the foundation for numbers in 
their  two  guises,  that  of  the  mathematical  and  the  geometrical.  According  to 
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Aristotle this results in the absurdity that Xenocrates says formal numbers can be 
added, though Dillon has defended Xenocrates on this point
405.  
 
Favonius Eulogius, basing himself on the polymath Varro, asserts that all is number 
for Xenocrates: “Number is intellect and god; for there is nothing else but what is 
subject to number.
406” We saw above, in the discussion of the formal levels, that 
Xenocrates called the Monad: “odd”, a characteristic of number. However the One 
that is the active principle for Xenocrates is more properly understood as a principle 
of number rather than as number in general. Instead the idea of number in general 
is found in the world-soul: 
 
The  former  [sc.  Xenocrates  and  his  followers]  believe  that 
nothing but the generation of number is signified by the mixture 
of the indivisible and divisible being, the One being indivisible and 
Multiplicity  divisible,  and  Number  being  the  product  of  these 
when  the  One  bounds  Multiplicity  and  imposes  limit  upon 
unlimitedness,  which  they  also  term  the  Indefinite  Dyad
407. 
(Trans. Dillon) 
 
Xenocrates  “and  his  followers”  thought  of  the  world-soul  as  nothing  other  than: 
“number moving itself.
408” The passage of the  Timaeus
409 explaining the creation of 
the world-soul was interpreted by Xenocrates in the following way: the indivisible 
being was the One and the being which is divided about bodies  is the Dyad. The 
third  form  of  being  is  that  which  comes  out  from  these:  the  sum  total  of  form 
numbers
410: The forms are not only reduced to mathematical principles but are also 
the  content  of  the  world -soul.  The  matter  of  the  world -soul‟s  thought  is 
characterised as the dyad: the female principle of fragment 15. But this dyad is only 
indefinite in potential; it is in reality the “fountain of all number”, i.e. the tetraktys. 
The creation is only a story; the mathematical numbers are from those constituting 
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the  tetraktys  which  contain  the  decad  and  hence  all  later  numbers
411. While for 
Speusippus mathematicals were collections of monads classed under resemblance to 
the formal 3 or 6 etc. the same cannot be the case for Xenocrates. Instead it seems 
most  likely  tha t  they  are  still  monads but  that  the  classes  that  they  form  are 
somehow supposed to be permanent: so that a collection of 3 monads is 3 but 
added to a collection of 4 monads we have the number 7 since there are 7 monads 
but there are also all the possible ways of reaching the number 7 subsumed in that.  
 
The world-soul in the Timaeus spends its time understanding the relationship of the 
world to the forms. In Xenocrates‟ system it is well placed to do this as the numbers 
which constitute its nature are the forms and are directly influencing the structure of 
the sensible world. 
 
The picture that we have here resembles quite closely the idealism that we saw in 
the  Stoic  theory.  While  there  is  still  a  significant  difference  between  the  sensible 
world  and  that  which  it  is  modelled  on  the  gap  has  been  significantly  reduced. 
Xenocrates is, after all, still a Platonist and so it is no surprise that immanent forms 
were anathema to him, unlike for the Stoics.  
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3.3.3 The Sensible Level: 
 
In  all  the  Platonic  systems  that  have  been  looked  at  we  have  seen  the  common 
theme of at least a one stage removal of the sensible world from the formal and 
mathematical realms. However in the last, Xenocrates‟, system the gap had closed 
to such an extent that forms were in the mind of god qua world-soul and identical 
with  mathematical  number.  In  their  treatments  of  the  material  principle  of  the 
sensible world all three philosophers become much closer than their active principles 
made them appear. The cause of the corporeal nature was for Plato accidental but 
necessary; a by-product of the realisation of the elemental figures in the geometrical 
matrix of the sensible world. That the sensible world is sensible is necessary; and 
given that it exists as sensible and that Plato was disturbed by the changeability of 
the sensible it would be peculiar, to say the least, if he had a system whereby it was 
optional for his demiurge to make the sensible world sensible or not: if he had a 
choice  then  there  could  be  no  reason  for  a  Platonist  to  make  the  sensible  world 
sensible; there must be something necessary about it. It was this consideration that 
led to the conclusion that Plato‟s physics must be thought about from both a top 
down and bottom up approach. With both the sensible world necessary, since we 
experience it, and the formal world necessary, for we must have knowledge. There 
has to be an explanation that will meet in the middle: hence Plato‟s ultimate appeal 
to number as the mechanism by which both can be linked.  
 
Speusippus, like Plato, has a material principle at each level but it is the material 
principle that is responsible for the sensible nature of the sensible world that is our 
main focus. We saw that Speusippus has a principle at each level and that there are 
three levels involving mathematics with each level‟s matter being analogous to the 
previous level‟s. The lowest of these levels is geometrical number.  
 
It is this level which is responsible for the sensible nature of the world – just as it 
was for Plato. Each level of material is analogous but becomes further removed its 
predecessors the more we move away from the first One.   
 
When the sensible world is discussed ambiguity creeps in. Aristotle‟s report gives us 
a brief account of Speusippus‟ physics: 
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These  thinkers,  then,  generate  magnitudes  from  this  kind  of 
matter, but others [Speusippus] from the point – they regard the 
point as being, not one, but like the one – and another material 
principle which is like Multiplicity, but not Multiplicity; yet in the 
case  of  these  principles  nonetheless  we  get  into  the  same 
difficulties. For if the matter is one, then line, plane, and solid will 
be the same; because the product of the same elements must be 
one and the same
412. (Trans. Dillon) 
 
Point is indeed “like one” but not One. It is not a causative active principle like Ones 
at  other  levels.  Nor  is  the  Multiplicity3  strictly  like  the  Multiplicity  which  exists as 
matter at other levels. The highest Multiplicity was characterised by Iamblichus as a 
“pliable and fluid matter
413”. The language used here should not be taken to indicate 
that  Speusippus  is  thinking  of  a  corporeal  material  principle  in  the  way  that  the 
Stoics or even Aristotle do. Instead the characterisation used by Iamblichus is only 
indicative  of  the  Multiplicity‟s  characterlessness  just  as  the  Gold  Analogy  of  the 
Timaeus is indicative of characterlessness and not of the Receptacle‟s nature as hylē 
in the sense the Stoics understand. In the case of geometrical number the point is 
like the One because it not only has as its cause the number one, it is through a 
knowledge of one that we have knowledge of a point, but it is through the point that 
all the other geometrical figures are made. Just as mathematical number is made of 
a collection of monads subsumed under the “form” of a greater single number (e.g. 
the 5 itself), so too are geometrical figures made of collections of points subsumed 
under the numbers of the tetraktys – 1 the point, 2 the line, 3 the plane, 4 the solid.    
 
The  system  of  relations  between  the  levels  of  reality  seems  to  work  along  the 
following lines: the basic Multiplicity opposed to the One is bound by the One. The 
result  is  a  new  Multiplicity1,  a  by-product  of  creation;  that  is,  a  sort  of  definite 
Multiplicity  in  that  it  is  not  as  characterless  as  the  previous  Multiplicity.  This 
Multiplicity1 is the matter bound into the decad, which was the object of the creation 
of the first One on the first Multiplicity. The Multiplicity2 which is created, again as a 
by-product, is once again a more definite type of Multiplicity. This is bound by formal 
number which was the object of creation of the previous level. This mathematical 
number  which  is  constantly  bound  in  imitation  of  the  formal  number  which  is 
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constituted of the decad. This multiplicity2 is quite definite: it is an infinite number of 
monads. These are bound in resemblance to the level above: the formal numbers. 
The by product of this is the geometrical level: a collection of geometrical points. 
These  geometrical  points  are  collected  under  the  image  of  the  mathematical 
numbers  which  were  the  object  of  creation  at  the  level  above.  The  geometrical 
points‟ being bound creates lines, then planes and finally solids. The sensible world 
is then created by the bounding of “physical points” in imitation of the geometrical 
level.   
 
The  Platonic  join-the-dots  made  up  of  geometrical  points  has  been  repeated  by 
Speusippus. By calling the world-soul the “form of the omni-dimensionally extended” 
he  has  reiterated  the  structure.  The  world-soul  is  constituted  by  the  formal 
understanding of the geometrical nature of the world. In Speusippus‟ system, as in 
Plato‟s,  the  world-soul  acts  as  the  intermediary  between  the  highest  level  of 
knowledge  and  the  sensible  world‟s  instantiation  of,  or  resemblance  to,  those 
paradigms. It is well placed to do this as we have seen Speusippus‟ characterisation 
of it as the “form of the omni-dimensionally extended”. It is clearly the principle that 
controls  the  ordering  of  the  geometrical  points.  At  the  higher  levels  the  material 
principle has been limited by a limiting principle identified as the One. This relates to 
what  was  found  in  the  Philebus  about  the  indefinite  being  limited  according  to 
mathematical principles
414.  
 
These were understood as mathematical tools – doubling, adding, etc. – while here 
they  are  more  simply  called  the  One  which  by  its  definiteness  limits  the 
indefiniteness of the number series. The point in the geometrical level can thus be 
thought  of  as  being  part  of  the  matter  of  the  sensible  world  while  also  being 
analogous to the Ones at the higher levels. From this we can see that the “matter” 
of the sensible world is not  really a “fluid and pliable matter” in the sense  of an 
amorphous body like wax, but, as it was for Plato, a system based on principles of 
mathematics.  It  is  “fluid  and  pliable”  in  the  sense  that  it  is  made  of  geometrical 
points which can have any arrangement whatsoever. What makes the sensible world 
sensible  is  the  instantiation  of  the  dimensions  that  make  up  the  thoughts  of  the 
world-soul. These thoughts are what arrange the pre-existing geometrical points into 
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some sort of order. In theory the basic elemental shapes are reducible to planes and 
thence lines and finally to points, but doubtless such an event could not take place.  
 
Xenocrates  also  utilised  the  idea  of  the  sensible  world  consisting  of  geometrical 
points  arranged  in  the  semblance  of  the  world-soul‟s  thoughts.  It  is  through  the 
mathematical considerations of Xenocrates that I think the strongest connections of 
the Old Academy (and so Plato) with the Early Stoa can be seen. In particular the 
considerations  that  led  Xenocrates  to  posit  minimal  lines,  a  consideration  which 
Chrysippus will be seen to build on.  
 
The cause of the sensible world‟s sensible nature will be seen to be largely the same 
for Xenocrates as it was for Plato and Speusippus. Xenocrates does not separate out 
the different levels of reality in the same way as Plato and Speusippus. Rather than 
have the One existing completely separately and apart from the sensible world he 
has  his One  identified  with  god  and  with  the  world-soul  and  so  immanent  in  the 
world  from  the  start.  The  material  principle  for  this  One,  which  for  Plato  and 
Speusippus was more important and “pure” than that of the sensible world which 
exists as a pale imitation of it, becomes instead the material principle of the sensible 
world. Xenocrates is moving closer to the Stoic position by reducing the levels of 
complexity. However he clearly failed to move as far to the Stoic position as Zeno 
would have liked: he was, after all, criticised by Zeno for having an immanent god 
who is located at the heavens but one that remains immaterial
415. God is still, for 
Xenocrates, a mathematical principle and not a corporeal entity.  
 
Xenocrates‟ mythological account involves, as we saw above, the reduction of the 
forms  and  ideal  numbers  to  mathematical  number.  Since  all  forms  and  numbers 
exist at this level then there need be only one cause. Let us look once again at what 
we are told by Aetius: 
 
Xenocrates, son of Agathenor, of Chalcedon, [holds] as gods the 
Monad  and  the  Dyad,  the  former  as  male,  having  the  role  of 
father,  reigning  in  the  heavens,  which  he  terms  “Zeus”  and 
“odd”  and  “intellect”,  which  is  for  him  the  primary  god;  the 
other as female, in the manner of the Mother of the Gods, ruling 
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over the realm below the heavens, who is for him the Soul of 
the Universe
416. (Trans. Dillon) 
 
Dillon is surely right in his analysis when he says that a step is here missing and that 
it is not the Mother of the Gods which is the world -soul but rather that this role is 
taken over by another deity
417. The Mother  of the Gods would be the material 
principle  for  both  the  world -soul  and  the  world  itself.  Since  there  is  only 
mathematical number which acts as the nature of the forms then this becomes a 
plausible solution. The forms become formulae made of the ten basic numbers, 
which do not exist separately from the rest. The Mother o f the Gods is clearly the 
antithesis of the One and so must be the Indefinite Dyad. In one way its interaction 
with the One leaves us with the content of the world -soul: the world-soul being 
nothing other than the sum of its, immaterial, thought
418; in another it leaves us 
with the sensible world.  
 
The passive principle of Xenocrates is called, according to Plutarch, by many names: 
Multiplicity,  Unlimitedness,  and  Indefinite  Dyad
419. These we have seen used by 
Plato and Speusippus already but Xenocrates‟ own personal term for it appears to 
have been “the Everflowing
420”. Dillon
421 sees this, and I see no reason to disagree, 
as reminiscent of the Pythagoreans and so also as indicative of the tetraktys – hence 
the reference to it as the fountain of number. Dillon
422 concludes that the numbers in 
the tetraktys are the thoughts of god: but not god qua world-soul. Instead he sees 
them as constituting the thoughts of god qua Monad. If Dillon is correct then the 
Monad  is  limiting  matter  according  to  itself  and  creating  from  this  limiting  the 
tetraktys. The limiting is achieved by the instantiation of the Monad‟s “thought” in 
the  female  principle:  the  unlimited  becomes  limited  but  being  the  tetraktys  it 
remains potentially unlimited.   
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The  tetraktys  is,  as  Dillon  points  out,  the  symbolisation  of  “the  totality  of 
number
423”. The totality of mathematical number is indefinite.  
 
Others  [sc.  Xenocrates],  wishing  to  preserve  both  Forms  and 
numbers, but not seeing how, if one posits these [sc. The Monad 
and the Dyad] as first principles, mathematical number can exist 
beside  form-number, identified  form-number  with  mathematical 
number  –  but  only  in  theory,  since  in  practice  mathematical 
number is done away with, because the hypotheses which they 
propound  are  of  a  peculiar  nature  and  not  mathematical
424. 
(Trans. Dillon)  
 
Since, as with Speusippus, any creation is allegorical there was never a time when 
the  indefinite  totality  of  number  had  to  be  limited  by  the  Monad.  The  material 
principle  becomes  the  tetraktys  by  being  limited:  the  tetraktys  can  be  called  the 
Indefinite or Indeterminate since it is the source of all numbers as it contains in itself 
the decad
425; it is the potential cause of the unlimited. In this guise it can perform its 
two roles: as source of the forms for the world -soul,  and as the source of the 
corporeal nature of the sensible world.  
 
The mechanism of how the  tetraktys can function as the material for the sensible 
world will be by now familiar. As the principle of the point is one so the principle for 
the line is two, for the plane three and the solid four. These will then be arranged in 
imitation of the other “offspring” the forms as mathematical formulae. The system of 
Xenocrates is not only simpler, reducing the number of levels of reality, but akin to 
his predecessors. He  maintains the dualistic structure of creation. In this way his 
creation account of the sensible world resembles the dualistic base the Stoics have. 
There is only one active principle for Xenocrates and that is his Monad. This Monad 
acts on the one material principle: the female principle. In one way it creates the 
forms/mathematical numbers but in the other it creates the sensible world. The role 
of the world-soul and its thoughts – the forms – is thus to act as a link between the 
active “pure” aspect of the world and the passive, sensible, aspect of the world. The 
world  soul  is  that  which  makes  the  whole  system  rational.  By  reducing  the 
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complexity  of  the  Platonic  system  Xenocrates  has  explained  the  necessity  of  the 
sensible world and kept the forms immanent but incorporeal. 
  
While Xenocrates‟ predecessors seemed to have pictured the sensible world as being 
constructed by a three-dimensional-join-the-dots Xenocrates did not in exactly the 
same way. He posited, to Aristotle‟s amusement, a theory of minimal lines
426. It is 
this theory of minimal lines that will form an important link to the Stoics in the way 
in which matter is supposed to exist. Xenocrates seems to have been concerned with 
the issue of how extension is supposed to be created from extensionle ss points. A 
collection of 0s is still 0. This consideration is most likely what led him to posit 
minimal  lines.  In  a  sense  Xenocrates‟  concern  is  reasonable.  Trying  to  build 
something up out of nothing is a trial doomed to failure. But do as the Stoics do and 
do not build up from nothing but try to reduce down to nothing and we can see that 
Xenocrates may have been unwise, though not unreasonable, to posit such a theory. 
Each geometrical point can be divided, but since it is extensionless each is still one, 
just  as  each  ½  or  1/3  is  still  a  monad  at  the  mathematical  level.  It  is  because 
Xenocrates is building up the sensible world that he is appealing to indivisible lines. 
Each indivisible line in theory would still have to be reducible to points, since that is 
what it is to be a line: the connection between two points.   
 
Xenocrates is not afraid to build on the atomistic implications of the Timaeus. This 
attitude has another interesting effect for the theory of the material principle of the 
sensible world. Plato‟s main concern with the sensible world is not that it is bad in 
itself but rather that it is inconsistent even with itself: what is true at one point is 
not true at another and this sort of “truth” is of no use at all. The consideration that 
the world was in flux is something that Aristotle tells us that Plato believed from his 
youth right through to his old age
427. The idea that the sensible world‟s imperfection 
is in its inconstancy is far preferable to the idea that Plato simply had no time for it. 
Xenocrates  makes  great  use  of  the  idea  that  the  sensible  world  is  in  flux  in  his 
explanation of harmony as Dillon makes clear:  
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In explaining the Pythagorean doctrine of harmonics, Xenocrates 
sets out, first, an analysis of types of motion, and then, when he 
has identified sound as a species of motion in a straight line, he 
presents it as consisting in fact of a sequence of sound-atoms, 
each occurring at a given instant, but giving the impression of a 
continuous  flow.  To  illustrate  this  conception,  he  offers  the 
interesting analogy of a spinning top with a single white or black 
spot  on  its  surface,  which,  as  the  top  spins,  appears  as  a 
continuous line
428.  
   
This is taken by Dillon as indicative of a wider theory of perception and in this he is 
no doubt correct. But for our purpose it potentially shows how the world made of 
collections of geometrical points can be a three-dimensional reality. The spinning top 
must spin if the points are to be a continuous line. Likewise the sensible world must 
be in continuous flux if the minimal lines are not to “breakdown” to their constituent 
geometrical points: this would result in the collapse of the sensible world. In order to 
be  knowable  in  the  minimal  way  in  which  it  is  the  sensible  world  must  be  in 
continuous motion by necessity, which ironically also stops it being knowable in a full 
sense.  
 
The sensible world for Xenocrates can still be seen as an image of a separate and 
incorporeal paradigm since it is rendered rational by being understood through the 
forms: the thoughts of the world soul. But this paradigm has become much closer to 
the material of the sensible world than it was in either Plato or Speusippus. However 
Xenocrates did not make the final leap to a corporeal cause such as the Stoics did. 
His material principle became a single thing responsible for two aspects of reality; 
the first time that such a complex theory had been put forward. It may appear as 
though Xenocrates‟ conception of the material of the sensible world is at odds with 
that  of  the  Stoics.  Xenocrates‟  material  principle  for  the  sensible  world  is  a 
mathematical and atomic structure as opposed to a continuum of three-dimensional 
extension  with  resistance.  Indeed  on  the  surface  the  difference  is  striking,  his 
material principle is after all still incorporeal, but the implications of the Xenocratean 
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theory  are  in  fact  much  closer  and  he  gave  to  the  Stoics  the  way  in  which  their 
material principle exists.  
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3.4 The Stoics: 
 
Xenocrates is the last of the heads of the Old Academy to have had a major interest 
in physics and the first to have made such great innovations in this sphere. Since it 
is his, and not Polemo‟s, physics that have survived in greater detail we cannot know 
the extent of Polemo‟s interest in physics. Indeed the lack of reportage on Polemo‟s 
physics suggests that he was not particularly interested in physics. He was also said 
to  have  been  a  great  admirer  of  Xenocrates  and  as  we  have  seen  Xenocrates‟ 
physics did not leave much for Polemo to do before Zeno.  
 
It appears, if we take Diogenes Laertius‟ account seriously, that by Xenocrates‟ time 
as head of the Academy mathematics, and  proficiency  therein, would be a major 
part of what those entering would be expected to know and continue to study
429. It 
is  extremely  likely  then  that  Zeno  wo uld  have  been  proficient  in  mathematics, 
especially since he was supposedly a merchant before he became a philosopher
430. 
As a result of this background it is likely that the intense mathematical rigour of the 
Old Academy influenced and permeated the Stoa. Indeed Chrysippus is credited with 
various mathematical solutions to problems and it is to these that I will turn to 
demonstrate  how  mathematical  considerations  can  be  used  to  chart  the 
understanding of the Stoic passive principle.  
 
According to Plutarch Chrysippus had an answer to the Cone Paradox of Democritus:  
 
Again,  look  how  he  countered  Democritus,  who  in  the  vivid 
manner of a natural philosopher raised the following puzzle. If a 
cone were cut along a plane parallel to its base, what should we 
hold the surfaces of the segments to be, equal or unequal? For if 
they are unequal they will make the cone uneven, with many 
step-like indentations and rough edges. But if they are equal, the 
segments will be equal and the cone will turn out to have the 
properties of a cylinder, through consisting of equal, not unequal, 
circles,  which  is  quite  absurd.  Well  here  Chrysippus  declares 
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Democritus to be ignorant and says that the surfaces are neither 
equal nor unequal, while the bodies, thanks to the surfaces‟ being 
neither equal nor unequal, are unequal
431. (Trans. L&S)  
 
Obviously  Plutarch  does  not  think  much  of  Chrysippus‟  response  but  it  is  in  fact 
remarkably  ingenious.  Chrysippus  makes  use  of  the  idea  of  convergence  on  the 
infinite and the notion that limits, being only “sayables” and not real things
432, can 
have  contradictory  properties.  While  Xenocrates  posited  minimal  lines  these  each 
had  a  definite,  though  no  doubt  unknown,  minimal  length.  Chrysippus,  as 
Sambursky  points  out
433, has gone beyond this and posited a vari able  “atomic” 
length. In essence he created an “atomic continuum”.  
 
In his reply to the Cone Paradox Chrysippus says that the body will be unequal. This 
expresses  again  the  convergence  principle  since  the  body,  although  bound  by  its 
limit, is not itself coterminous with those limits:  
 
Let  A1<A2<A3  be  the  surfaces  of  three  adjacent  sections. 
Chrysippus‟ assertion is that the volume defined by the surfaces 
A1 and A2 is not equal to that defined by A2 and A3, in spite of 
the relations lim (A3 – A2) = 0 and lim (A2 – A1) = 0
434.  
 
Discussion of limits is one thing, they do not properly exist. But matter clearly does. 
However if the same considerations that led Xenocrates to  posit minimal lines, that 
the sensible world cannot be built up from nothing, apply to the Stoics then perhaps 
we can use the concept of convergence on the infinite in this way too.  
 
Man  does  not  consist  of  more  parts  than  his  finger,  nor  the 
cosmos of more parts than man. For the division of bodies goes 
on infinitely, and among the infinitie s there is no greater and 
smaller
435. (Trans. L&S) 
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The division of bodies goes on infinitely. It seems that Plutarch is ascribing to the 
Stoics the idea of a convergence on the infinite in terms of spatial extension which 
applies to sensible bodies and not just in terms of geometrical figures. Chrysippus is 
reported  to  have  drawn  a  distinction  between  vague  and  definite  answers  to  the 
question of how many parts a man consists. If someone asks how many parts a man 
consists of we can give two answers: 
  
1)  We can give the general reply that man consists of a head, trunk, two arms 
and  two  legs:  “head,  trunk  and  limbs  –  for  that  was  all  the  question 
amounted to
436”.  
 
2)  If the questioner demands a more specific answer and wants to know about 
the ultimate parts then we should: “not, he says, in reply concede any such 
things, but must say neither of what parts we consist, nor, likewise, of how 
many, either infinite or finite. I have, I think, quoted his actual words.
437” 
 
There  can  be  no  answer  to  the  second  question  because  there  are  no  actual 
“ultimate  parts”  if  we  continue  to  divide  we  will  never  stop.  As  the  quote  above 
shows: there is just as much “stuff”, or matter, in a human finger as there is in the 
cosmos as a whole: because the quest to reach a definite number in either case will 
be an infinite one.  
 
The  cutting  of  a  geometrical  cone  and  a  body  may  appear  different  but  the 
considerations that apply are the same. If the limits on the cones are expressible as 
converging  on  the  infinite  so  this  must  be  logically  consistent  as  mathematical 
considerations are essentially based on solely logical concerns. But is the division of 
a sensible body the same as the division of a geometrical body? Since the Stoics are 
continuum theorists then the division is in essence the same. Neither can actually be 
divided to an end since both consist of infinite parts. These considerations explain 
the way in which apoios ousia is supposed to be understood in only one sense. In 
the most simplistic sense it is three-dimensional extension with resistance; a lump of 
malleable plastic as we saw Speusippus‟ Multiplicity characterised by Iamblichus. But 
this explains only one aspect of apoios ousia: its characterless quality. Mathematical 
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considerations explain how, in the manner of Plato
438 and Speusippus, it  is three-
dimensional. Mathematics also explains in what sense it is a continuum and brings a 
new facet to the understanding of total blending, which we saw in the first chapter 
only applies to god and apoios ousia.  
 
These considerations apply to body in general; god, apoios ousia and the synthesis 
of  the  two.  But  the  truths  that  mathematics,  and  these  concerns  in  particular, 
demonstrate will apply to apoios ousia primarily: for if it applies to the others it does 
so only because they are body; and apoios ousia is body par excellence. It will be 
remembered  from  the  first  chapter  that  the  active  principle  is  body  in  a  rational 
disposition: a single thing. Apoios ousia is body not disposed in any particular way. 
If  the  synthesis  of  the  active  and  passive  is  understandable  likewise  as  infinitely 
divisible then it is so only because it is apoios ousia disposed by the active principle, 
and not because of something extra.  
 
Following the tradition of his predecessors at the Academy Zeno is said to have had 
at  least  enough  interest  in  the  Pythagoreans  to  have  written  a  book  entitled  On 
Pythagorean  Questions
439.  According  to  Long  and  Sedley
440  by the Hellenistic age 
mathematics and philosophy had become separate disciplines and mathematics no 
longer served as  a paradigm case for the philosopher. While it is true to say that 
mathematics as it has appeared in this part of the present chapter was no longer a 
paradigmatic discipline for the Stoics it is also true to say that it still served an 
important purpose.  
 
In his paper “The harmonics of Stoic virtue” Long shows that, in fact, the Stoics had 
a place for aspects of mathematics in directing the “good life”. The Stoic universe is 
held  together  in  perfect  proportion  with  all  its  parts  being  in  sympathy  with  one 
another – it is a perfect harmony. This situation can only really be best understood in 
terms of mathematics since harmonics is and was a branch of mathematics. Uttered 
language  is  for  the  Stoics  “the  natural  expression  of  reason
441”.  The  Philebus 
connected language and music and subsumed both under mathematics as the way to 
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understand them. It seems plausible that the Stoics would follow this mindset and 
relate  music  to  language  and  if  music  is  part  of  harmonics  and  harmonics  of 
mathematics  then  the  connection  between  language  and  mathematics,  although 
convoluted, is clear. 
 
Long cites the interest the Stoics had in Heraclitus and his interest in conceiving of 
the world as held together in some sort of ratio or proportion. We know also that 
Heraclitus  was  not  too  impressed  with  Pythagoras  and  saw  him  as  someone  with 
much learning but not much use
442. It is possible that he had the same frustration 
with the Pythagoreans as Plato did: That they had a great system but failed to see to 
just what use it could be put. It is likely that the idea of cosmic harmony was taken 
from the Academy by the early Stoics and further justified by relating it to the great 
sage Heraclitus.  
 
The best way to emphasise the interest of the Stoics in mathematics and hence a 
connection to the physics of the Old Academy would be to look for a role for the 
tetraktys in Stoicism. The tetraktys, we have seen, has played a very strong role in 
the philosophies of all three of the Platonists discussed, going so far as to  be the 
theoretical principle of the sensible world; a theory which must have been of interest 
to  the  Stoics.  However  they  seem  to  have  had  little,  if  indeed  anything,  to  say 
expressly about the tetraktys qua tetraktys. Given the removal of mathematics from 
its privileged position over the sensible world that is not surprising. The first chapter 
showed that the forms of the Platonists had been reduced to the thoughts of the 
active principle instantiated through apoios ousia, in a manner reminiscent of the aim 
of Xenocrates, but not eliminated. That we are all subsumed under the “idea” of man 
means no more than that we are many varieties of a species, instantiated by god as 
he thinks of us. So there is man, and here is man and all over the place is man, but 
there is no “man” over and above all the instantiations. This is something that should 
not be possible for a form proper but looks like a criticism that Aristotle would lay 
against Xenocrates‟ identification of the forms with mathematical number. With the 
reduction to immanence of both number and form, when form is just apoios ousia 
held together according to a ratio dictated by harmony according to god in his infinite 
wisdom, the Stoics need no longer give the tetraktys such a privileged position. If 
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Xenocrates began the reduction of ontological levels the Stoics finished it. The result 
of this is, as we have seen in the first chapter, a type of material Idealism.    
 
However  old  habits are  difficult  to  break  and  if we  look  hard  enough  we  can  see 
some remnants of the importance of the mystical tetraktys. There are four cardinal 
passions: pleasure, distress, appetite and fear. These four passions were referred to 
by Aristo, an associate of Zeno‟s, as the “Tetrachord
443”. This is a musical term which 
expresses  a  concept  central  to  all  Greek  music,  which  again  reinforces  the 
mathematical heritage of the Stoics. The virtuous man contains all the virtues - again 
four  in  number:  prudence,  moderation,  courage  and  justness.  The  standard 
description of this state of affairs in Stoicism is to say: “they contain all the numbers 
of virtue
444”. That sounds quite Pythagorean, especially when we recall that 4 is the 
number of justice
445, and that 10 is the number of the whole and complete
446. The 
sum of the tetraktys is 10 and the reference could be to something so oblique as that 
the virtuous man has the sum of the tetraktys in proportion and so can be called the 
decad  owing  to  his  completeness.  This  is  pure  speculation  but  has  an  air  of 
plausibility to it. This is a little more  esoteric than Long‟s suggestion that “all the 
numbers”  simply  somehow  represents  the  four  cardinal  virtues  and  their  subsets 
which  gives  rise  to  a  definite  number,  but  is  not  unreasonable  for  all  that.  The 
cardinal  virtues,  and  passions,  can  only  be,  since  they  must  be  bodies,  different 
tensions  in  the  pneuma  and  this  can  readily  be  understood  as  harmonies  lending 
more  credence  to  a  mathematical  interpretation.  We  also  find  in  Stoicism  four 
“categories”, perhaps another reminder of the Stoics‟ Platonic heritage
447. 
 
The Stoics had an interest in mathematics. It was not the same intense insistence on 
its  ability  to  explain  everything  in  the  world  that  the  Old  Academy  had  but  had 
reverted back to being a tool. In relation to apoios ousia it helps us understand how 
such  a  passive  three-dimensional  body  works  and  exists.  Unformed  substance  it 
indeed is, but it is also the material which is a necessary condition for the existence 
of the sensible world. The active principle needs something to act on and its relation 
to the passive is best explained through mathematics and the method of Xenocrates 
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elaborated  by  Chrysippus  into  a  theory  of  a  substance  whose  parts  are  always 
converging on the infinite.  
 
The theory of convergence on the infinite also helps explain the mechanisms of the 
Stoic theory of total blending which was seen to only apply to god and the passive 
principle.  In  the  constant  division  of  parts  the  isolation  of  the  ingredients  would 
become  impossible,  which  given  that  one  of  these  ingredients  is  devoid  of  all 
qualities is what we should expect. We saw also in the first chapter how the Stoics 
used  a  geometrical  understanding  of  body  to  characterise  their  apoios  ousia,  it 
follows that the best way to understand it would be through geometrical language: 
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3.5 Polemo: 
 
I have left the discussion of Polemo to the end of this chapter because, although he 
was Zeno‟s teacher at the Academy, I have argued that it was from Xenocrates that 
the  real  influence  on  Stoic  physics  came.  After  all  it  is  claimed  by  Aetius  that 
Xenocrates passed at least the characterisation of elements as god to the Stoics
448 
so they were likely aware of his metaphysics and so also of his physics. Dillon has 
spent considerable time reconstructing Xenocrates‟ physics from his fragments and 
the  contemporary  accounts  of  Aristotle.  I  too  have  attempted  a  brief  account  of 
Xenocrates‟ physics as it relates to the subject of this thesis. Such enterprises are 
possible because we have at least some evidence for what Xenocrates thought and 
the environment that his education took place in. Polemo, on the other hand, has 
left us with no evidence either from his own hand or from contemporary accounts. 
His known works do not include anything relating to either mathematics, though he 
must  have  been  proficient  to  have  been  in  the  Academy,  or  physics.  Instead  his 
primary  interest  seems  to  have  been  in  ethics.  There  is  undoubtedly  a  strong 
influence on the Stoics in the field of ethics but it is unwarranted to move from an 
influence in this field to influence in one for which we have no evidence to suggest 
that Polemo was even interested in. Further, given my interpretation of Xenocrates‟ 
physics there would be little left for Polemo to do to close the gap. Indeed if he did 
close the gap at all it can only really be to have created Stoic physics, and if he did 
this as well as influence so strongly Stoic ethics we must ask why the Stoics left so 
sympathetic  an  Academy  or  else  why  Polemo  was  not  forced  out  before  Zeno‟s 
arrival.  
 
Despite  the  lack  of  evidence  both  Sedley
449  and  Dillon
450  have  attempted  to 
reconstruct  Polemo‟s  physics.  The  result  is  a  physics  that  so  strongly  resembles 
Stoicism that there is no way to know which aspects are actually Polemo and which 
are Stoic innovation. Sedley took as the basis of his interpretation the account of 
physics offered by Varro in Cicero‟s Academica I 24-9. On the basis of this Sedley 
argued that the Stoic god could in fact be seen to have his origin in Polemo. Given 
that the only fragment we unambiguously have from Polemo regarding this topic is 
that: “the cosmos is god”, this does not seem unreasonable. However there is no 
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reason  to  suppose  that  Polemo  in  particular  is  the  influence  of  paramount 
importance since the non-literal readings of the Timaeus led both Speusippus and 
Xenocrates to conclude pretty much the same thing. Xenocrates in particular has an 
immanent world-soul which is responsible for the ordering of the sensible world in a 
way that is clearly much closer to the Stoic account than the vague statement that 
the cosmos is god. The only other support I can see for Polemo‟s having regarded 
god as corporeal in particular is that Zeno is said to have criticised Xenocrates for 
having  an  immanent  but  incorporeal  god
451.  If  Polemo  also  had  an  immanent 
incorporeal  god it would make sense for Zeno to criticise him too. But negative 
evidence is not a strong basis to build an argument on.  
 
Instead I will look at the arguments of Dillon and Sedley that lead them to conclude 
that  Polemo‟s  physics  is  essentially  the  same  as  Stoic  physics.  By  showing  that 
although it is a plausible interpretation it is unnecessary I hope to be able to safely 
conclude that Xenocrates is the most important connection for Stoicism to the Old 
Academy and Plato.   
 
Sedley basis part of his reasons for his search of Polemo‟s physics on the words of 
Theophrastus: 
 
But  Theophrastus,  having  first  given  a  historical  account  of  the 
others, adds: “These were followed by Plato, who preceded them 
in reputation and ability, although chronologically he was later. He 
devoted the greater part of his work to first philosophy, but also 
paid attention to appearances, trying his hand at physical inquiry. 
In this inquiry he wants to make the principles two in number: 
one  which  underlies,  in  the  role  of  matter,  which  he  calls  “all 
receiving”,  the  other  in  the  role  of  cause  and  mover,  which  he 
connects  with  the  power  of  god  and  with  that  of  the  good
452. 
(Trans. Sedley)  
 
The interpretation of Plato that I have offered in the first part of this chapter is 
indeed strongly metaphysical and it is through analogy that it relates to physics. But 
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it was supposed that Plato‟s metaphysics and his physics are strongly linked since 
his  metaphysics  is  a  reaction  to  his  concerns  regarding  physical  phenomena. 
Theophrastus  appears  to  be  relying,  in  this  passage,  on  the  Timaeus  for  his 
interpretation  and  also  to  be  accepting  a  non-literal  reading  and  ignoring  the 
implications  of  the  metaphysical  teachings.  It  is  unlikely  that  this  two  principle 
system  of  physics  has  its  origins  in  Polemo  since  Theophrastus  was  roughly 
contemporary with him, a little older, and would not ascribe to Plato the opinions of 
Polemo.  Sedley  is  happy  to  accept  that  Theophrastus  is  offering  a  standard 
Aristotelian interpretation of Platonic physics and that it is based on the Timaeus. 
What bothers him though is the absence of forms. There should be three principles 
in the Platonic system
453. It is also the case that Theophrastus seems to be basing 
his dualistic interpretation on the  Timaeus explicitly and so Sedley thinks that there 
should be some independent justification for the authority of this view
454, i.e. that 
the Old Academy furnished this interpretation. Sedley does not believe that the 
dualistic interpretation resembles either the physics of Speusippus or Xen ocrates 
sufficiently and so it must be based on Polemo.  
 
Sedley  sees  the  account  of  Antiochean  physics  offered  in  Cicero‟s  Academica  as 
representative of physics at the time of Polemo and the direct predecessor of Stoic 
physics with their strong physical dualism. The passage from the Academica runs as 
follows:  
 
The topic of Nature, which they treated next, they approached by 
dividing it into two principles, the one the creative, the other at 
this one‟s disposal, as it were, out of which something might be 
created.  In  the  creative  one  they  deemed  that  there  inhered 
power, in the one acted upon, a sort of “matter”; yet they held 
that  each  of  the  two  inhered  in  the  other,  for  neither  would 
matter have been able to cohere if it were not held together by 
any  power,  nor  yet  would  power  without  some  matter  (for 
nothing exists without it being necessarily somewhere). But that 
which is the product of both they called “body”, and, so to speak, 
a sort of “quality”… 
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But  they  hold  that  underlying  all  things  is  a  substance  called 
“matter”, entirely formless and devoid of all “quality”, and that 
out of it all things have been formed and produced, so that this 
matter can in its totality receive all things and undergo every sort 
of transformation  throughout  every  part  of it,  and in  fact  even 
suffer dissolution – not into nothing, but into its own parts, which 
are  capable  of  infinite  section  and  division,  since  there  exists 
nothing  whatever  in  the  nature  of  things  that  is  an  absolute 
minimum, so as to be  incapable of division; but that all things 
that  are  in  motion  move  by  means  of  “interspaces”,  these 
likewise  being  infinitely  divisible;  and  since  the  force  that  we 
have  called  “quality”  moves  in  this  manner  and  since  it  thus 
travels back and forth, they think that the whole of matter also 
undergoes  complete  change  throughout,  and  that  thus  these 
things are produced which they call qualia – from which latter, in 
a nature which as a whole coheres and forms a continuum with 
itself, there has been produced a single world, outside of which 
there is no portion of matter and no body, while all the things in 
the world are parts of it, held together by a sentient nature, in 
which  inheres  perfect  reason,  and  which  is  also  eternal,  since 
nothing stronger exists to cause it to perish; and this force they 
say is the soul of the world, and it is also perfect intelligence and 
wisdom,  which  they  call  “god”,  and  is  a  sort  of  providence, 
presiding over all the things that fall under its control, governing 
especially the heavenly bodies, and then those things on earth 
that  concern  mankind.  This  force  they  also  sometimes  call 
“necessity”, because nothing can happen otherwise that has been 
ordained  by  it  under,  as  it  were,  a  “fated  and  unchangeable 
concatenation  of  everlasting  order”  –  although  they  sometimes 
also  call  it  “fortune”  because  many  of  its  operations  are 
unforeseen and unexpected by us on account of their obscurity 
and our ignorance of causes
455. (Trans. Dillon. With omissions)   
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As Dillon
456 points out in his treatment of the passage the identification of the active 
principle  with  the  world -soul,  which  resides  in  the  heavens  and  permeates  the 
universe,  is  not  new  in  the  Old  Academy.  Xenocrates‟  world-soul  was  said  to 
permeate the whole universe and in my interpretation was the cause in the sensible 
world. His Monad, moreover, was stated to reside in the heavens. It is clear that this 
way  of  reading  the  Timaeus  preceded  Polemo,  starting  at  least  with  his  teacher 
Xenocrates. This active principle is not, as again Dillon points out, identified with fire 
as it is for the Stoics nor is it corporeal. Sedley‟s main concern is over the strength 
of the fate expounded in the passage. The doctrine is indeed strong here, and Stoic 
sounding.  Dillon  agrees  that  Antiochus  need  not  be  giving  a  pure  account  of 
Polemo‟s physics and can be forgiven for incorporating aspects of Stoicism into it. 
This idea, that Antiochus is not offering us either an account solely of Polemo or the 
Stoics I agree with. On the other hand I agree with it because I think Antiochus is 
doing what he has long been thought to have been doing which is taking aspects of 
Stoicism and mixing them with earlier philosophy
457. My interpretation leads me to 
conclude that he is mixing Stoicism with the views of Xenocrates, not of Polemo. 
Dillon is more   cautious than Sedley and accepts that the doctrine of fate as it 
appears here could be an aspect of Xenocrates‟ philosophy representing not a force 
that is in competition with god but the necessary nature of the Sensible World.  
 
The passage from the  Academica is undoubtedly a fascinating and useful tool for 
understanding the shift occurring in physical philosophy at the time of Antiochus. 
However  there  is  little  reason  to  see  this  passage  as  representing  Polemo  in 
particular, since we know so little of his actual views in this area. If, on the other 
hand, the passage did represent the views of Polemo accurately then we would have 
to ask what work would there have been left for Zeno to do? The answer is not a lot. 
The active principle in the account is not  called fire, but that could be as little a 
difference as a terminological one since the “fire” that is the active principle is for 
the Stoics different from fire as commonly understood. Indeed the fact that the two 
principles  are  said  to  “inhere  in  one  another”  could  be  taken  to  imply  the  Stoic 
theory of total blending which only makes sense, as I argued in the first chapter, if it 
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32, Kramer Platnismus und hellenistische Philosophie, Berlin 1971 11, n. 6.  183  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
applies to the two principles as three-dimensional with extension which is just too 
Stoic  sounding  to  belong  to  any  other  school.  Moreover  the  active  is  said  in  the 
passage to “travel back and forth”. This strongly resembles the motion of the active 
in Stoicism
458. If all of these factors were in fact part of the physics of Polemo and 
since he influenced Stoic ethics so much Zeno wo uld have had nothing to do and 
would have had no reason to call himself other than a Platonist in distinction to the 
sceptics at the Academy. These aspects in the passage that resemble Stoicism so 
much have to be, as a result, Stoicism read with a Platonic  eye. Antiochus is taking 
those aspects of Stoic physics which improve on Xenocrates and blending the two, 
leaving out the potentially difficult aspects such as a fiery nature for god and his 
unambiguous corporeality.   
 
If Polemo is not the final link in  the chain from Plato to the Stoics, since Xenocrates 
is, then what is his role? Rather than as an innovator his lack of interest in physics 
makes it more likely that he influenced Zeno by teaching him the physics of his 
teacher:  Xenocrates.  There  is  no  evi dence,  and  so  no  reason  to  suppose,  that 
Polemo reformed or altered greatly the physics of Xenocrates. He is the only one of 
Zeno‟s teachers likely to have taught him any physics at all
459, and if he was not 
teaching him his own physics then it is only reaso nable to suppose that he taught 
Zeno the physics of Xenocrates whom we are told he greatly admired
460.  
 
We have seen how the Old Academy, and Xenocrates in particular, was responsible 
for the reduction in the number of separate levels of reality. Xenocrates   reduced 
metaphysics to an aspect of the sensible world, with physics being another. His 
considerations of minimal lines also influenced the Stoics in their considerations of 
how  the  material  principle  was  to  be  explained,  though  its  functionality  was 
nevertheless understood more in terms of a lump of plastic than as a mathematical 
entity. The next chapter will look at the pedigree of such a material principle and 
examine the influence of the man whom the Stoics themselves credited with the 
creation of much of their philosophy: Heraclitus the Obscure.  
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Chapter 4:  
 
4.1 Intellectual Climate of the Time.  
 
The first part of this chapter will look at the Stoics‟ claim that their true philosophical 
antecedent  is  not  Plato  or  the  Old  Academy  but  Heraclitus.  This  claim  does  not 
conflict as strongly with the one that I have been making throughout this thesis - 
that  the  origin  of  the  Stoic  material  principle  is  to  be  found  in  the  mathematical 
considerations  of  the  Platonists  -  as  it  may  at  first  appear  to.  There  are  several 
reasons for taking the claim seriously and examining its place in the picture that I 
have been exploring. Firstly it is a claim that the Stoics themselves make and who, if 
not  the  Stoics  themselves,  would  know  why  they  thought  what  they  thought? 
Secondly even if the Stoics misinterpret the teachings of Heraclitus or overstate his 
direct  influence  on  them  he  was  in  fact  influential  on  the  Stoics‟  ultimate 
predecessors: Socrates and Plato, and so could well have an indirect influence on 
them. However, the full relationship of Heraclitus to Socrates and Plato is beyond the 
scope  of  this  thesis.  Finally,  although  the  Stoics  are  most  likely  actually  claiming 
Heraclitus as their own having already formed their philosophical conclusions they do 
not draw unreasonable connections between his and their theories, and so he may 
convincingly be considered to be their spiritual predecessor if not their actual one
461.  
 
The second half will look at the impact of the cultural and biological theories that 
form the background of the intellectual climate that the Stoics were working and 
developing their theories in. The early cosmogonic myths are replete with male and 
female imagery and we will see how the Stoics were not isolated in using such 
imagery to clarify their cosmological theory. The Derveni papyrus and the  Phaedrus 
both  indicate  that  the  interpretation  of  archaic  myth  in  the  language  of  natural 
philosophy was prevalent in intellectual circles. The Stoic notion of the active and 
passive principles is mirrored in both early myth and medical imagery and it is this 
connection  that  will  be  looked  at.  It  is  doubtful  that  any  of  these  background 
considerations  had  a  decisive  influence  on  the  direction  of  thought  of  the  Stoics; 
however it is important to see the use of imagery and general understanding that 
serves to form the background of the intellectual climate of the Hellenistic era.  
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4.1.1 Heraclitus: 
 
Heraclitus‟ place in the history of philosophy is a peculiar one. None of his writings 
survive and there is even some dispute over whether or not there was a single book 
in  the  first  place  for  followers  to  call  on
462.  He  was  also  not  a  teacher  in  the 
conventional sense and does not seem to have had a school or even actively taught 
to a group or individuals. As a result the words of his followers lack the force of those 
who could claim to have been actual disciples of  antiquity‟s great thinkers
463. Owing 
to space and the topic of this thesis I will avoid the complicated discussion over the 
accuracy or authenticity of the fragments that we have of Heraclitus and trust in the 
reportage of Aristotle, Theophrastus and the Church Fathers
464. Before any relation 
to the Stoics will be examined I will take a little time to place Heraclitus in his 
appropriate position in the history of  philosophy before the creation of Stoicism so 
that any appeal to him will have a clearer context.  
 
If we may trust the report of Diogenes Laertius, and there seems to be no special 
reason not to, then we can conclude that everyone‟s sage of choice, Socrates, was 
an admirer of Heraclitus: “What I understand I like, and I think that what I don‟t 
understand is good too, but it would take a Delian diver to get to the bottom of it.
465” 
That Socrates was a fan of the abrasive Heraclitus is easy to believe. Both clearly 
had  a  talent  for,  and  got  enjoyment  from,  cutting  the  pretentious  down  to  size. 
Heraclitus‟ targets were the acknowledged wise men of the day: Hecataeus, Hesiod, 
Pythagoras and Xenophanes
466. Socrates‟ were  those who thought they were  wise 
and wanted to convince others of this fact too. Anyone who valued Socrates‟ opinion, 
which probably includes the entire educated community of the ancient Greek world, 
would have to look at Heraclitus with at least grudging respect. It seems clear that 
Plato too was aware of the philosophy of Heraclitus and made use of it in developing 
his own thoughts: especially in regard to  epistemology but with an impact on his 
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463 Cf. DL IX.6. “So great fame did his book win that a sect was founded and called the Heracliteans, after 
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of the Natural Philosophers.  
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physics
467, and  we  have  also  seen  Xenocrates  making  use  of the ideas  of flux. 
Aristotle states clearly that Plato was not only aware of the teachings of Heraclitus 
but also that he believed them to be true from his youth to his old age
468. The 
doctrine  of  Heraclitus‟  that  Aristotle  is  referring  to  is  indeed  the  most  famous 
Heraclitean one that Plato uses in the Theaetetus for his own ends: that of the theory 
of flux. This is probably the most well known of Heraclitus‟ theories: that the world is 
continuously changing. To what extent he held this to be true we cannot be entirely 
sure but its general sense is enough to understand its appeal to Plato
469. For Plato if 
knowledge is possible then it must be of unchanging objects since knowledge is 
always of what is true. If the objects in the sensible world are always changing then 
they cannot be the objects  of knowledge so there must be true unchanging objects 
which  differ  substantially  from  those  in  the  sensible  world
470.  Note  that  neither 
Heraclitus  nor  Plato  deny  the  existence  of  the  sensible  world,  nor  does  either 
necessarily  accept  that  the  sensible  world  is  bad.  Xenocr ates,  we  saw  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  could  make  use  of  the  same  argument  to  explain  the  very 
existence of the sensible world: it has to move and change continuously  -  if it 
stopped it would cease to be. Continuous motion ensures the integrity of minimal 
lines which in turn ensure the integrity of minimal surfaces and so solids
471. No 
motion  would  result  in  no  world  which,  owing  to  the  necessary  existence  of 
geometrical points because of the necessary emanations from the One, would be an 
impossible scenario
472. For Heraclitus constant motion or “War” is absolutely vital to 
existence and is, as such, a positive thing
473. Even if the Stoics over-emphasise their 
reliance on, or pedigree from, Heraclitus they are not being entirely disingenuous. 
Aspects of Heraclitus‟ thought did indeed come through to them if only indirectly and 
play a role in the development of their material principle.  
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The evidence for the Early Stoics‟ interest in Heraclitus is in a sense less doctrinal 
than scholarly. Sphaerus and Cleanthes both wrote treatises on Heraclitus
474. We do 
not know either the content of these works or what access to Heraclitus‟ teachings 
they had. It does not seem likely that they had access to the book of Heraclitus (if he 
in  fact  wrote  one)  since  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  either  Aristotle  or 
Theophrastus had access to his work.  
 
The  strongest  piece  of  work  by  a  Stoic we  possess that  clearly  demonstrates the 
connection of Stoicism to Heraclitus is Cleanthes‟ Hymn to Zeus. However since this 
work does not directly relate to the subject of this thesis I will not devote much to its 
analysis which in any case has been dealt with excellently by Long
475. If the Stoics 
were in fact working from a similar set of fragments to those which we possess then 
the fact that the y  felt  at  liberty  to  interpret  Heraclitus‟  philosophy  as  a  spiritual 
precursor  to  their  own  becomes  more  understandable
476. With such a paucity of 
evidence  who  would  dare,  or  bother,  to  argue  with  the  Stoics‟  claim?  The  real 
question then becomes: how valid, based on the evidence we have, is the Stoics‟ 
interpretation of Heraclitean natural philosophy? And how much can this seriously be 
taken to influence their doctrine of the material substrate of the sensible world?  
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4.1.2 Ekpyrosis: 
 
A source of debate over the validity and popularity of Stoic interpretation is in the 
subject  of  ekpyrosis.  Accordingly  I  will  take  this  as  an  example  of  the  Stoics‟ 
relationship to Heraclitus on philosophical matters. There are those who are of the 
opinion  that  the  main  reason  later  thinkers  assert  the  theory  of  ekpyrosis  of 
Heraclitus is due to Aristotle and that he held no such theory
477. The continued, or 
otherwise, existence of the  kosmos is an excellent point of discussion owing to its 
implications for the material principle. I will, thus, take it as a case-in-point of Stoic 
interpretation  of  Heraclitus  and  use  it  to  exemplify  the  Stoic  interpretation  of 
Heraclitus‟ natural philosophy in general.  
 
For  the  early  Stoics  the  combination  of  matter  and  god,  that  is  the  Whole
478, 
alternated  between  being  as  it  is  now  –  ordered  –  and  a  state  of  pure  fiery 
existence
479. In that state everything that is exists in a fiery state, making everything 
pure god. This is the state of  ekpyrosis. Seneca tells us that this is a positive state 
and that the cosmos is in fact an aberration from the perfect state of ekpyrosis when 
god exists perfectly with himself
480. The cycle alternates between the cosmos and the 
state of ekpyrosis each following from the other. The cosmos that exists at each time 
is in essence the same. It is the same because god produces what is best and there 
could be no reason for deviation from that. As a result every event recurs endlessly 
and the repetition stretches back in time infinitely and will continue infinitely. This 
raises several points of interesting discussion but none of them concern us for the 
purposes of this thesis
481. What does is the idea of the underlying material which 
persists throughout the process, in the cosmos and at  ekpyrosis. For the Stoics it is 
apoios ousia that is turned now this way, now that. While there is no direct evidence 
either way to help us to a certain conclusion we might tentatively suggest that since 
apoios ousia is absolutely passive, each time that Socrates appears in the world he is 
constructed from the very same dimensions of apoios ousia. It may be easier for our 
modern minds if we think of apoios ousia as a three-dimensional matrix replete with 
coordinates then the very same coordinates would correspond to Socrates in each of 
                                                 
477  (2002,  pg.  61)  quite  clearly  blames  “Aristotle  and  the  Peripatetics”,  who  could  then  be  plausibly 
responsible for passing this on to the Stoics.    
478 E.g. Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 9.332 (= 44AL&S = SVF 2.524 part).  
479 Which, though counterpoised to the kosmos, should not be understood as disorder.  
480 Seneca Letters 9.16 (=46OL&S = SVF 2.1065). 
481 E.g. the issue of the identity of indiscernibles and its impact on the notion of eternal recurrence.  189  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
the infinite occurrences of his lifetime, and so on for the rest of the world. This may 
not be exactly the way the Stoics would have thought about it, but that, I suggest, is 
most likely because they lacked the language – not the idea. The idea of matter as a 
co-ordinated three-dimensional matrix would be something that they would probably 
be very happy with. I raise this as it reinforces the absolute passivity of the material 
principle and its reliance on the active for any kind of alteration. It also very clearly 
shows  the  continuous  nature  of  the  material  principle.  It  is  not  created  nor  is  it 
destroyed; it is most firmly one of the two principles of reality and does not derive its 
reality from anything else.  
 
The  Stoics  moved  to  the  idea  of  ekpyrosis  from  observation.  All  the  parts  of  the 
cosmos decay and cease to be. All animals are born and die and have offspring
482. If 
the parts are perishable then it follows that there is good reason to suppose that the 
whole is capable of dissolution. Being an organism (broadly s peaking) the cosmos 
should have a lifespan. But god cannot die and so his form alternates: he produces 
himself from himself – he is both father and son in eternal derivation.  
 
The theory fell into disrepute fairly quickly with followers of Chrysippus unconvinced 
about the need or practicality of ekpyrosis
483. One concern was that there would be 
nothing  for  god  to  do  during  ekpyrosis.  A  more  serious  concern  is  one  raised  by 
Aristotle in his de Philosophia where he likens a god who would destroy his creation 
to a small child kicking down sandcastles:  
 
If (the new world) is like (the old), its artificer will have laboured 
in vain, differing in nothing from silly children, who often when 
playing  on  the  beach  make  great  piles  of  sand  and  then 
undermine them with their hands and pull them down again
484. 
(Trans. Barnes/Lawrence) 
 
Plato, like Aristotle, undoubtedly believed in the eternity of the world
485. Although in 
the Timaeus it is written that god could destroy the world he would not as it would 
be  against  his  goodness
486. However Aristotle was writing before the Stoics so it 
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seems likely that he had someone else in mind when he raised the doctrine of a 
perishable world else the criticism would seem rather redundant. As it happens he 
tells  us  in  the  Physics  that  both  Empedocles  and  Heraclitus  thought  the  present 
world would alternate between its ordered state and another:  
 
That  the  world  was  generated  all  are  agreed,  but,  generation 
over, some say that it is eternal, others say that it is destructible 
like any other natural formation. Others again, with Empedocles 
of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, believe that it alternates, 
being sometimes as it is now and sometimes different and in a 
process  of  destruction,  and  that  this  continues  without  end
487. 
(Trans. Stocks) 
    
If the Stoics are falsely ascribing ekpyrosis to Heraclitus then they were not the first 
and had an impressive precedent in the intellect of Aristotle. Ekpyrosis, as the name 
suggests, requires fire. For the Stoics this is explicitly stated and is the case because 
of the fiery nature of the active principle – pyr technikon. Heraclitus is well known to 
have held fire to be the most important element and Aristotle tells us quite clearly 
that he, like the Stoics
488, thought that everything would at some point become fire: 
 
For generally, and apart from the question how any of them [the 
elements] could be infinite, the universe, even, if it were limited, 
cannot either be or become one of them, as Heraclitus says that 
at some time all things become fire
489. (Trans. Hardie & Gaye) 
 
The clear implication here is that all things become fire at the same time. If it were a 
simple notion that each element will at some point change into fire, while others 
change into another to retain some sort of balance, then it is unlike ly that Aristotle 
would bother to raise the point as he himself, along with Plato, believed this too. This 
is not to say that Heraclitus did not believe in the transmutation of elements. Indeed 
if at some point all the elements become fire transmutation is  a precondition. How 
this happens though is not clear. He does, however, speak of “turnings”:  
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“turnings  of  fire:  first,  sea;  and  of  sea,  half  earth  and  half 
burning…sea is dispersed and is measured in the same proportion 
as there was before.
490” (Trans. Barnes) 
 
This tantalising fragment does not tell us if there is an underlying matter consistently 
present  beneath  the  change  or  if,  as  King  holds of Aristotle
491, transmutation can 
occur simply through the transfer of properties alone with the elements actuall y 
being the minimum matter. It is perfectly possible that the issue and consideration 
never occurred to Heraclitus and so the distinction is perhaps redundant. I will come 
back to the specific issue of a material principle in Heraclitus after this discussi on of 
ekpyrosis.  
 
Not  only  do  we  have  Aristotle‟s  evidence  stating  that  for  Heraclitus  the  world 
alternates  between  order  and  “another  state”,  but  we  can  also  infer,  along  Stoic 
lines, another reason for thinking he held something like ekpyrosis. One reason we 
saw the Stoics giving for ekpyrosis was that the parts of the world are destructible 
and that this led them to suppose the destructibility of the whole. Heraclitus‟ most 
influential doctrine, for Plato at least, was undoubtedly the doctrine of flux. Is it not 
reasonable to ascribe a similar train of reasoning to Heraclitus as we find in Stoicism? 
If the parts of the whole are in flux does it not seem reasonable to suppose that the 
whole is in flux too? If the formed kosmos is, paradoxically, characterised by disorder 
and instability then the kosmos would change to being at peace and stability if only 
for a time. This would mirror the positive nature of ekpyrosis found in Seneca
492. It is 
not impossible to see a Stoic interpreting Heraclitus as implying t hat the doctrine of 
flux will entail the change from a system of flux to one of non -flux, the divine peace 
of ekpyrosis, and then back again in an infinite loop. It may be a misinterpretation 
but it is an understandable and attractive one.  
 
Despite  the  evidence  for  the  reasonable  interpretation  of  Heraclitus  as  holding  a 
theory  of  cosmic  flux,  later  termed  ekpyrosis,  some  see  the  idea  as  too  far 
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492 Letters 9.16 (=46OL&S = SVF 2.1065).  192  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
fetched
493. The most common reason  for thinking that the Stoics misinterpreted 
Heraclitus or deliberately misrepresented him is due to fragment 38
494:   
 
This world neither any god nor man made, but it always was and 
is and will be, an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and being 
extinguished in measures
495. (Trans. Barnes) 
 
This statement is taken to be incompatible  with a doctrine of  ekpyrosis. However if 
the world repeats in cycles of order and disorder then is not everything that exists, 
by turning from being completely and only fire to being only part fire, continuously 
existing – whether it is ordered in a particular way or not? The only problem comes 
from the fact that “world” renders kosmos – literally: order. Heraclitus was not called 
the obscure for nothing and Aristotle criticises him for his lack of clarity
496. I would 
suggest then that Heraclitus is potentially having a little joke with us (provided that 
Clement‟s reportage is literal). There are two possibilities: 
 
1.  By  “order”  Heraclitus is in  fact  referring  to  the  state  that  the  Stoics  would 
later call ekpyrosis as this is the state when there is just fire and no flux.  
 
2.  This kosmos – what we know as the “ordered” world - is in fact a state of 
disorder
497. This world is constantly riven by flux; flux or constant disorder 
being the only order that there is.  
 
The constant existence of fire, no matter how minimally it exists is the basis for all 
the order and creation in the world and it is this, I suggest, that Heraclitus is talking 
about.  
 
Whether or not Heraclitus himself actually held a doctrine of ekpyrosis as found in 
Stoicism, (and we have seen much to suppose that this is a reasonable interpretation 
for the Stoics to have held at least), is almost irrelevant. What this discussion has 
shown  is  the  reasonable  inferences  drawn  by  the  early  Stoics  about  Heraclitus‟ 
                                                 
493 E.g. Kahn, Long, Barnes in the works cited in this chapter.  
494 This reason is cited by Barnes (2002, pg. 61 -2) as definitive proof since he sees the two positions as 
completely irreconcilable and understands this fragment as authentic.  
495 Clement Stromateis V.103.6 (=Fr. 30 D = 51 M = 37 K). 
496 Rhetoric 1407b14-25. 
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philosophy which there is no reason to suppose they based on much more evidence 
than we possess. If they could read a justification for such a novel view as ekpyrosis 
into Heraclitus‟ fragments then how much more likely is it that they found supporting 
reasons for their doctrine of apoios ousia in the great master of natural philosophy? 
This is what will be looked at in the next section.  194  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
4.1.3 Fire, matter and god:  
 
Heraclitus‟  surviving  fragments  revolve  around  two  main  topics  that  concern  the 
subject of this thesis: flux and extolling the virtues and importance of fire. This part 
of the chapter will look at the role of fire in Heraclitus‟ philosophy and see how it 
relates to fire and matter in Stoicism. The role of fire is important in this respect 
because,  as  I  will  show,  fire  seems  to  play  a  dual  role  in  Heraclitus‟  natural 
philosophy  while  the  Stoics, as  we  have  seen, separate  these  roles  out. Both  the 
Stoics and Heraclitus however are monists and it is with this claim as the backdrop 
that our explanation will play out.  
 
In the first chapter we saw how the Stoics have an immanent god who pervades all 
of reality and guides every aspect of it in the best possible way. We also saw his 
nature described as a pure and creative fire – pyr technikon. This fire went by the 
name  of  pneuma  when  engaged  in  certain  activities:  when  it  was  causing  apoios 
ousia to take on the form of a person for instance. But god‟s essential nature remains 
fiery  as  this is  the  most  directing  and  self-sustaining  thing  in  creation.  His  will  is 
inexorable and is epitomised in the Stoic doctrine of fate. Through all this the Stoics 
also maintain their claim to monism. They do this, as we saw in chapter one, through 
the remarkable and ingenious doctrine of krasis. This allowed god to permeate apoios 
ousia absolutely. The two cannot be found apart: wherever there is god so too there 
is  matter,  wherever  there  is  matter  so  too  there  is  god.  They  are  at  most 
conceptually distinct but can never be found apart. 
 
Heraclitus‟ monism is of a more classic form: “The wise is one: to understand the 
purpose by which it steers everything through all
498”; “listening not to me but rather 
to the logos it is wise to agree that all things are one.
499” Fire is the material principle 
for Heraclitus, but more than that it is also god. The Stoics require two principles 
because  of  their  maxim  that:  “only  body  can  act  or  be  acted  upon
500”, and the 
associated concept that no body can act on itself
501 Heraclitus, as far as we know, 
had no such maxim.  
 
                                                 
498 DL IX.1 (= Fr. 41 D = 85 M = 54 K). (trans. Barnes) 
499 Hippolytus Refutatio IX.9.1 (=Fr. 50 D = 26 M = 36 K). (trans. Barnes) 
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Heraclitus says: “the thunderbolt steers all things
502” showing not only the traditional 
all-powerful nature of the king of the gods but also that fire is the mechanism of rule. 
However most illuminating in exposing the nature of god as co-extensive with fire is 
fragment 67: “The God: day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/hunger. [He] 
is  changed  in  the  manner  (of  fire)  when  it  is  mingled  with  spices  and  is  named 
according to the delight of each of them.
503” This fragment quite clearly says two 
things of god. Firstly it tells us that god is a full unity of opposites; he is everything, 
making  the  identification  between  active  and  passive  easier  to  attribute  to  him. 
Secondly it tells us that he is changed in contrast to the Stoic god. Undoubtedly it is 
god who is causing the changing too but for Heraclitus he changes himself while for 
the Stoics he changes apoios ousia. While the Stoic god is immanent in his creation 
Heraclitus‟  appears to  be  not  so  much  immanent  as  identical. It  would  appear  as 
though if we were to look for a material principle in a cosmogony for Heraclitus then 
we would have to look no further than god himself. This is different to any other 
theory that has been looked at in this thesis and while it has resonances with the 
Stoic  theory  it  is  significantly  different.  But  is  it  so  significantly  different  that  the 
Stoics could not have looked at the situation slightly differently and found something 
they did like? 
 
If we suppose that god is not in fact identical with the sensible world but separate 
from it and that he “steers all things” in accordance with his will and look just at 
what  it  is  that,  most  primitively,  he  “steers”  we  will  be  left  with  his  body  as  the 
equivalent  of  the  Stoic  apoios  ousia:  i.e.  fire  again.  In  the  previous  section  the 
transmutation of elements was briefly mentioned and it was asked whether or not 
this  event  requires  an  underlying  substrate  such  as  the  Stoics‟  apoios  ousia,  or 
whether  it  can  occur  through  the  simple  transference  of  properties  as  we  saw 
discussed  in  relation  to  Aristotle.  Heraclitus  does  little  to  clear  up  this issue.  The 
choice of fire as material substrate comes with some innate problems; after all it is 
as hard to see how fire can be a material substrate as it is for, say, water or air. Qua 
material substrate Heraclitus has this to say of fire:  “fire is the element, all things 
are an  exchange for  fire and come into being by rarefaction and condensation
504” 
                                                 
502 Hippolytus Refutatio IX.10.7 (=Fr. 32 D = 84 M = 118 K). A sentiment echoed in Cleanthes‟ Hymn to 
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forked thunderbolt. By its strokes all the works of nature came to be established, and with it you guide the 
universal Word of Reason which moves through all creation.” (trans. M.A.C.Ellery, 1976).  
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and: “All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods are for 
gold and gold for goods.
505” These statements are, however, too vague to answer the 
question. It appears, on the face of it likely that Barnes
506 is right in his assessment 
that takes fire as being nothing more than the primary element – the original source, 
rather than underlying substrate. He takes the statement “everything is from X” as 
not implying that at any one point everything was X. Rather that it means that things 
can be made from but not out of fire. The idea that fire is not then an underlying 
substrate that persists through all formal change is appealing owing to Heraclitus‟ 
own words and the concerns that having fire as the substrate would bring. Further 
supporting  this  notion  that  fire  is  not  a  persisting  substrate  but  only  an  exalted 
element  are  the  words  of  Aristotle:  “Anaximenes  and  Diogenes  make  air  prior  to 
water, and the most primary of the simple bodies, while Hippasus of Metapontium 
and  Heraclitus  of  Ephesus  say  this  of  fire…
507”  Leaving  aside  the  horror  that 
Heraclitus would no doubt feel at being mentioned in the same breath as another 
philosopher, this statement  reinforces the  idea  of fire  as an  element  just like  the 
others but simply more primary. It would appear to be the case that Heraclitus could 
not have had much influence on the Stoic theory of matter as they would probably 
claim. Yet this is only one side of the coin. Aristotle also tells us:  
 
But  what  these  thinkers  maintained  was  that  all  else  is  being 
generated and is flowing, nothing having any stability, except one 
single  thing  which  persists  as  the  basis  of  all  these 
transformations.  So  we  may  interpret  the  statements  of 
Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others
508. (Trans. Stocks) 
 
This clearly states that Aristotle thinks the right and reasonable interpretation of 
Heraclitus is that he believed in a single unchanging substrate that underlies all 
change in the sensible realm. This sounds very much like  apoios ousia and is clearly 
not a Stoic interpolation. However there is now a conundrum which properly earns 
Heraclitus  his  epithet  “the  obscure
509”.  A  moment  ago  we  noted  that  Heraclitus 
suggests that fire ceases to be when it becomes something else. This would make 
god disappear. If: “For souls it is death to become water; for water it is death to 
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become earth: out of earth comes water; out of water, soul
510” and we suppose that 
souls are similar to god then it becomes clear that if god is fire and fire can turn into 
water and in doing so not remain fire then it follows that in so doing god kills himself. 
But  we  also  know  that  there  must  be  a  persistent  substrate.  We  have,  thus,  a 
problem. If god is fire and fire is not the persistent substrate, which it seems it is 
not,  then  god  can  die  and  there  is  a  principle  more  fundamental  than  god  which 
underlies  his  turnings  from  life  to  death.  Heraclitus  seems  to  have  offered  us  a 
substrate which is not permanent at all, completely negating the point of a substrate. 
The  picture  is  complicated  and  contradictory  and  no  doubt  the  problems  are 
compounded by the paucity of our sources and the strong Aristotelian interpretation 
that  we  rely  on  as  well  as  our  background  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  a 
substrate  that  Heraclitus  may  not  have  shared.  We  cannot  know  just  how  clear 
Heraclitus himself was about the concepts we have been looking at: the confusion 
may not be intentional or may be due to the fragmentary nature of the sources. Or it 
may be that contradiction and confusion is simply endemic in any discussion of the 
sensible world as it is itself constantly changing. 
  
How could the preceding discussion relate to the Stoics? Clearly they were attracted 
to Heraclitus because of his monism, his pantheistic god, and the emphasis on fire 
which mirrored their own conclusions. A fiery god who directs all things in a world 
which, since “all things are one” and “good and evil are the same thing as Heraclitus 
says
511”, must be the best has clear resonances with Stoic theology. In clearly not 
distinguishing the active from the passive (for the active is the passive) Heraclitus 
differs from the Stoics even though they claim to be monists too. As a result the 
material principle  of Heraclitus has  a  peculiar  relation  to  that  of the  Stoics  and it 
seems unlikely that he will have had the same influence on the development of the 
material principle that Xenocrates did. Barnes‟ rejection of a cosmogony in Heraclitus 
does not remove the issue of how, since god is fire, fire can change and fail yet also 
be said to continuously persist as god. It is not enough to reply that as long as there 
is  some  fire  then  god  survives  in  that  since  god  would  then  be  limited  in  his 
existence  to  certain  places.  Instead  god  is  everywhere  irrespective  of  how  it  is 
disposed – fiery or not – as the following anecdote shows
512: It is said that when 
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some people went to visit Heraclitus in his home they found him at his oven. They 
were  embarrassed  but  Heraclitus  replied  that  even  here  there  are  gods.  There  is 
nothing that is too base for god to have a share in and as a result he is all things.   
 
It would not be too hard to see the considerations that have been raised here as 
inspiring  the  Stoic  division  between  the  active  and  passive  principles.  The  same 
considerations also explain the division between pyr technikon and pyr atechnon
513. 
Seeing  the  difficulty  in  having  fire  as  the  persistent  substrate  when  elemental 
transmutation is also accepted would not have been difficult given the teachings of 
Xenocrates and Plato. So instead they move a level down to abstract resisting three-
dimensionality. They also realised the issues raised by identifying god not only with 
the persistent substrate but also with an element. However the identification of god 
with fire is appealing owing to the biological models prevalent at the time and so 
they separated out two types of fire.  
 
All of this can be read into Heraclitus with a little imagination and the Stoics were 
certainly not short of that. Heraclitus was undoubtedly an influence but he was not a 
direct teacher in the sense that the Stoics could not have incorporated much of his 
natural philosophy into theirs. The interpretations that have been posited here are 
not necessarily obvious or immediate ones that would be reached. Instead it is more 
likely  that  in  interpreting  Heraclitus  the  Stoics  clarified  their  views  rather  than 
coming up with them.  
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4.2 Biology and the Mythic Account: 
 
Philosophy does not take place in an intellectual vacuum. In light of this fact this part 
of  the  thesis  will  look  at  biological  imagery  in  regard  to  embryology  and  the 
mythological treatment of matter and creation. The Stoics themselves were fond of 
the  “science”  of  etymology  as  we  saw  in  the  first  chapter  with  Chrysippus‟ 
explanation  for  the  origin  of  the  word  god  coming  from  Zēn  “in  so  far  as  he  is 
responsible  for,  or  pervades  life  [zēn]
514”,  reinforcing  the  Stoic  concept  of  an 
immanent  god  and  the  theory  of  total  blending.  The  religious  and  cultural 
developments that took place in the past or near past, including the poetic accounts 
of the creation, will have furnished the intellectual background and cultural education 
of  all  students  who  would  later  come  to  philosophy.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
understand  what  these  background  elements  would  have  suggested  and  that 
subsequently philosophers would have adopted
515. The interpretation of cosmological 
myth was frowned upon by Plato as a waste of time
516. Despite this his successor 
Xenocrates was more inclined to mythologizing  accounts and daemonology resulting 
in  his  being  branded  an  “inferior  intellect
517”  by  Guthrie.  Both  Speusippus  and 
Xenocrates  are  known,  as  we  have  seen,  to  have  had  a  great  deal  of  interest  in 
Pythagoreanism  and  also  in  its  correlate:  Orphism.  Such  a  pedigree  of  general 
mythologizing in Greek culture as proto-philosophy mixed with its analysis by serious 
near contemporary philosophers no doubt influenced the direction of the thought of 
Zeno during his time at the Academy. To get a flavour of the culture of intellectual 
thought that was being developed in the late fifth or early fourth century BC I will 
look at the relevant parts of the Derveni Papyrus. This interesting document is of 
uncertain date and authorship
518 but serves to demonstrate the relationship of myth 
to philosophy as the author is at pains to point out that those who have problems 
believing the terrors of Hades do so because they are taking the words of the poets 
too literally and that we must delve behind the words to the real meanings behind 
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them
519. This type of esoteric teaching and cult knowledg e was obviously popular in 
the ancient world and I will not attempt an analysis of it or its relation to philosophy. 
Instead I will look more at the pedigree of matter in “popular” thought to see how 
the Stoics used “popular cultural” imagery to reinforce the ideas of their philosophy 
and make it more accessible and acceptable to their contemporaries
520.  
 
Diogenes Laertius offers us the following account of the cosmic genesis according to 
the Stoics: 
 
In  the  beginning  all  by  himself  he  (god)  turned  the  entire 
substance through air into water. Just as the sperm is enveloped 
in the seminal fluid, so god, who is the seminal principle of the 
world,  stays  behind  as  such  in  the  moisture,  making  matter 
serviceable to himself for the successive stages of creation
521. 
(Trans. L&S) 
 
An interesting thing to note in passing is that god seems unable, even at the most 
basic level, to deviate from the established formula for elemental transformation. 
Diogenes continues his  explanation:  “The  world  is  created  when  the  substance  is 
turned from fire through air into moisture.” The term “substance” denotes, in this 
case, the material principle. This account shows us something about the nature of 
the  material  principle  in  Stoicism  and  its  relation  to  the  established  mythology  of 
Greece. In both cases god is turning  apoios ousia from fire into air and then into 
water. Once there is water he then continues to the next level of creation; that of 
particular things: “Thereafter by mixture plants and animals and the other natural 
kinds are produced.” The initial fire, the first thing produced, which apoios ousia is 
turned from is clearly representative of the state of ekpyrosis.  
 
This elemental fire is fully transformed into air and then condensed into water
522. It 
seems that Diogenes is attributing to the Stoics the notion that water is somehow the 
most suitable disposition of matter that the active principle can work on. It is not the 
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case that god is turning parts of the material principle into air and other parts into 
water in order that all the elements exist; for Diogenes has told us that god: “turned 
the entire substance through air into water.” Water possesses, then, some power of 
base materiality. If god is going to make the world, and he is, then he is going to 
make it out of water. The question that this part will help us answer is: Why water? 
 
It is this notion of matter as water that I will look at, briefly tracing this conception in 
myth
523, early philosophy and medicine as each r elates to the present subject. Its 
relationship  to  the  female  will  be  looked  at  as  will  both  water‟s  and  the  female‟s 
relationship  to  the  passive  nature
524. Water will be looked at in this part as the 
primary principle since this account forms the backdrop o f thought in which the 
Stoics were working. In looking at myth, which I will do only briefly, I am following 
much the same supposition that I did above in regard to the relationship of Stoicism 
to Heraclitus: That the germs of Stoicism can be found in thes e writers but that the 
Stoics did not seriously think that their ideas existed in these earlier writers; any 
resemblance was most likely by chance, or dubious interpretation, but appealing to 
ancient authority was still an appealing notion. This is, as Long states
525, contrary to 
the received opinion that the Stoics saw the Ancients as in possession of truth about 
the world: “According to this received opinion the Stoics took Homer (and other early 
Greek poets, especially Hesiod) to have a correct understanding of the world – its 
physical structure and processes, its god(s), its basic causes and purposes.
526” For 
the Stoics to have thought that the ancients were in possession of the “truth” they 
would  have  had  to  suppose  that  they  were  in  fact  saying  the  same  thing  as  the 
Stoics, and it is hard to credit that the Stoics really thought Homer and Hesiod were 
saying  the  same  things as  they  were. This,  however, did  not  stop  them  crediting 
their predecessors with ancient wisdom, but this is surely more a political move than 
a genuine account of the historiography of their school.  
 
                                                 
523 Cf. Baldry (1932): “Mythical and symbolical notions are often replaced in time by more scientific ideas.” 
Pg. 28. 
524 One should always keep in mind that when the Stoics talk of a female god or power they are doing so  
for explanatory purposes only and not because the terms relate to an actual entity  – Although of course 
the  traditional  gods  do  exist  but  not  at  the  level  of  importance  that  is  the  subject  of  this  thesis  so 
references to Hera and Zeus are illustrative only.  
525 Long (1996, pg. 58. Cf. pg. 64): “The Stoics were rationalists and they were also empiricists. They 
don‟t talk nonsense, and it is frankly nonsensical to suppose that Homer was a crypto-Stoic.” That Homer 
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suggest is all that was happening.   
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In his discussion of the relationship of Stoicism to poetic accounts Boys-Stones raises 
the  point  that  the  Stoics  were  seen  as  using  previous  accounts  to  support  their 
position:  
 
Their  (the  Stoics‟)  interest  in  Homer  and  Hesiod,  and  the 
allegorical interpretations they offered of their poems, were a way 
of  justifying  their  position  at  the  centre  of  Greek  culture  –  and 
were  perhaps,  as  the  Epicureans  insinuated,  a  way  of 
appropriating their authority for the doctrine of Stoicism too
527.  
 
While I agree with Long, and I doubt anyone would disagree, that Homer and Hesiod 
were not in fact crypto-Stoics and the Stoics did not believe they were; it does not 
mean that they could not have spotted some  obvious parallels and marvelled at the 
similarity of thought in these earlier thinkers. This is not withstanding  Boys-Stones‟ 
well argued point that the Stoics had little time for the poets as serious thinkers
528; 
though he goes on
529 to mention that the Stoics did hold, as did Aristotle
530, that the 
poetic accounts did contain germs of ancient wisdom  – especially in regard to the 
naming of gods. The poets may not furnish much; but to the trained eye they can 
offer a glimpse back to the time when mankind was closer to god and so there is 
wisdom in their stories – even if it is deeply hidden. The Stoics could take these hints 
and  turn  them  to  their  advantage  by  using  them  to  establish  their  philosophy  in 
acceptable sources – a cynical method of exploitation.  
 
That the Stoics had an interest in Homer and Hesiod is supported by the fact that 
Zeno  wrote  five  books  on  Homer
531  and  Chrysippus  too  wrote  philological 
commentaries
532. So, like all educated Greeks the Stoics were familiar with the poets 
and perhaps owing to the ir foreign birth
533 would have been all the more eager to 
demonstrate the relationship of their thought to that of the established national 
poets. In support of the influence of myth on the conception of the Stoic material 
                                                 
527Boys-Stones, 2001, Pg. 32.  
528 Cicero DND 2.70-1 says that it is stupid to repeat the stories of the poets, however there are some 
things in them that are helpful.  
529 Op. cit. pg. 36.  
530 Cf. Metaph.  1074a38-b14.  
531 DL. 7.4. 
532 DL. 7.189-200. 
533 E.g. Zeno “the Phoenician” Cf. DL. 7.3: “Why run away, my little Phoenician?”  203  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
principle I will look at just two passages. The first is an argument from silence but 
points in the direction of matter as wet or water:  
 
There was a famous and obscene painting at Argos which showed 
Hera fellating Zeus (SVF II.I071-4). Chrysippus explained this (do 
we know he was utterly serious in doing so?) as an interaction 
between  the  two  Stoic  principles,  Zeus/god  and  Hera/matter. 
Interestingly  enough,  this  interpretation  does  not  invoke  the 
standard Stoic etymology, Hera/aēr
534. 
 
Whether or not Chrysippus is being entirely serious does not really impact on the 
interesting omission that Long draws our attention to. Why does Chrysippus not use 
the standard etymology of Hera from air? Although the evidence is weak it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that since he was using Hera as a synonym for the material 
principle Chrysippus was reluctant to use air as one too since the proper elemental 
synonym in this case would be not air but water. In order not to contradict himself 
Chrysippus  refrains  from  calling  the  material  principle  air.  Since  Chrysippus  has 
refrained from calling the material principle air in this instance it seems likely that 
another  candidate  should  stand in its place;  the  next  obvious element, as  will  be 
shown, is water. The science of etymology lets the Stoics down in this case. It is far 
easier to understand, especially in light of the Diogenes Laertius passages above and 
medical imagery of the time, Hera being matter qua female and not qua aēr. The 
matter  that  is  being  referred  to  here  should  not  be  confused  with  apoios  ousia. 
Although it would be understandable to contrast the active principle, which is called 
Zeus,  to  apoios  ousia  and  refer  to  the  latter  as  Hera  the  Stoics  cannot  do  this 
seriously  for  the  folliwng  reason:  They  are  monotheists  so  god  cannot  have  a 
counterpart.  
 
Any talk of a second deity is clearly allegorical and a teaching aid. Meijer remarks, 
and it seems clearly true, that the distinctions made between male and female gods 
are the result of poetry only and not of serious philosophy expressing his position 
with the following remark: “The gods are said to be of two sexes, so that when they 
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are  active,  they  are  males,  and  females  when  they  have  a  nature  of  a  passive 
object.
535” 
 
There  is  only  one  god  and  his  names  vary  according  to  its  functions.  The  matter 
being  referred  to,  not  only  by  Chrysippus  but  by  Diogenes  in  his  account  of 
substantial change, is not bare apoios ousia. Instead it can only be proximate matter. 
This  means  our  speculation  ends  up  with  the  rather  strange  conclusion  that  the 
barest qualification for matter is in fact water (which is a combination of the active 
and passive principles). We saw in the first chapter that if we were to ask what is the 
barest  matter  out  of  which  things  were  made,  the  Stoics  would  answer  the  four 
elements, since apoios ousia always exists in the barest qualification as at least one 
of these: at ekpyrosis and just after, and just preceding the birth of the cosmos. First 
of all there is fire, then all elemental fire becomes air so that the active may have the 
barest – or most opposite of the active – type of matter to act on: water. Even god is 
constrained by his own laws of ordered elemental transmutation. For the process of 
cosmic creation to start god first needs to move all of apoios ousia from being fiery to 
being something akin to it‟s (apoios ousia‟s) actual nature. The most passive element 
(because it is opposite to fire) is water. Hence when god wants to create the world as 
we  know  it  he  needs  a  perfectly  passive  element  to  work  on,  which,  since  he  is 
“fiery”, can only be water.   
 
The second passage in support of the mythic influence on the conception of matter as 
water relates directly to Zeno and his interpretation of Hesiod. Regarding the pre-
cosmic chaos as it appears in Hesiod we are told that Zeno interpreted it along the 
following lines: “Zeno interpreted Hesiod‟s chaos as „primal water‟, deriving the word 
from chysis or cheesthai (SVF I.I03-4) meaning „pouring‟.
536” The chaos is the “out of 
which” in the Hesiodic account, accordingly it parallels the apoios ousia of Stoicism. If 
the mythologizing poets can furnish the ancient and cultural tendency for interpreting 
bare matter as water as far as the Stoics are concerned we have still uncovered only 
part  of  the  picture.  The  Derveni  papyrus  is  an  attempt,  much  in  the  vein  of  the 
received opinion of Stoicism in relation to the poets, to demonstrate that the poets 
are  allegorisers  with  a  hidden  truth.  The  truth,  as  far  as  the  Derveni  author  is 
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to male and female.  
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concerned, is known by the poets; while we have seen that whether or not this is the 
case is irrelevant to the Stoics. What matters is that they can read their philosophy 
into the poetry without making too many ludicrous assumptions and it is at any rate, 
as  Long  said,  far  fetched  to  suppose  that  the  Stoics  really  thought  of  their 
predecessors as proto-Stoics. They can still adopt and adapt the common notions to 
support their philosophy though it is cynical exploitation rather than a genuine belief 
that Hesiod is teaching Stoicism. The passages in the Derveni papyrus that I will look 
at are those explaining the material principle. Looking at how the author describes 
this  and  draws  the  meanings  from  the  poets  will  help  to  furnish  us  with  the 
intellectual mythologizing mindset of the mid 5
th to the mid 4
th century B.C
537. This 
mindset should have resonances with the early Stoics as they came out of the 
mythologizing Academy.  
 
In  column  10
538  the  author  states  Orpheus‟  real  meaning  behind  terming  night 
“nurse”: “By saying that she is nurse, he (sc. Orpheus) expresses in riddling form 
that whatever the sun dissolves by heating, the night unites by cooling.” At column 
22 he continues:  
 
Earth  (Ge),  Mother  (Meter),  Rhea  and  Hera  are  one  and  the 
same. She was called Earth (Ge) by convention; Mother, because 
all things are born from her. Ge and Gaia according to each one‟s 
dialect.  And  she  was  called  Demeter  as  the  Mother  Earth  (Ge 
Meter), one name from the two; for it was the same.  
 
The issue of the roles of air and water, splitting them into what can be understood as 
active and passive, becomes confused in column 23: 
 
…but to those who understand correctly it is clear that Okeanos is 
the  air  and  air  is  Zeus.  It  is  not  the  case  that  another  Zeus 
contrived  Zeus,  but  that  the  same  one  (contrived)  for  himself 
great  strength.  But  those  who  do  not  understand  think  that 
                                                 
537 The author‟s references to Heraclitus (Col. 4) in his works means it must post-date him and also shows 
that the author was well educated and possibly well travelled. Such an individual can be fairly safely taken 
as an average representative of the intelligentsia of Ancient Greece.  
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Okeanos is a river because he (sc. Orpheus) added the epithet 
“broadly flowing”.    
 
The author has also gone to great pains to identify the phallus, which is responsible 
for Zeus‟ power, with the Sun
539. From these passages we can make the following 
conclusions about the intellectual or cultic explanation of myth. The sun is the male 
principle which, as for Heraclitus, is not only a vitalistic power but also a destructive 
one if left unchecked
540. To counteract the over-zealous power of the sun/male/Zeus 
the cooling principle is one which draws together. Thus Night and coolness are the 
counterpoint to sun/Zeus. The night bounds the destructive power of the sun acting 
as a necessary power opposed to it that is supported by necessity and justice. As a 
result of this description the two aspects (night and sun) become two principles.  
 
The  material  principle  is  the  binding  principle  which  we  have  seen  identified  with 
night
541. We have  also  seen  that  “She”  (the  material  principle)  is  called  “mother” 
because  “all  things  are  from  her”.  The  identification  of  night  with  mother  seems 
perfectly reasonable in this context, two systems of opposites – night with day and 
Hera with Zeus. In the final passage we are told that Okeanos, who is an aspect of 
the power of Zeus, is not actually a river as would be natural to assume but is in fact 
air. Air is also explicitly identified with Zeus. The positive outcome of that passage is 
that water is not identified or associated with the active principles. On the other hand 
air is identified with Zeus. This can, and I think should, be understood along the lines 
of an Aristotelian and Stoic division of active and passive elements
542. Air and fire are 
the two active elements in the traditional interpretation of Stoicism
543, though I have 
argued that this is a bit of misnomer based on a misunderstanding of  pneuma. It 
would be plausible to suppose that this misunderstanding, so prevalent in the Ancient 
world, occurred because of the popular educated distinction of fire and air as the two 
active elements, as we find in the Derveni papyrus
544. If these two are active and we 
can suppose that Ge or Gaia is earth then water must also be associated with earth 
                                                 
539 Col. 13: Orpheus is “likening the sun to a phallus.” 
540 The Derveni author quotes Heraclitus Fr. 94 (Plutarch De Exilio 604A = Fr. 94 D = 52 M = 44 K) in Col. 
4.  
541 Enveloping the male active principle, just like in a biological simile.  
542 Derived, as we will see, from the medical theory of Philistion who in turn is sai d to have derived them 
from Empedocles.  
543  Cf.  Galen  On  Bodily  Mass  7.525,  9-14  (=47F  L&S  =  SVF  2.439,  part),  Plutarch  On  Common 
Conceptions 1085c-d (= 47G L&S = SVF 2.444, part), Galen On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 5.3.8 
(=47H L&S = SVF 2.841, part), Alexander of Aphrodisias On Mixture (=47I L&S = SVF 2.442, part). 
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as a passive element. This also relates to Stoicism when we are told that earth and 
water lack tonos
545.  
 
A  plausible  interpretation  by  way  of  natural  philosophy  of  the  Derveni  author‟s 
meaning is along the following lines: God qua god and his power is fire – from the 
identification of the phallus with the sun. But if he is to act on the world he must do 
so in a mediated fashion since fire is too powerful –hence the Erinyes controlling the 
sun. To do so Zeus “reduces” himself to air – from the Okeanos passage. The matter 
that this air acts on and from which all things are is the female principle Ge or earth. 
But underlying, in parallel to the fire/air Zeus/Okeanos relationship, earth or Ge is 
Rhea or water – from the reasonable etymology Dillon employs in his interpretation 
of  Xenocrates:  of  Rhea  from  “flowing”
546,  which  relates  to  Zeno‟s  etymology  of 
Hesiodic chaos
547.  
 
I would not go so far as to suppose that the Derveni author is a proto-Stoic or in fact 
related to them in any way. What this discussion has shown is that, whether or not 
the ultimate conclusions I have drawn are in fact what he is trying to demonstrate, 
this is not an unreasonable way to see popular myth through Stoic eyes. If this sort 
of thing were going on around the time of the Stoics and in the intellectual circles 
they  mixed  in  then  the  relationship  of  the  female  and  the  element  water  to  the 
material principle becomes a symptom of cultural tradition. Myth no doubt did not 
influence the interpretation or understanding of matter so much as furnish it with a 
context which lent cultural support to an otherwise “foreign” school.  
                                                 
545 See note 545.  
546 Dillon 2005, pg. 104. 
547 Cf. Baldry‟s (1932) explanation of Pherecydes: “who seems to me to have based his cosmogony on a 
combination of two conceptions of the microcosm – the mythical equation of the male with Heaven, the 
female with Earth, and the seed with Eros, and the more rational explanation, in which the embryo forms 
itself from the three essentials of life, „the hot,‟ „the cold,‟ and „the wet.‟” The elements, apart from earth, 
were created by Cronos from his own seed. The Stoics would just be in a long line of thinkers taking part 
in  the  same  activity.  I  do  not  share  Barnes‟  opinion  that  Pherecydes  is  a  mere  literary  curiosity  with 
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4.3 The Impact of the Natural Philosophers and Medical Theory: 
 
The most relevant aspects of the contemporary medical teachings have been seen in 
the first chapter and so I will not repeat myself too much here. As well as biological 
imagery  I  will  also  very  briefly  mention  the philosophical  antecedents of water  as 
primary matter and the notion of an underlying substrate, though these are unlikely 
to  have  had  any  but  the  most  indirect  influence  on  any  later  physical  theory. 
Contemporary medical theory and imagery would be familiar to the Stoics as a way 
of  expressing  the  relationship  between  primarily  active  and  passive  constituents 
while fitting in with established mythic models. It will be worth our while to at least 
look at some of the instances of embryological discussion to see how women were 
identified with the more passive aspect of creation even in the science of medicine
548.   
 
Aristotle  furnishes  us,  at  Metaphysics  983b6,  with  the  information  that  Thales 
believed that water was the most primary element. All of the first philosophers, we 
are  told, thought  the  elements were  the  principles of things.  Aristotle  conjectures 
that Thales thought water to be the origin of all things because all things are seen in 
some way to rely on the moist and so it is through the principle of moisture that they 
come to be. Further, Aristotle informs us in his De Caelo
549 that according to Thales 
the Earth rests on water on the basis that water can support other things, like logs, 
but water always “seeks” a lower level. We can imagine Thales having a conception 
that each element has its natural place and that the natural place of water is at the 
bottom and since all things would sit on that perhaps that was enough to make him 
suppose that they rely on it. Whatever the reasons that Thales had it is doubtful that 
the  Stoics  had  access  to  any  more  information  about  him  than  Aristotle  did  and 
Aristotle seems unsure as to what Thales was intending to explain by claiming water 
as the element par excellence. Thales‟ conception of water as primary element can 
be  safely  confined  to  part  of  the  general  backdrop  of  physics  and  relatively 
unimportant in relation to the Stoics.  
 
It seems unlikely that any pre-Socratic theory or philosopher exerted any decisive 
influence on the Stoics, either in the form of Heraclitus or anyone else. However the 
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general influence of the pre-Socratics on the intellectual climate of Greece is without 
doubt very high and so it is interesting to note that the Stoics for all their appearance 
as wayward thinkers were really adopting and adapting common place language and 
imagery
550; and, further, justifying this use by relating their philosophy to the person 
of Heraclitus.  
 
The medical influences on philosophy in the 4
th century are difficult to assess and I 
will not in any way attempt to explore the complex relation of medical theories to 
philosophy here
551. Instead I will look at theories of insemination and embryology to 
see how the idea of the sperm as hot and breathy substance relates to Stoic theories 
of cosmogenesis. Though most medical theories held that both parents contributed 
seed Aristotle had his own theory. He held that it is primarily the male sperm that 
informs the passive female menses to create the embryo. In the earlier writers it is 
the preponderance of either male or female seed which determines the sex of the 
child while for Aristotle it is more the relative strength of the male to mould the 
female principle.  
  
The  Stoics,  in  common  with  most  other  ancient  philosophers,  employed  biological 
parallels to explain the workings of the cosmos. In particular they also moved from 
microcosm to macrocosm. The naturally occurring relationship of men and women in 
the creation of a child so clearly parallels that of the idea of cosmic creation that it is 
no wonder that not only myth but natural philosophy is replete with it
552. The Stoics 
were no different and found the imagery useful, as we have seen. Now we will see 
more clearly a rational justi fication for the identification of water with the primary 
matter of the formed cosmos with the female from a medical perspective that helps 
contextualise the Stoic imagery of the relationship of  apoios ousia to god and also 
the idea of water as primary element of material creation. 
  
The  transference  of  information  from  medicine  to  philosophy  was  not  one-way  of 
course.  Indeed  in  Edelstein‟s  opinion  the  medical  sect  of  the  dogmatists  were 
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ideas that were prevalent in everyday society.    
551 See Van Der Eijk (2005) and Edelstein (1967) Von staden (1989) Garof alo (1988) and Guardasole 
(1997) for interesting discussions of the relationship of philosophy to medicine.   
552 Cf. Baldry (1932, pg. 28); “But every anthropologist knows that interest in birth and other phenomena 
connected with sex is a regular feature of primitive societies long before other aspects of biology are even 
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appealing to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and “even the Epicureans
553” to support their 
views  making  the  disentanglement  of  medical  and  philosophical  positions  more 
difficult.  Philistion,  perhaps  the  doctor  with  the  most  influence,  was  certainly 
influenced by Empedocles and his four element theory
554. In turn it seems likely that 
Philistion influenced Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics
555. The Stoics were versed in 
medical theory as evidenced by Chrysippus‟ defence of the placing of the intellect in 
the  heart  even  when  the  nervous  system  had  been  discovered  showing  the 
importance  of  the  brain  over  the  heart  and  liver.  In  his  defence  he  appealed  to 
Praxagoras  who  had  flourished  about  a  century  and  half  before,  such  an  appeal 
displays an interest in medicine that would go beyond mere familiarity. Philistion, and 
Plato
556 and Diocles
557 after him, appealed to the notion of innate  pneuma and this 
would no doubt have struck resonances with the Stoics, especially if they had already 
begun  to  develop  their  theories  or  if  Zeno  had  already  become  familiar  with  the 
theory at the Academy as he might have through the Timaeus
558, then they could 
have  incorporated  it  into  their  philosophy  that  way.  However  through  the  eyes of 
Stoic physics this innate pneuma will need something to be innate in. In the cosmic 
sense we have seen that the pneuma is innate in apoios ousia. We should not expect 
the medical parallel to be perfect but to act as a kind of analogue for the cosmic 
ideas and an analogy we do begin to see even in Aristotle.  
 
In the Hippocratic texts On the Nature of the Child and On Generation it is said that 
the woman contributes a seed to the foetus. Both parents contribute to the foetus 
and  the  relative  strengths of their  seed  determine  what  the  foetus  will  be
559. The 
weaker the seed then the more likely it is a girl will be produced, the stronger a bo y 
                                                 
553 Edelstein (1967 pg. 352). 
554 Cf. Coulter (1994 pg. 105): “The teachings of Empedocles were developed by the Sicilian school of 
medicine whose most famous representative was Philistion of Locri.” The Menon Papyrus gives Philistion‟s 
physiology and his use of the four element theory, in Jones (1947) cap. XX: 24.  Diocles was also heavily 
influenced by Empedocles (cf. Phillips 1987, pg. 130). 
555 The second Platonic letter, which is of dubious authenticity, suggests that Plato and Philistion were well 
acquainted (Longrigg sees this as a sufficient connection). Also Timaeus 82A and 86A reveal a strong input 
from the Sicilian School of medicine, as pointed out by Coulter (1994). See Parts of Animals 646a13-20 for 
Aristotle. For the Stoic  association of one property with each element see DL 7.137 (47B L&S  =  SVF 
2.580, part).  
556  In the  Timaeus  pneuma  is  an  essential  cause  of  health  or  sickness  and  because  of  this  it  seems 
reasonable to see it as innate. Phillips (1987, pg. 127) see the influence of Philistion on Plato as “strong 
and definite” and it is clear that he held an innate pneuma and so it is likely that such a position was 
passed on to Plato.  
557 Cf. Phillips 1987 (pg. 128).  
558 See note 557 above. Although it may be a tendentious claim we can also speculate that 45b-d - which 
says that sight is made of fire and that it is the vibrations back down this “fiery stream” to the soul that 
give rise to sight implies that the soul or at least its relation to its powers is fiery.  
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as it will resemble its father more. Despite the early medical opinion that the female 
is clearly not passive, she contributes her own seed to the foetus, the image of a 
woman as passive receptacle of the male seed was common: “The image of woman 
as  soil  is  even  more  widespread  in  ancient  literature.  Man  is  represented  as  the 
farmer  who  sows  the  seed, woman  as  the  soil  in  which  this is grown.
560”  Popular 
conceptions, and indeed those in philosophy,  do not mirror acknowledged medical 
opinion
561. Aristotle also briefly contemplates the image of a woman‟s uterus as an 
oven, a warm receptacle that nurtures but does not contribute substantially to the 
bread in it before rejecting it in favour of a more equal contribution to that of the 
male; he replaces that position with one in which the mother contributes matter. If 
he can make such an assumption then it seems likely that this was acknowledged 
medical  opinion  and  imagery  of  a  passive  woman  was  merely  for  illustrative 
purposes.  
 
Whatever Aristotle‟s opinion about  the biological role of the woman, and it seems 
clear that he thought she did contribute something – even if it was just matter - and 
was not completely passive, it remains that the idea of the woman as a receptacle 
was a common notion. This clearly does not reflect actual biological or medical views 
of the time but it is the imagery that concerns us as the woman is identified with the 
moist for clear reasons. The notion of a “receptacle” or space has, as we have seen, 
already caused numerous problems of interpretation in Plato but for the Stoics the 
“moist female aspect” would most likely be seen as explicable in terms of a material 
principle  rather  than  as  a  receptacle  or  space.  I  do  not  wish  to  overstate  the 
importance of the medical views at the time or the biological theories. Perhaps the 
most important notion to come down to the Stoics is rather the identification of each 
element with a single power which they took from Philistion. This clearly delineates 
for rational purposes the elements into active and passive ones in a way that reminds 
us of the Derveni author‟s interpretation of myth.  
 
This necessarily brief discussion of medical and biological imagery has shown not that 
the Stoics were influenced to great degree by doctors but that the imagery and mode 
of understanding  the  cosmos has  a  common  origin  with  medical  explanations and 
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561 E.g. Sophocles‟ Trachiniai 31-33 where Heracles‟ attitude to his wife and children is likened to that of a 
farmer sowing seeds and returning to the crop. In Aeschylus Oedipus is reported as having “sowed his 
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imagery. The imagery of man as a microcosm helped the Stoics explain the workings 
of the macrocosm in familiar language. Unfortunately the imagery seems to have got 
in  the  way  of  the  message  they  were  trying  to  explain  with  the  result  that  Stoic 
physics  has  been  somewhat  misunderstood.  The  pre-Socratics  furnished  the 
language and method of natural physics which the Stoics adopted and updated so 
that  for  the  next  five  or  so  hundred  years  Stoicism  became  the  lingua  franca  of 
science  regardless  of  personal  allegiance.  The  biological  imagery  adopted  by 
medicine from pre-Socratic philosophy in parallel to the Stoics also reinforces Zeno 
and his followers as very much the product of their age and displays a willingness, if 
not eagerness, to make their natural philosophy as accessible as possible to all, in 
contrast to what I have to be the secretiveness of Plato.  
 
What this part of the chapter and thesis has shown is not really the material principle 
qua apoios ousia but how, qua material principle, it actually relates to the world. As 
apoios  ousia  the  material  principle  is  simply  that:  a  principle.  It  is  explanatorily 
purposeful but it cannot do anything itself. Unformed substance by itself is incapable 
of anything. It explains why things are three-dimensional with resistance, since that 
is what it is to be material, but god does not make things out of apoios ousia directly. 
Although, as we have seen, it is true to say that everything is a combination of the 
active and passive principles this is not enough. If god is going to make a tree, say, 
he  does not  simply  manipulate  bare  apoios  ousia. Instead  there  is a  process that 
must be rigidly followed. First apoios ousia must be made into a suitable medium for 
the active principle to act on in the guise of pneuma. First it must be “turned into” 
water as the most suitable element for the others to be made out of; then the other 
elements are created; then the elements must come together in proportion to make 
the tree through the inherent direction of god. Then by degrees the requisite laws of 
nature  will  ensure  the  correct  combinations  of  the  mixture  of  active  and  passive, 
allowing the active to manipulate the passive not  nolens volens but in accordance 
with a strict formula. It is this adherence that ensures the regularity of the world and 
prevents  the  spontaneous  creation  and  destruction  of  the  world‟s  parts.  Qua 
explanatory  principle  matter  and  the  material  principle  is  properly  understood  as 
apoios ousia. Qua “out of which” matter is properly speaking water, from which the 
rest  of  the  elements  are  subsequently  produced,  and  so  the  position  is  no  more 
revolutionary than Empedocles‟ elemental theory since all objects in the world are 
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which  exist  at  the  microscopic  as  well  as  macroscopic  level.  The  idea  of  the  two 
principles that exist just preceding the cosmos‟ creation being the creative spark of 
fire  that  remains
562  and  water  reinforces  the  Stoics‟  relationship  to  their 
predecessors, and especially to Heraclitus: everything is from opposites and from the 
alteration between them. 
 
   
 
 
  
 
                                                 
562 Cf. DL 7.135-6 (=L&S 46b = SVF 1.102, part) which likens god to a sperm enveloped in water which he 
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Conclusion: 
 
This  thesis  has  proposed  a  link  between  the  geometrical  atomism  and  abstract 
metaphysics  of  Plato  and  the  Old  Academy  and  the  Stoics‟  apoios  ousia.  It  has 
argued  that  the  Stoics  continued  a  process  of  reduction,  simplification  and 
rationalisation of the formal metaphysical hierarchy that began with Plato himself. 
This account is not definitive, and there may be aspects that have not been taken 
account  of  or  explored  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  the  reader.  However  a  definitive 
account could not be hoped for owing to the subject, the space available and the 
paucity of definitive evidence for the views of the early Stoics and Old Academy. The 
most that could be hoped for is, as Timaeus would say, a likely account.  
 
The  first  chapter  proposed  an  interpretation  of  the  interaction  of  the  two  Stoic 
principles that  rendered  comprehensible  their  notion  of total  blending  and  set  the 
scene for the ultimate reduction of forms to an immanent existence in the sensible 
world. The second chapter examined the relationship of the Timaeus to matter. We 
looked at the possible candidates for a material principle and concluded that if there 
is such a candidate in the Timaeus it is inaccessible without some other knowledge. 
With this in mind attention shifted to the Parmenides and Philebus and it was argued 
that these two works provided a new interpretation of the formal realm. It was then 
argued  that  the  way  that  the  formal  realm  was  understood  to  exist  was  directly 
mirrored  in  the  sensible  world  and  that  the  atomistic  picture  suggested  in  the 
Timaeus was thus rendered more coherent. The Unwritten Doctrines were included in 
the discussion to add more detail to the emerging picture of creation from opposites 
and helped to place the interpretation of the Old Academy which followed into more 
context. The metaphysics of Speusippus and Xenocrates were seen to be following in 
the footsteps of Plato. They built on the later metaphysics of Plato and it was their 
simplification of the metaphysical system that formed the background out of which 
the Stoic principles would grow.  
 
At  the  start  of  this  thesis  many  options  for  the  main  influence  on  the  Stoics‟ 
development  of  their  theory  of  matter  were  suggested.  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Old 
Academy, Heraclitus and the medical writers of the time were proposed as influences 
and their relationship to the Stoic theory of apoios ousia was looked at throughout 
the  thesis.  All  of  these  sources  have  a  part  to  play  in  the  development  of  Stoic 215  Stoic Unformed Substance and Old Academic Ontology 
 
physics. However the major influence on the early Stoics was undoubtedly from the 
Old Academy. The cultural and intellectual background of the times was most likley 
influential in the formation of the Stoa; however there is no reason to suppose that 
the medical, mythical or even pre-Socratic background was a strong direct influence 
on the formation of the Stoics‟ material principle in the way that the Old Academy 
and Plato were. What I have endeavoured to show is how the seemingly incompatible 
positions of the Old Academy and the Stoics are actually quite closely related; and 
that if it had not been for the rigid, formal, mathematical, metaphysics of Plato then 
the Stoic notion of apoios ousia could well look very different. The contribution of this 
thesis to the contemporary debate on Stoicism, ancient physics, Platonism and the 
importance of the Old Academy is, I hope, clear. I have attempted to show Plato‟s 
late ontology to have been markedly different from his earlier theory; to extend the 
understanding of this to the metaphysics of the Old Academy; and ultimately to show 
how Plato‟s late ontology became the basis for Stoic physics. The Stoics came from 
the Academy and the relationship of their active principle to their passive principle 
shows this as does the very nature of that most un-Platonic of things: the material 
principle of the sensible world simpliciter.       
 
The Stoic account of their material principle is fairly straightforward and fits in with 
our  modern  conception  of  what  a  material  principle  should  be.  They  describe  a 
substance that in and of itself is without any individuating properties. It exists, in 
theory, as a bare extension and is responsible for the extended nature of all objects 
in the world. We saw how its passivity and unchanging nature are its key attributes 
and that it never exists alone as prime matter. Instead it always exists conjoined 
with the active principle and as a result is always informed. At some times it exists 
as fiery, at others as the world. When the world is to be created from the fiery state 
all that is fiery must first become water. The Stoics seem on some level to maintain 
the  tradition  that  water  is  the  primary  matter  of  the  world.  This  is  most  likely 
because it is in opposition to fire which is the active principle in the world.  
 
The Stoic account of apoios ousia makes it a three-dimensional continuum. It is not 
built up from anything and is not reducible to anything. All parts of it are instead 
infinitely divisible so that each spatial block of it can be divided infinitely; converging 
on  but  never  reaching  the  infinite.  The  Stoics‟  characterisation  of  apoios  ousia  in 
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demonstrates their interest in mathematics and debt to the mathematical teachings 
of the Old Academy. The hypothesis of this thesis was that the precursor to apoios 
ousia could be found in Plato‟s late ontology and that it was transferred to the Stoics 
via  the  Old  Academy;  yet  on  a  traditional  interpretation  of  Plato  there  does  not 
appear to be anything that resembles the Stoics‟ apoios ousia.   
 
The  Timaeus  was  taken  as  the  starting  point  of  explanation  of  Platonic  matter. 
However  it  was  shown  in  chapter  two  that  the  two  candidates  for  matter  in  the 
Timaeus, the Receptacle and the elemental triangles, are inadequate on their own to 
explain Platonic matter. It was argued that just as the objects in the sensible world 
are imitations of forms, so too the matter of the sensible world will be an imitation of 
a matter that exists at a higher level. To understand the material principle of the 
sensible world, it was argued, we must first interpret and understand matter at the 
metaphysical  level.  It  was  with  this  in  mind  that  the  discussion  moved  from  the 
physical realm to Platonic metaphysical speculation. The analysis of the second half 
of  the  Parmenides,  Philebus,  and  Unwritten  Doctrines  showed  us  not  only  a 
mathematization  of  metaphysics  but  also  explained  the  way  the  sensible  world 
relates to the formal and why the sensible world is an imperfect image of it. The 
picture was seen to involve creation through opposites and by necessity. Just as the 
Stoics have the active and the passive so Plato has the One and Multiplicity. It is the 
One  of  the  second  hypothesis  of  the  Parmenides  that  is  the  important  start  of 
speculation for Plato. 
 
This One, we saw, was because of nothing other than Being. Being and the One were 
different  by  nothing  other  than  the  Different.  These  three  things,  by  the  simple 
necessity that something is, create multiplicity. From the interaction of 2 and 3 the 
ideal  numbers  are  created.  Their  creation  is made  possible  by  the  limiting  of  the 
multiplicity  that  comes  about  from  the  interaction  of  2  and  3,  by  a  new  One1. 
However the limiting of this stream of multiplicity, to, I would suggest, the decad, 
also creates a series of monads by virtue of the fact that each ideal number is itself 
one. This is in turn yet another stream of multiplicity and is limited again by a One2. 
This limiting creates the mathematical numbers, those things that exist as single and 
multiple.  It  is at  this level  that  the  forms  were  seen  to  exist. They  were  seen  in 
chapter  3.1.2  to  consist  of  both  one  and  many  in  their  natures.  Somehow  -  the 
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the  mathematical  level  also  “overflows”.  This  creates  the  geometrical  level.  This 
multiplicity, which, rather than the mathematical monads of the previous level, must 
be  made  of  geometrical  points  is  limited  by  the  imposition  of  the  One3.  The 
geometrical level is, thus, an image of the mathematical level which is in turn an 
image of the ideal level which is in turn an image of the One. Each metaphysical level 
is more removed from the One itself and hence also from Being. The interpretation of 
Plato‟s  late  ontology  offered  in  this  thesis  shows  matter  to  be  the  unlimited 
multiplicity. It is unlikely that Plato thought this was a process which had a beginning 
in  time. More  likely  the  multiplicity is constantly limited  by the  One. The  two  are 
never separate. This is one connection to the Stoic principles, and clearly predates 
Aristotle‟s discussions of matter.  
 
This picture was seen to be consistent with that found in the Timaeus and offered the 
key  to  understanding  the  notion  of  matter  in  that  dialogue.  The  Receptacle  was 
rejected as matter on the basis that it was space, but the question still remained of 
what  it  was  space  for.  It  was  suggested  that  the  Receptacle  is  three-dimensional 
because of the presence of the four elements in it. But the nature of the elements as 
geometrical figures required explanation that was not available in the Timaeus. The 
metaphysical picture from chapter three furnished the explanation of the nature of 
the sensible world. Again, just as it is unlikely that Plato thought of the metaphysics 
having a beginning, it is unlikely that he thought the sensible world began to exist at 
some point. Rather the metaphysical necessity of “emanation” explains the formal 
realm and the sensible is an inescabable fact. Just as the geometrical level was seen 
to  consist  of  the  multiplicity  of  geometrical  points  being  limited  into  geometrical 
figures, so too this picture is repeated at the sensible level. The sensible level, given 
the explanation of the elements as three-dimensional geometrical figures, mimics the 
geometrical level. The sensible world‟s matter is then a multiplicity of sensible points 
limited according to a One4, who is perhaps god – the demiurge or giver of form. God 
plays  a  game  of  cosmic  join  the  dots  in  imitation  of  the  limitations  of  the 
multiplicities  at  the  levels  above.  The  reason  the  sensible  world  is  such  a  poor 
imitation and not a fit object for knowledge is the distance it has from the original 
One.  It  is  also  a  three  dimensional  representation  of  “formulae”  that  exist  more 
properly at the mathematical or ideal level.  
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This picture from Plato‟s late ontology lays the foundations  for the  Stoics to build 
upon. He has given them a matter that is infinitely divisible, a continuum, devoid of 
properties (apart from those associated with points) and the constant conjunction of 
active to passive.  
 
Xenocrates, we saw from 3.3.-3.3.3, followed Plato quite closely. The main concern 
for  him  was  that  he  did  not  see  how  points,  being  nothing  in  themselves,  could 
“come together” to create the world. A multiplicity of nothings is still nothing. To 
avoid this problem we saw, in 3.3.3, his account of perception and his positing of 
minimal lines. It is unlikely that these minimal lines had a definite length that could 
be known. 
 
The lines have an advantage over points because they have some extension and so 
an  infinity  of  these  will  result  in  something:  the  aggregate  of  something  is 
something. But we also noted Xenocrates‟ appeal to intrinsic motion in the sensible 
world. The minimal lines are lines and all lines are still made of points. The lines are 
sustained by the inherent motion of the sensible world - the pre-cosmic shaking of 
the Timaeus comes to mind. Xenocrates builds on Plato‟s picture of the sensible by 
adding  another  reason  for  the  inherent  imperfection  of  the  sensible  world  thus 
reinforcing the need for a formal level which his metaphysics had reduced.  
 
Plato himself and Xenocrates furnish everything that is necessary for the early Stoics 
to have developed their theory of apoios ousia and account for its interaction with 
the  active  principle.  Plato‟s  late  ontology  and  the  Old  Academy  were  both  very 
mathematical  and  the  conceptions  of  matter  that  they  employ  demonstrate  this 
strongly. The account given of the early Stoics‟ interest in mathematics was highly 
speculative. To move, for example, from Chrysippus‟ explanation of the cone paradox 
to the very substance of the sensible world may be seen as a speculation too far. But 
the Stoics are materialists and at the end of the day if Chrysippus‟ explanation of the 
cone paradox is genuine then it will apply to the sensible world in general as much as 
to the cone in particular. The cone is, after all, just as sensible as anything else. 
 
While mathematics had no doubt fallen from the exalted position it had enjoyed at 
the Academy it is likely that it was still a serious subject for philosophers. We know 
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Academy, and that Chrysippus responded to mathematical paradoxes. We also saw 
Long‟s argument that Stoic language is peppered with mathematical terms.  There 
seems  to  be  substantial  circumstantial  evidence  to  suggest  that  it  is  likely  that 
mathematical  considerations  would  have  played  a  not  insignificant  role  in  the 
development of Stoic thought in general; and there is even better reason to believe 
that they played a significant role in the codification of the nature of their material 
principle.  As  such  the  fact  that  Platonic  and  Old  Academic  matter  is  primarily 
mathematical in nature only reinforces the suitability of these conceptions of matter 
as the primary influences on the Stoic development of their material principle.   
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